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Abstract 
Despite the benefits transnational corporations (TNCs) offer, they remain largely unregulated 
entities, enabling environmental, social, and human rights violations to be overlooked. Canadian 
extractive sector TNCs operating internationally are frequently cited as major perpetrators of 
such violations. Literature on new governance and self-regulation as well as global corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) increasingly offers disclosure and reporting as a solution for TNC 
regulation. This study examines disclosure in international CSR frameworks, and the reflexive 
law and new governance theories explaining the role of such disclosure and reporting. Mirroring 
international CSR initiatives, Canadian jurisdictions are increasingly recommending disclosure 
for its extractive sector TNCs, including through its securities laws. Securities law provides a 
promising foundation for sustainability reporting because of its existing disclosure framework 
and its ability to compel disclosure. This potential of Canadian securities law also provides a 
basis for comparison with the Global Reporting Initiative, the leading sustainability reporting 
standard. 
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Introduction 
I Introduction to the Research Problem 
The globalization of business and its operations, particularly through transnational corporations 
(TNCs), has the potential to promote increased global trade and development,
1
 the creation of 
jobs, and the reduction of poverty.
2
 However, another side effect of such expansion is that 
environmental, social, and human rights violations go unaddressed, as TNCs remain largely 
unregulated. Host states are responsible for regulating corporations within their borders. 
However, adequate regulation is often challenging for host state developing countries that suffer 
from a lack of resources, capacity or political will. TNC regulation has also proven challenging 
for home states, since TNCs primarily operate outside of the country of incorporation. This 
difficulty is complicated by the issue of state sovereignty, according to which no state has the 
right to exercise its power in another state’s territory.3 
The complexity of regulating TNCs has resulted in and permitted negative impacts on 
environmental and human rights.
4
 These impacts flow from the inherently intrusive nature of 
                                                 
1
 See generally Eric Rugraff, Diego Sanchez-Ancochea, and Andre Sumner, Transnational Corporations and 
Development Policy: Critical Perspectives (Rethinking International Development) (Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2008); Anthony Elson, Globalization and Development: Why East Asia Surged Ahead and 
Latin America Fell Behind (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013); Theodore H. Moran and John H. 
Dunning, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Governments and Transnational Corporations 
Part 7 (London: Routledge, 1993); Michael Blowfield and Catherine S. Dolan, “Business as a development agent: 
evidence of possibility and improbability” (2014) 35 Third World Quarterly 1:22. 
2
 See generally Michael Blowfield, “Business, Corporate Responsibility, Poverty Reduction” (2010) in Peter Utting 
and Jose Carlos Marques, Corporate Social Responsibility and Regulatory Governance: Towards Inclusive 
Development (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan 2009); John Madely, Big Business, Poor Peoples: The 
Impact of Transnational Corporations on the World’s Poor (New York: Zed Books 1999). 
3
 See generally Elisa Morgera, Corporate Accountability in International Environmental Law (New York: Oxford 
University Press Inc., 2009). Ch 3 Shortcomings of Traditional Legal Solutions (25, 31, 34); Jennifer Zerk, 
Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility: Limitations and Opportunities in International Law, (UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). Ch 1 Multinationals and corporate social responsibility: a new regulatory 
agenda, Ch 3 Multinationals under National Law: The Problem of Jurisdiction, Ch 4 New Directions in 
extraterritorial regulation of CSR Standards, and Ch 7 Multinationals and CSR: Limitations and opportunities in 
International law; Michael Kerr, Richard Janda, and Chip Pitts, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Legal Analysis 
(Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2009) ff 8.2.1 to 8.2.4, 9.5. [KJP]. 
4
 Sara L. Seck, “Environmental Harm in Developing Countries Caused by Subsidiaries of Canadian Mining 
Corporations: The Interface of Public and Private International Law” (1999) 37 Can Y B Int’l L 139 at 196. [Seck, 
Environment]; Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Government Response to 
the Fourteenth Report of the SCFAIT: Mining in Developing Countries – Corporate Social Responsibility (October 
2 
 
 
extractive sector operations, which impose on environmental, social, and human rights of local 
stakeholders.
5
 Notably, the world’s largest sources of equity capital for the extractive sector are 
the Toronto and Vancouver financial markets.
6
 These markets have helped develop and support 
Canadian and non-Canadian extractive sector companies.
7
 However, this success has also 
resulted in a corresponding trail of negative impacts, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
International frameworks have been developed to address problems associated with TNC 
regulation. The United Nations (U.N.) Draft Code of Conduct on TNCs and the U.N. Global 
Compact are just two examples.
8
 Unlike domestic laws, these international efforts lack the legal 
authority and enforcement mechanisms necessary to ensure compliance. This lack of legal 
authority, the concept of state sovereignty, and the continued growth and globalization of TNC 
businesses has created a governance gap between global TNC operations and their regulation.
9
 
                                                                                                                                                             
2005);  Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights obligations related to 
environmentally sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and waste, Calin Georgescu, HRC, 21st 
Sess, Agenda item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/21/48 (2012), online: wecf.eu 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Environment/ToxicWastes/Pages/annual.aspx> (Accessed 5 August 2013). 
[Georgescu Report]. 
5
 Seck, Environment, supra note at 4 179-181; Georgescu Report, supra note 4 at 7 – 12. 
6
 Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Corporate Social Responsibility: Building the Canadian 
Advantage: A Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Strategy for the Canadian International Extractive Sector (26 
March 2009), at Introduction and Overview, online: Int’l CSR <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/other-autre/csr-strat-rse.aspx?lang=eng> (Accessed 5 August 2013). 
[Extractive Intro]. As of 2008, over 75 percent of the world’s exploration and mining companies have headquartered 
in Canada, and 43 percent of all global exploration expenditures have come from mining and exploration companies 
based in Canada.  
7
 Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, News Release, “Canada’s World-Class Mining Sector Creates 
Jobs and Growth and Shows the Benefits of Trade, Says International Trade Minister” (5 March 2012) online: 
Canada DFAIT <http://www.international.gc.ca/media_commerce/comm/news-
communiques/2012/02/05a.aspx?lang=eng> (5 August 2013); TSX, “Global Leaders in Mining” (31 May 2013), 
online: TMX.com <http://www.tmx.com/en/listings/sector_profiles/mining.html> (Accessed 5 August 2013). 
8
 United Nations ESC Commission on Transnational Corporations, Report of the Secretariat of the Outstanding 
Issues in the Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, UNCTC 23 ILM 626 (1984); United Nations 
Global Compact, The Ten Principles, online: unglobalcompact.org 
<http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html> (Accessed 5 August 2013).  
9
 John Ruggie, April 2008: Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights (2008 
Report), at ¶ 3 of A/HRC/8/5 online: SRSG Portal, <http://www.business-
humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/ReportstoUNHumanRightsCouncil> (Accessed 5 August 2013). [2008 
Report]. 
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Efforts to address the gap in regulating TNCs have included voluntary industry efforts;
10
 
international multi-stakeholder efforts;
11
 as well as domestic efforts.
12
 The main focus of this 
study is on the potential use of sustainability reporting as a means of regulating Canadian 
extractive sector TNCs operating in foreign jurisdictions. Disclosure as a regulatory tool is 
designed to increase the level of transparency and awareness. In theory, increased transparency 
and the dissemination of, and accessibility to, information have the potential to increase 
corporate accountability. This process operates as a result of stakeholders being armed with 
information and then influencing post-disclosure TNC decision-making and actions. 
In the process of gathering and reporting on environmental, social, and human rights 
information, a sustainability reporting disclosure requirement may also compel TNCs to engage 
in due diligence. The significance of due diligence is that it serves as a risk management 
mechanism to educate the disclosing organization. As a whole, disclosure through sustainability 
reporting has the potential to not only inform stakeholders and increase the level of transparency 
and accountability, but also develop good corporate governance practices and decision-making.
13
 
                                                 
10
 See for example O. Bomsel, P. Borkey, M. Glachant, F. Leveque, “Is There Room for Environmental Self-
Regulation in the Mining Sector?” (2009) 22 Resources Policy 79 at 84. The authors argue there is room for self-
regulation from the International Council on Metals and the Environment (ICME), whose mandate includes 
diffusing good environmental practices and information and to raise industry standards. The ICME is now the 
International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM). ICMM, Sustainability Development Framework, online: 
ICMM.com <http://www.icmm.com/our-work/sustainable-development-framework> (Accessed 5 August 2013). 
11
 See for example Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, About Us, online: EITI <http://eiti.org/about> 
(Accessed 5 August 2013). The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) “aims to increase transparency in 
transactions between governments and companies within extractive industries” by requiring extractive sector 
companies to disclose revenue payments to governments and for governments to provide receipts; Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights, The Principles, online: 
<http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/principles/introduction> (Accessed 5 August 2013). The Voluntary Principles 
outline non-binding principles to help the extractive sector balance security with human rights; Global Reporting 
Initiative, About GRI, online: globalreporting.org <https://www.globalreporting.org/information/about-
gri/Pages/default.aspx> (Accessed 5 August 2013). 
12
 See for example the Office of the Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Counsellor. Foreign 
Affairs, Trade and Development, Welcome to the Office of the Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) Counsellor, online: international.gc.ca <http://www.international.gc.ca/csr_counsellor-
conseiller_rse/index.aspx> (Accessed 5 August 2013). The mandate of this Canadian effort includes an Extractive 
Sector CSR Counsellor, which promotes performance standards, including the GRI.  See further in chapter 3.  
13
 See chapter 1 for more on due diligence and chapter 2 for the relationship between disclosure and stakeholders; 
David Hess, “Social Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The Prospects of Achieving Stakeholder 
Accountability through Transparency” (2007) 17:3 Business Ethics Quarterly 453 at 455. [Hess, New 
Governance].The importance of stakeholder feedback is illuminated through the theories of reflexive law and new 
governance, which are discussed in depth in chapter two. Disclosure and feedback is intended to inform a 
continuous reinforcing relationship. 
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II What is Social Disclosure/Sustainability Reporting?   
Similar to the traditional reporting of financial information by public corporations under 
securities laws, the disclosure of information revealing legal compliance, “policies, practices, 
and business impacts as they relate to issues such as environment, labour, and human rights” is 
often referred to as social disclosure.
14
 Sustainability reporting (SR) is a term used in the same 
context and for the purpose of this study will be used interchangeably with social disclosure. In 
addition to business practices and impacts, SR also discloses whether or not business is operating 
in a sustainable manner. This means whether a firm’s business activity can be continued and 
endured by its surrounding environment and communities during and after the completion of a 
project in a healthy manner.
15
 Cynthia Williams articulates the potential content of SR to 
generally include 
information on the products a company produces and the countries in which it does 
business; on the company’s law compliance structure; on its domestic labor 
practices; on its global labor practices and supplier/vendor standards; and on its 
domestic and global environmental effects. Other types of social disclosure could 
include information on corporate charitable contributions, political contributions, or 
the effects of using a company’s products on consumer health and safety.16 
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) uses the term SR and defines it as a process for publicly 
disclosing an organization’s economic, environmental, and social performance in association 
with its business activities. This GRI disclosure also includes information on whether or not 
business activities can be continued for a prolonged period of time, and endured in a manner that 
is healthy for its surroundings for the duration of the project.
17
 For the purpose of this study SR 
                                                 
14
 Aaron Dhir, “The Politics of Knowledge Dissemination: Corporate Reporting, Shareholder Voice, and Human 
Rights” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 47 at 50. [Dhir, Politics]. 
15
 Global Reporting Initiative, Sustainability Reporting Guidelines Version 3.1, online: globalreporting.org 
<https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/G3.1-Guidelines-Incl-Technical-Protocol.pdf> at 3 (Accessed July 
31, 2013). [SR Guidelines]; See generally William R. Blackburn, The Sustainability Handbook: The Complete 
Management Guide to Achieving Social, Economic and Environmental Responsibility (Washington, DC: Cromwell 
Press, 2007). See chapter 1 and chapter 3. 
16
 Cynthia Williams, ‘The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency’ (1999) 112 
Harvard Law Review, 1197 at 1201. [Williams]. 
17
 Global Reporting Initiative, About Sustainability, online: globalreporting.org 
<https://www.globalreporting.org/information/sustainability-reporting/Pages/default.aspx> (Accessed July 31, 
2013). Sustainability is a broad term “considered synonymous with other terms for non-financial reporting; triple 
bottom line reporting, corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting” to describe reporting on economic, 
5 
 
 
is similarly defined, and will also be deemed to display the level of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) of an organization.
18
 The work of the U.N. on business and human rights 
identifies that extractive sector companies have a significant impact on human rights.
19
 As a 
result, the definition of SR in this study will also reference the broad spectrum of human rights 
that may be impacted by extractive sector TNC activity.
20
 
III Why Sustainability Reporting?  
Industry Canada acknowledges that CSR is “ultimately about performance” and that reporting 
combined with verification provides important tools in measuring whether CSR performance has 
actually taken place.
21
 This builds on the understanding that transparency leads to greater 
accountability. The development of integrated or triple bottom line reporting
22
 similarly suggests 
that the traditional and current means of disclosure under securities and other laws may not, or 
may not adequately, be providing guidance on SR or non-financial disclosure. The triple bottom 
line model fuses the factors of “people, planet, and profit”23 and looks to report on short-term 
                                                                                                                                                             
environmental, and social impacts. The G3.1 Guidelines were updated to include reporting on human rights, local 
community impacts, and gender. See further the GRI discussion in chapter 1. 
18
 KJP, supra note 3 at 242-243. KJP note the many ways the practice of CSR reporting is defined. The terms they 
identify include CSR Reporting, SR, triple-bottom-line reporting, stakeholder reporting, citizenship reporting, and 
corporate responsibility reporting. They also conclude that the differences between the terms reporting and 
disclosure is “purely academic” and are terms commonly used interchangeably, as will be the case in this study. 
19
 Georgescu Report, supra note 4; John G. Ruggie, United National Human Rights Council, 4th Sess, Addendum: 
State responsibilities to regulate and adjudicate corporate activities under the United Nations core human rights 
treaties: an overview of treaty body commentaries, UN Doc A/HRC/4/35/Add 1 at ¶ 18, 23, 32, 74, online: 
ohchr.org <http://ap.ohchr.org/Documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/4/35/Add.1> (Accessed July 31, 2013). 
[Addendum 1 for 2007 Report]. The former Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), John Ruggie, 
identifies that treaty body commentaries single out the extractive sector as an industry that has had and will have a 
major impact on ESG and human rights.  
20
 2008 Report, supra note 9 at ¶ 6. The SRSG references a broad spectrum of human rights to avoid justifying one 
particular human right over another or attempting to declare one more important than the other; John Ruggie, 
Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including 
the Right to Development, Addendum, Summary of the Five Multi-Stakeholder Consultations, A/HRC/8/5/Add 1 
(2008), online: SRSG Portal <http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-1-addendum-23-April-2008.pdf> 
(Accessed July 31, 2013). 
21
 Industry Canada, Corporate Social Responsibility: Task 5 Verify and Report on Progress, online: Industry Canada 
<http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/csr-rse.nsf/eng/rs00136.html> (Accessed July 31, 2013). 
22
 Timothy F. Slaper and Tanya J. Hall, “The Triple Bottom Line: What Is It and How Does It Work?” (2011) 86 
Indiana Business Review 1 at 4 online: <http://www.ibrc.indiana.edu/ibr/2011/spring/article2.html> (Accessed July 
31, 2013).  
23
 Ibid. 
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economics, environmental sustainability, and human rights concepts.
24
 This combination of SR 
and financial disclosure is naturally inclined to use existing securities disclosure regulations. 
Such an inclination towards existing mechanisms is important, as Williams points out, since it is 
unlikely that “people are either pure economic investors or pure social investors as a company’s 
financial position can be affected by both its social and environmental performance.”25 Overall, 
the turn towards environmental, social (human rights), and corporate governance (ESG) 
disclosure is considered to have the potential to educate stakeholders; increase TNC 
accountability to stakeholders, investors, and non-government organizations; and satisfy a 
growing need for more information arising from socially-conscious investors.
26
 
The purpose of examining non-financial disclosure arises from the attention transparency has 
received in the field of CSR. As Janda et al. point out, some of the strongest regulatory advances 
in the area of CSR have been reporting and disclosure measures.
27
 In response to the argument 
that disclosure is costly, it is said that the costs are increasingly justified, especially since SR is 
becoming more and more relevant and not just to a select group of investors.
28
 SR has the 
growing potential to yield financial benefits as well.
29
 This can occur from gains arising from 
strengthened ties with stakeholders, such as end purchasers, suppliers and workers; an increased 
understanding of liabilities;
30
 a decrease in insurance, risk, and debt financing costs;
31
 less price 
fluctuation;
32
 as well as a justification of a social license and reputational capital.
33
 
                                                 
24
 Williams, supra note 16 at 1277. 
25
 Ibid.  
26
 Ibid.  
27
 KJP, supra note 3 at 241.  
28
 Aaron Dhir, “Shadows and Light: Addressing Information Asymmetries Through Enhanced Social Disclosure in 
Canadian Securities Law” (2009) 47 Canadian Business Law Journal 435 at 466. [Dhir, “Shadows”] 
29
 Ibid.  
30
 David Hess, “Social Reporting: A Reflexive law Approach to Social Responsiveness” (1999) 25 Iowa Journal of 
Corporation law 41 at 81. 
31
 Gil Yaron, Memorandum to OSC Continuous Disclosure Advisory Committee titled “Corporate Disclosure of 
Material Social and Environmental Information” (June 28, 2005) at 6 cited in Dhir, “Shadows”, supra note 28 at 
466. 
32
 Allen L. White, “New Wine, New Bottles: The Rise of Non-Financial Reporting” (June 20, 2005), online: 
businesswire.com 
<http://www.businesswire.com/portal/binary/com.epicentric.contentmanagement.servlet.ContentDeliveryServlet/ser
vices/ir_and_pr/ir_resource_center/editorials/2005/BSR.pdf> at 3 (Accessed July 31, 2013). 
33
 Dhir, “Shadows”, supra note 28 at 466. 
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SR promotes the dissemination of information to the public. This information is geared towards a 
broad range of stakeholders and contrasts with traditional disclosure which is shareholder or 
investor oriented and reveals mostly financial information.
34
 Some see this shift towards greater 
disclosure and SR as a form of regulation by disclosure, where disclosure of information 
potentially sets in motion a method of market monitoring that influences the behaviour of 
corporations.
35
 This process is argued by some to be more effective than command-and-control 
or, traditional, top-down regulation.
36
 The movement of transparency as a form of soft law into 
the regulatory sphere is evidence of the growing recognition of the benefits transparency 
provides.
37
 These benefits include improved decision-making, legitimacy and trust; the formation 
of business advantages; increased accountability and reputational concerns; and overall the 
prevention of violations and destructive corporate behaviour.
38
 Moreover, there is not one mode, 
medium, or method of reporting that is considered the most effective in achieving the above 
benefits. Disclosure can take many different forms, “including in-person meetings, online 
dialogues, consultation with affected stakeholders, and formal public reports.”39 Online updates 
of formal reporting methods, annual reports, SR, and integrated financial and non-financial 
reports also provide a method of reporting and disclosing information.
40
 
                                                 
34
 KJP, supra note 3 at 241. 
35
 Ibid at 242. 
36
 See further in chapter 2. See also Anne Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004) at 187; Heledd Jenkins and Natalia Yakovleva, “Corporate social responsibility in the mining industry: 
Exploring trends in social and environmental disclosure” (2006) Journal of Cleaner Production 271 at 272, 282.  
37
 See for example KJP, supra note 3 at 281; U.S. Securities Exchange, Specialized Corporate Disclosure: 
Background on Title XV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, online: 
<http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/speccorpdisclosure.shtml> (Accessed July 31, 2013); US, HR Res 4173, 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 111
th
 Cong, 2010. [Dodd-Frank Act]. This Act 
mandates the disclosure of conflict minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo because such sales finance 
“conflict characterized by extreme levels of violence in the eastern [DRC]”. 
38
 Virginia Haufler, “Disclosure as Governance: The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and Resource 
Management in the Developing World” (2010) 10 Global Environmental Politics 3:53 at 55, 57, 70. Haufler argues 
revenue disclosure has the potential to provide greater accountability and help reduce corruption in global extractive 
projects. Like the EITI, legitimizing disclosure and delegitimizing secrecy with regards to resource management 
also helps to increase the level of TNC accountability. 
39
 See United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, New Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights Endorsed by the Human Rights Council, News Release, (16 June 2011), online: Business and Human 
Rights Resource Centre <http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-guiding-principles-
endorsed-16-jun-2011.pdf> (Accessed July 31, 2013).  
40
 Ibid.  
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Another rationale for focusing on disclosure is that Canadian securities laws already have a 
system of disclosure in place.
41
  Although this system largely targets financial information 
disclosure, it provides a potential platform on which to formulate or integrate a system of SR. 
Although the concept of regulation-through-disclosure may not fit the traditional command-and-
control form of regulation many academics have pointed out that the  
classic state centered model of corporate regulation is, in the modern global 
context, ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst, and that national 
governments have recognized this and are currently experimenting with alternative 
forms of regulation, including ‘self-regulation, use of incentives, awards and 
accreditation systems, market-based initiatives, disclosure obligations... and 
education campaigns.’42  
This view reinforces the call for greater disclosure and SR.
43
 At the same time, compelling TNC 
SR, domestically, avoids violating host state sovereignty since it relies on home state 
jurisdictional authority targeting extractive sector TNCs headquartered in its jurisdiction and 
subject to securities laws and regulations.
44
 
                                                 
41
 See generally John Ruggie, Human Rights Council, 17th Sess, Addendum: Human rights and corporate law: 
trends and observations from a cross-national study conducted by the Special Representative, UN Doc 
A/HRC/17/31/Add 2 (2011), online: business-humanrights.org <http://www.business-
humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/report-human-rights-and-corporate-law-23-may-2011.pdf> (Accessed 
July 31, 2013). 
42
 Larry Cata Backer, “Multinational Corporations as Objects and Sources of Transnational Regulation”, (2008) 14 
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 499 at 500. Agreeing with Jennifer Zerk, Backer feels traditional 
state-centered regulation is fairly ineffective at the international level in regulating TNCs/MNCs; Jennifer Zerk, 
Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility: Limitations and Opportunities in International Law 
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 37; John Ruggie, “Business and Human Rights: The 
Evolving International Agenda” (2007) 101: 4 American Journal of International Law at 819 at 820. Ruggie 
identifies “[t]he state-based system of global governance has struggled for more than a generation to adjust to the 
expanding reach and growing influence of [TNCs]”; Larry Cata Backer, “From Moral Obligation to International 
Law: Disclosure Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational Corporations”, (2007-2008) 39:4 
Georgetown Journal of International Law 591 at 594 [LCB, Global Disclosure]. Academics argue there is a “failure” 
of the state-centered model and promote an alternative form of regulation.  
43
 LCB, Global Disclosure, supra note 42 at 594. Backer argues disclosure informs and establishes a framework 
where stakeholders are able to adjust their relationships based on the information or behaviour disclosed. 
44
 National Roundtable Steering Committee and the National Roundtable Advisory Group, National Roundtables on 
CSR and the Canadian Extractive Sector in Developing Countries: Final Draft Discussion Paper, at 18 Table 2, 
cited in Sara Seck, “Home State Responsibility and Local Communities: The Case of Global Mining” (2008) 11 
Yale Human Rights & development L J 177. There are two different approaches here. In addition to being a 
Canadian company domiciled in Canada, a company may also, by simply listing on a domestic stock exchange be 
considered to be a “Type 4” Canadian company, according to the typology determined by the Canadian government. 
This introduces the different possible typologies of Canadian corporations [Corporate Nationality]. 
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IV Objective 
The objective of this study is to assess Canadian disclosure and SR efforts relating to 
environmental, social, and human rights issues and information applicable to the Canadian 
extractive sector operating internationally. This entails examining Canadian SR efforts generally 
applicable to the Canadian extractive sector and then exploring disclosure obligations under 
Canadian securities laws. The research will then determine how well securities disclosure 
obligations measure up against international best practices, such as the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI), and its possible theoretical underpinnings for SR. The goal is to demonstrate 
where Canada stands in the potential formation of a SR-based regulatory framework for its 
extractive sector. 
V Research Questions 
1. What is sustainability reporting? Specifically, what is environmental, social and human 
rights disclosure, and to what extent is such disclosure promoted through international 
initiatives as a tool for addressing the global governance gap? 
 
2. Why is disclosure promoted as a useful tool? What theories inform the trend in chapter 1? 
Additional related questions are: What role do these theories suggest exist for the state as 
a regulator of corporate conduct? To whom is such disclosure targeted? What are the 
critiques leveled towards disclosure as a regulatory tool? 
3. What specific steps has the Canadian federal government taken to implement the 
disclosure and reporting of environmental, social, and human rights impacts of Canadian 
extractive sector TNCs operating abroad? 
4. What steps have Canadian securities regulators taken to implement the disclosure and 
reporting of non-financial topics, such as environmental, social, and human rights 
impacts of TNCs operating abroad, through Canadian securities regulations? Overall, 
how do the Canadian efforts and initiatives compare with leading International Standards, 
such as the GRI, and the theories of reflexive law and new governance? 
 
VI Brief Overview 
Chapter 1 will provide a descriptive overview of global CSR initiatives, revealing an 
international trend for transparency and environmental, social, and human rights disclosure. 
10 
 
 
Chapter 2 introduces the concept of global legal pluralism and focuses on the theories of 
reflexive law and new governance regulation as a potential justification for the emerging 
disclosure trend identified in Chapter 1. The theories reveal a corporate governance framework 
that promotes stakeholder input and TNC self-reflection, which rationalizes the SR-based 
regulatory framework for extractive sector TNCs operating abroad. Chapter 3 provides a 
Canadian extractive sector case study. This includes an examination of how Canada has 
promoted SR and CSR in the extractive sector and the steps it has taken to ensure Canadian 
extractive sector TNCs consider and disclose environmental, social, governance, and human 
rights issues. This case study is then reinforced by Chapter 4 which explores non-financial 
disclosure obligations through the lens of state mandated Canadian securities laws. This includes 
an examination of how well the Canadian securities non-financial disclosure regulations measure 
up against the GRI and the ideals of the reflexive law and new governance approaches. The 
conclusion will briefly summarize the findings of this study in relation to each research question 
identified above. 
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Chapter 1 
1 International Support for Disclosure 
This chapter provides a descriptive analysis of international corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
and sustainability reporting (SR) initiatives. The chapter will identify an international disclosure 
trend that promotes SR through environmental, social, governance (ESG), and human rights 
disclosure. Reinforcing this trend is the use of disclosure and transparency as a means of 
regulating transnational corporations (TNCs) and their global operations.
45
 The formation of 
early disclosure initiatives led the 1990s to be labeled as the transparency decade,
46
 and since 
then, a number of international initiatives have emerged addressing SR, ESG, human rights, and 
due diligence. As a result, this chapter will review the following initiatives: the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI), the United Nations (U.N.) Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), the 
U.N. Global Compact (U.N. GC), the U.N. Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework and its 
related Guiding Principles, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), and other initiatives that 
illustrate the global disclosure trend and promote SR. Lastly, in order to provide a more complete 
discussion of SR this chapter will review some of the primary arguments made against SR. 
 
                                                 
45
 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Corporate Social Responsibility, online: IISD.org 
<http://www.iisd.org/business/issues/sr.aspx> (Accessed July 31, 2013); Michael Kerr, Richard Janda, and Chip 
Pitts, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Legal Analysis (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2009) at 241. Kerr Janda, 
and Pitts identify that some of the strongest regulatory advances in the area of CSR have been reporting and 
disclosure measures. [KJP].  
46
 SustainAbility and UN Environment Programme, “Trust Us: The Global Reporters 2002 Survey of Corporate 
Sustainability Reporting” (2002) online: kommunikationsforum.dk  
<http://www.kommunikationsforum.dk/log/Trust_Us_indledning.pdf> at 6 (Accessed December 13, 2013). After 
labelling the 90’s as the “transparency decade”, SustainAbility argued for the 21st Century to possibly bring the 
“Trust Decade” as a result of the trend for transparency, accountability, and reporting, and growth in the number of 
reporting companies, the shift from environmental to integrated SR and the rapid increase in the volume of 
information”; For example: EPA, Toxics Release Inventory, online: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
<http://www.epa.gov/tri/> (Accessed July 31, 2013). “TRI is a database containing date on disposal and other 
releases of over 659 toxic chemicals”; Ceres, About Ceres, online: Ceres.org <http://www.ceres.org/flash/vision-
and-accomplishments/2020_view> (Accessed July 31, 2013). These principles stem from the 1989 Exxon Valdez 
Oil Spill; Science and Technology Division November 1992; The Rio Earth Summit: Summary of the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development by Stephanie Meakin, online: publications.gc.ca   
<http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp317-e.htm> (Accessed July 31, 2013). 
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1.1  International Mechanisms Promoting Disclosure 
1.1.1 The Global Reporting Initiative  
Established in 1997, the GRI is a multi-stakeholder, network-based organization that provides 
reporting and sector guidelines, as well as a global standard and benchmarks.
47
 Forming the 
largest SR framework worldwide,
48
 the GRI provides guidance for “all companies and 
organizations”, such as corporations, governments, and non-government organizations (NGOs), 
who have an interest in sustainability performance.
49
 The primary goal of the GRI is to 
mainstream SR by promoting SR through guidance and support, and making SR “as 
commonplace and comparable as financial reporting, and just as important to [a firm’s] 
organizational success.”50 
The GRI is a constantly evolving framework that continuously develops through a consensus-
seeking, multi-stakeholder process. This includes different actors representing a variety of views 
from “corporations, governments, NGOs, consultancies, accountancy organizations, business 
associations, rating organizations, universities, and research institutes.”51 This constant evolution 
and multi-stakeholder involvement is said to allow the GRI to react to and address new issues as 
                                                 
47
 Global Reporting Initiative, What is GRI, online: globalreporting.org 
<https://www.globalreporting.org/information/about-gri/what-is-GRI/Pages/default.aspx> (Accessed August 25, 
2013). [What is GRI]; KJP, supra note 45 at 11, 203. 
48
 Global Reporting Initiative, ‘Next Step’ in sustainability reporting to be unveiled in May, says GRI, online: 
globalreporting.org <https://www.globalreporting.org/information/news-and-press-center/Pages/Next-step-in-
sustainability-reporting-to-be-unveiled-in-May-says-GRI.aspx> (Accessed August 12, 2013); KJP, supra note 45 at 
279. In 1999, only 20 companies issued GRI sustainability reports. In 2010, approximately 1800 companies issued 
SRs.  
49
 Global Reporting Initiative, FAQS: About GRI – Who Participates in GRI?, online: globalreporting.org 
<https://www.globalreporting.org/information/FAQs/Pages/About-GRI.aspx>  (Accessed August 16, 2013); Global 
Reporting Initiative, About GRI, online: globalreporting.org <https://www.globalreporting.org/Information/about-
gri/Pages/default.aspx> at Vision and Mission (Accessed August 12, 2013). [About the GRI]. 
50
 Global Reporting Initiative, Year in Review 2009/10 Global Reporting Initiative, online: globalreporting.org 
<https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRI-Year-in-Review-2009-2010.pdf> at 2 (Accessed August 16, 
2013); About the GRI, supra note 49 at Vision and Mission; Global Reporting Initiative, About Sustainability 
Reporting, online: globalreporting.org <https://www.globalreporting.org/information/sustainability-
reporting/Pages/default.aspx> (Accessed August 21, 2013); Global Reporting Initiative, Reporting Framework 
Overview, online: globalreporting.org <https://www.globalreporting.org/reporting/reporting-framework-
overview/Pages/default.aspx> at “the Sustainability Reporting Guidelines” (Accessed August 15, 2013). 
[Framework Overview].  
51
 GRI, Who Participates in GRI?, online: globalreporting.org 
<https://www.globalreporting.org/information/FAQs/Pages/About-GRI.aspx> (Accessed August 15, 2013).  
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they emerge.
52
 In May 2013, the GRI framework was updated to the G4 Guidelines, from the 
previous version of G3.1.
53
 
The foundation of the GRI framework is its reporting guidelines, which are set out in two parts.
54
 
Part 1 refers to “Reporting Principles and Guidance” and includes “principles to define report 
content, such as materiality, stakeholder inclusiveness, sustainability context, and 
completeness.”55 The guidance from Part 1 helps inform Part 2, which refers to Standard 
Disclosures and includes “principles to define report quality [, such as] balance, comparability, 
accuracy, timeliness, reliability, and clarity”, with further guidance given on how to set the report 
boundary.
56
 In other words, Part 2 outlines guidance on the content to appear in the report. This 
includes disclosing the organization strategy and profile; how the organization addresses topics; 
and the performance indicators (PIs), which disclose “information on the economic, 
environmental, and social performance of the organization”.57 The PIs in essence provide the 
basic disclosure requirements, which are also further broken down into more specific indicator 
protocols (IPs).
58
 The technical protocols further complement GRI SR. Specifically, the technical 
protocols help reporting organizations determine the “scope of a report, the range of topics 
                                                 
52
 Framework Overview, supra note 50. The G3.1 Guidelines were expanded to include guidance on local 
community, human rights, and gender. 
53
 GRI, “G4 Sustainability Guidelines”, online: globalreporting.org 
<https://www.globalreporting.org/reporting/g4/Pages/default.aspx> (Accessed August 15, 2013). 
54
 GRI, G3 Guidelines, online: globalreporting.org <https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/G3.1-
Guidelines-Incl-Technical-Protocol.pdf> at 5 (Accessed August 15, 2013). [G3 Guidelines]. 
55
 Ibid.   
56
 Ibid. 
57
 Ibid; GRI, Application Levels Guidance, online: GRI <https://www.globalreporting.org/reporting/report-
services/external-assurance/Pages/default.aspx> (Accessed August 15, 2013). [Application Levels]; GRI, Defining 
Report Content, online: globalreporting.org <https://www.globalreporting.org/reporting/guidelines-
online/G3Online/DefiningReportContentQualityAndBoundary/Pages/DefiningReportContent.aspx> (Accessed 
August 15, 2013); Global Reporting Initiative, Reporting Guidelines, online: globalreporting.org 
<https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/G3.1-Sustainability-Reporting-Guidelines.pdf> at 20-24. 
58
 GRI, Part 2: Standard Disclosures, online: globalreporting.org 
<https://www.globalreporting.org/reporting/G3andG3-1/guidelines-
online/G3Online/StandardDisclosures/Pages/default.aspx> (Accessed August 15, 2013). The performance indicators 
are categorized into Economic, Environment, and Social, which are broken down into indicator protocols and 
elaborated by technical protocols. Each category includes guidance for disclosure through a Management Approach 
and additional IPs; GRI, “Technical Protocol Applying the Report Content Principles” (2011), online: 
GlobalReporting.org <https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRI-Technical-Protocol.pdf> at 11 
(Accessed August 12, 2013). [Technical Protocol]. 
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covered, each topic’s relative reporting priority and level of coverage, and what to disclose in the 
report about the process for defining its content.”59 
The basic disclosure guidance above is further reinforced through sector supplements, which act 
as “tailored versions of the GRI Guidelines” providing more focused and specific guidance on 
issues relevant to their industry.
60
 These supplements provide guidance not found in the GRI 
Guidelines because they focus on sector/industry specific factors and accordingly include new 
performance indicators for that sector’s key issues and concerns.61 The relevant supplements to 
this study are the Mining and Metals Sector Supplement (MMSS) and Oil and Gas Sector 
Supplements (OGSS), with both outlining IPs to guide reports on Economic, Environmental, 
Labor, Human Rights, Society, and Product Responsibility.
62
 
Another feature of the GRI is the external assurances component that allows prepared reports to 
be verified and receive a “+” on a reporting level represented by a letter grade of A, B, or C, 
indicating external verification.
63
 Since there is no obligation to comply with the voluntary GRI 
system, each reporter chooses the level and minimum requirements to be met under each letter 
grade. This indicates the extent of the GRI Guidelines applied, and not an opinion on SR 
performance of the reporting organization. The flexibility of this system is intended to guide and 
assist small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in creating and providing SR. Targeting 
                                                 
59
 Technical Protocol, supra note 58 at 2. 
60
 Global Reporting Initiative, G3/G3.1 Sector Supplements, online: globalreporting.org 
<https://www.globalreporting.org/reporting/sector-guidance/Pages/default.aspx> (Accessed August 15, 2013). 
[Sector Supplements]. Sector supplements provide industry specific guidance.  
61
 Ibid.  
62
 Global Reporting Initiative, Mining and Metals: Who Developed This Guidance and How?, online: 
globalreporting.org <https://www.globalreporting.org/reporting/sector-guidance/sector-guidance/mining-and-
metals/Pages/who-developed-this-guidance-and-how.aspx> (Accessed August 15, 2013); Global Reporting 
Initiative, Oil and Gas: Who Developed This Guidance and How?, online: globalreporting.org 
<https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/OGSS-G3.1-Complete.pdf> (Accessed August 15, 2013). 
63
 Global Reporting Initiative, Application Levels Checks, online: globalreporting.org 
<https://www.globalreporting.org/reporting/report-services/application-levels/Pages/default.aspx> (Accessed 
August 15, 2013); Global Reporting Initiative, Application Level Table, online: globalreporting.org 
<https://www.globalreporting.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/ALTable_En.pdf> (Accessed August 15, 2013); Global 
Reporting Initiative, Application Level Information, online: globalreporting.org 
<https://www.globalreporting.org/reporting/G3andG3-1/application-level-information/Pages/default.aspx> 
(Accessed August 15, 2013). After a report is made the next step involves a declaration of one of the GRI 
Application Levels, which must accompany GRI SR. In order to qualify for level C+, B+, or A+ the report must 
include each of the criteria for the relevant grade. The “+” indicates verification of meeting the minimum disclosure. 
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SMEs reveals an effort to extend SR to a more complete list of TNCs. The GRI also sets up a 
support system by providing tools, training, and publications and undertakes projects to make 
ESG and human rights SR easier and more possible for SMEs.
64
  
The GRI’s Report or Explain Campaign Forum is another program promoting ESG respect and 
disclosure of human rights from TNCs and SMEs.
65
 This Forum is designed for those who 
believe SR is “necessary and beneficial – that companies should reveal their performance or the 
reasons why they don’t”.66 The Forum promotes transparency and looks at how “sustainability 
disclosure can become standard practice”.67 This involves encouraging companies to report on 
ESG and human rights issues or else explain why they are not providing such SR.
68
 Although 
companies are “free to choose what information to disclose”,69 what this hopes to establish is 
minimum disclosure requirements and the development of a level playing field between 
organizations.
70
 At the same, ‘Report or Explain’ hopes to avoid the formation of a rigid 
regulatory framework, which some argue stifles reporting innovation and the flexibility of the 
more experienced reporters.
71
 Another premise of the Campaign Forum is that having basic 
requirements brings clear benefits for a broad range of stakeholders.
72
 This is because 
“[m]easuring sustainability performance enables organizations to identify opportunities to 
improve operations, and avoid risks to the long-term value of [the] organization”;73 “[t]he ability 
to manage sustainability impacts helps organizations preserve and increase their value”;74 
                                                 
64
 Global Reporting Initiative, Support for First Time Reporters, online: globalreporting.org 
<https://www.globalreporting.org/reporting/reporting-support/support/Pages/default.aspx> (Accessed August 15, 
2013); Global Reporting Initiative, GRI Business Transparency Program, online: globalreporting.org 
<https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/Business-Transparency-Program-Overview-Information-
Sheet.pdf> (Accessed August 15, 2013). See further in Chapter 2, which suggests the use of mandatory and non-
mandatory means of regulation. This combination could be useful for SMEs who do not have the funds or 
manpower to follow a SR requirement. 
65
 Global Reporting Initiative, Report or Explain Campaign Forum, online: globalreporting.org 
<https://www.globalreporting.org/network/report-or-explain/Pages/default.aspx> (Accessed August 15, 2013). 
[Explain].  
66
 Ibid.  
67
 Ibid. 
68
 Ibid.  
69
 Ibid. 
70
 Ibid.  
71
 Ibid. 
72
 Ibid.  
73
 Ibid.  
74
 Ibid.  
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“[i]nvestors and analysts gain vital insight into organizational performance, and optimal 
investment potential”;75 “[t]ransparency increases trust [at which point] stakeholders and civil 
society can respond to comparable and standardized information”;76 and “[o]rganizations can 
mitigate negative impacts.”77 These benefits serve the business organization, investors, and civil 
society by proactively working towards increasing transparency and corporate accountability.
78
 
Since GRI reports do not contain mandatory evaluation for compliance accuracy with GRI 
guidelines,
79
 it has attracted criticism from those who feel voluntary systems are not very 
effective without an enforced verification system. Critics argue that any positive impact of GRI 
reporting is, at best, limited.
80
 Where factors necessary for the optimal use and process of SR are 
missing, the corporate sector is then able to ““tame” transparency policies, reduce their 
transformative threat, and be able to tailor the instrument to suit their own needs.”81 For example, 
with no authority to ensure compliance, the GRI has received criticism for being weak and 
ineffective, and being viewed simply as a public relations opportunity.
82
 Still, as often argued by 
proponents of voluntary and self-regulatory initiatives, voluntary initiatives begin where 
legislative efforts end, and, as claimed by Kerr, Janda, and Pitts, the GRI “often plays an 
important role in supporting corporate efforts to comply with regulatory reporting mechanisms,” 
effectively clouding the distinction between regulatory and voluntary rules.
83
 This is further 
                                                 
75
 Ibid.  
76
 Ibid. 
77
 Ibid.  
78
 Ibid.  
79
 KJP, supra note 45 at 280. There is no obligation for a company to adhere to or even verify a GRI report.  
80
 Ibid at 281; Alison Maitland, “Survey of Sustainable Business: Companies Start to Detail What on Earth Is Going 
On”, The Financial Times, (23 August, 2002); Dickinson, D., Leeson, R., Ivers, J. and Karic, J., “Sustainability 
Reporting by Public Agencies: International Uptake, Forms and Practice”, (2005) The Centre for Public Agency 
Sustainability Reporting, online: <http://sd-cite.iisd.org/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=34051> 
(Accessed August 15, 2013). The GRI is been argued to be more of a public relations tool than for sustainability and 
accountability; Rob Gray, “Social, Environmental and Sustainability Reporting and Organisational Value Creation? 
Whose Value? Whose Creation?” (2006) 19:6 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 793 at 798, 803, 807, 
808-10.  
81
 Klaus Dingwerth and Margot Eichinger, “Tamed Transparency: How Information Disclosure under the Global 
Reporting Initiative Fails to Empower” (2010) 10:3 Global Environmental Politics 74 at 76. 
82
 Abdallah Simaika, “The Value of Information: Alternatives to Liability in influencing Corporate Behaviour 
Overseas” (2005) 38 Columbia Journal of Legal & Social Problems 321 at 361-362. 
83
 KJP, supra note 45 at 281; Steve Lydenberg, Jean Rogers, and David Wood, “From Transparency to Performance 
Industry-Based Sustainability Reporting on Key Issues” (2010) at 57, online: hausercentre.org 
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reinforced by Hohn as she identifies the existence of a communication gap between junior 
companies and shareholders; junior companies and community stakeholders; and junior 
companies and CSR practitioners as primarily being the result of a lack of guidance, as well as 
funds and manpower to address CSR Reporting.
84
 
Despite the above arguments, there are means of endorsing and advancing international 
frameworks and standards like the GRI. For example, Sweden now requires all state-owned 
corporations to comply with the GRI.
85
 Similarly, Denmark provides incentives to its largest 
corporations and requires SR, unless a company has adopted and adheres to the U.N. Global 
Compact or the U.N. Principles for Responsible Investment.
86
 Overall, the GRI provides a 
standardized disclosure system on how to incrementally increase the level of disclosure and 
transparency regarding company performance in sustainability.
87
 Current Canadian companies 
viewed as GRI compliant include Yamana Gold,
88
 Barrick Gold,
89
 Goldcorp Inc.,
90
 and even 
Avalon Rare Metals, which is a private SME.
91
 
                                                                                                                                                             
<http://hausercenter.org/iri/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/IRI_Transparency-to-Performance.pdf> at 57 (Accessed 
August 15, 2013).  
84
 Michelle Hohn, “Investing in Community: Canadian Junior Mining Companies, Corporate Social Responsibility, 
and the Communication Gap” (M Arts thesis, Royal Roads University, 2009) at 13, 38, 49-51. 
85
 Government of Sweden, “Guidelines for external reporting by state-owned companies”, (1 January 2008), online: 
www.sweden.gov.se/ <http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/09/41/25/56b7ebd4.pdf> (Accessed August 15, 2013). 
86
 John Ruggie, Human Rights Council, Addendum: Human Rights and corporate law: trends and observations from 
a cross-national study conducted by the Special Representative, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31/Add 2 (2011), online: 
business-humanrights.org <http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/report-human-rights-
and-corporate-law-23-may-2011.pdf> (Accessed August 15, 2013). [CLT ADD]; United Nations, Corporate Law 
Project, Overarching Trends and Observations July 2010, online: SRSG Portal <http://www.reports-and-
materials.org/Ruggie-corporate-law-project-Jul-2010.pdf> at 1 (Accessed August 15, 2013). [CLT overarching]. 
87
 Framework Overview, supra note 50.  
88
  Yamana Gold, Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2011, online: www.yamana.com 
<http://www.yamana.com/CorporateResponsibility/CorporateResponsibilityOverview/default.aspx> at 48 (Accessed 
August 15, 2013).  The 2010 Report is the 4
th
 Report to be published based on GRI Sustainability Reporting 
Guidelines using G3.  
89
 Barrick Gold, Barrick Responsible Mining: Global Commitment Local Engagement, online: www.Barrick.com 
<http://www.barrick.com/files/responsibility-report/2010/Barrick-2010-Responsibility-Report.pdf> (Accessed 
August 15, 2013).  Since 2005, Barrick has referenced the GRI in reporting. 
90
 Goldcorp Inc., Memberships and Commitments, online: Goldcorp 
<http://www.goldcorp.com/English/Responsible-Mining/Memberships-and-Commitments/default.aspx> (Accessed 
August 15, 2013).  
91
 Avalon Rare Metals, Corporate Sustainability Report 2011 & 2012, online: Avalon Rare Metals 
<http://avalonraremetals.com/sustainability/csr_report/> (Accessed August 15, 2013). In 2011 and 2012, Avalon 
complied with the G3.1 guidelines. Avalon is also a Canadian SME; Global Reporting Initiative, Database Search, 
online: globalreporting.org <http://database.globalreporting.org/search> (Accessed August 15, 2013). Canadian 
extractive sector GRI member-companies were found by searching in the GRI database, in the Mining sector under 
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1.1.2 United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment  
In 2006, the U.N. PRI was created by the global investment community to draw attention to the 
fact that ESG issues “can affect the performance of investment portfolios”, and should be given 
“appropriate consideration by investors if they are to fulfill their fiduciary (or equivalent) 
duty.”92 Developed for larger, highly diversified, investors with large stakes in companies where 
“divestment or avoidance is often impractical”, the U.N. PRI contains six standing principles that 
operate as a system of best practice sharing and collaboration.
93
 
The six principles are specifically “designed to be compatible with the investment styles of large 
and often diversified institutional investors that operate within a traditional fiduciary 
framework.”94 The U.N. PRI encourages the principles to be applied across the entire investment 
business spectrum and to the business organization as well, not just to a specific asset or product 
of a specific investment.
95
 “Promoting the active ownership and integration of ESG issues into 
investment analysis” does not suggest a policy of exclusion, or of screening companies or 
sectors, based on ESG measures.
96
 Rather, the goal is to promote ESG standards and principles.
97
 
Overall, the PRI requires a commitment to the following principles:  
 “Principle 1: We will incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-
making processes” 
 “Principle 2: We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership 
policies and practices.” 
 “Principle 3: We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which 
we invest.” 
 “Principle 4: We will promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within 
the investment industry.” 
 “Principle 5: We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the 
Principles.” 
                                                                                                                                                             
“Canada”; SRI Monitor, GRI Reporters: Growing but still a minority, (7 August 2009), online: SRI Monitor 
<http://srimonitor.blogspot.ca/2009/08/gri-reporters-growing-but-still.html> (Accessed August 15, 2013). As of 
2009, the number of companies complying with the GRI ranked Canada 10
th
 globally.    
92
 Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), About Us, online: UNPRI.org <http://www.unpri.org/about/> 
(Accessed August 15, 2013). [PRI About]. 
93
 PRI, FAQs, online: UNPRI.org <http://www.unpri.org/faqs/> (Accessed August 15, 2013). [PRI FAQ]. 
94
 Ibid.  
95
 Ibid. 
96
 Ibid. 
97
 Ibid.  
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 “Principle 6: We will each report on our activities and progress towards implementing 
the Principles.”98 
Becoming a signatory to the PRI is said to assist large and institutional investors in meeting their 
fiduciary duties by promoting a dialogue that includes ESG issues. This dialogue arises from 
companies seeking to attract PRI investors and capital and institutional investors looking to 
invest in businesses that follow principles shared by the PRI. This encourages the disclosure of 
ESG issues from those businesses that large and institutional investors and organizations are 
looking to invest in.
99
 This system, in turn, provides a framework for investors to incorporate 
ESG information “into decision-making and ownership practices.”100 Arguably, the process of 
ESG disclosure may provide a form of due diligence and risk management for subsequent 
corporate ESG, and sustainability, decision-making.  
As of April 2013, the U.N.  PRI has been signed onto by 1188 signatories and includes assets 
under management standing at more than $32 trillion (or more than 15% or the world’s 
investable assets).
101
 The U.N. PRI principle most relevant to SR and to Canadian extractive 
sector companies operating abroad is Principle three. This principle focuses on disclosure from 
the corporation seeking investment from an institutional investor, and explicitly outlines that PRI 
investors and signatories require from corporations “standardized reporting on ESG issues”; the 
integration of ESG issues into annual financial reports; the inclusion of current best practices, 
norms, and codes of conduct; and support for shareholder ESG disclosure initiatives and 
resolutions.
102
  
                                                 
98
 PRI, The Six Principles, online: UNPRI.org <http://www.unpri.org/about-pri/the-six-principles/> (Accessed 
August 15, 2013). [Principles]. 
99
 PRI About, supra note 92.  
100
 PRI FAQ, supra note 93. 
101
 PRI, Signatories, online: UNPRI.org <http://www.unpri.org/signatories/> (Accessed August 15, 2013); PRI, PRI 
Fact Sheet: Key Achievements, online: UNPRI.org <http://www.unpri.org/news/pri-fact-sheet/> (Accessed August 
15, 2013). [PRI Fact Sheet]. 
102
 Principles, supra note 98. 
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Principle six also promotes disclosure, but from the perspective of the institutional investor. This 
principle requires the reporting of progress and implementation of the U.N. PRI.
103
 Specifically, 
it allows an institutional investor to:  
 “Disclose how ESG issues are integrated within investment practices”;  
 “Disclose active ownership activities (voting, engagement, and/or policy dialogue)”; 
 “Disclose what is required from service providers in relation to the principles”;104  
 “Communicate with beneficiaries about ESG issues and the principles”;105 
 “Report on progress and/or achievements relating to the principles using a “Comply or 
Explain”106 approach”; 
 “Seek to determine the impact of the principles”; 
 “Make use of reporting to raise awareness among a broader group of stakeholders.”107 
As of 2011, the number of signatories that report on their progress has increased every year and 
stood at nearly 550; this represents 44 percent of the total signatory base choosing to disclose 
voluntarily.
108
  
Despite the PRI being a “voluntary and aspirational framework,” once a signatory reaches a one-
year period of subscribing to the PRI, the signatory becomes obligated to disclose and report on 
their assessment of their own performance of the PRI principles.
109
 This is done through the 
Reporting and Assessment survey,
110
 a learning tool allowing institutional investors to monitor 
their implementation of PRI Principles by providing a comparison over time and with other 
                                                 
103
 PRI, Principles, online: UNPRI.org <http://www.unpri.org/principles/> (Accessed August 15, 2013). [PRI 
Principles]. 
104
 PRI, “5 Years of PRI Annual Report of the PRI Initiative 2011”, (2011) at 3, online: UNPRI.org 
<http://www.unpri.org/viewer/?file=wp-content/uploads/annual_report2011.pdf> at 3 (Accessed August 15, 2013). 
“Service providers” refers to the institutional investors who are signatories to the UN PRI. [2011 Annual Report]. 
105
 The disclosure of information and communication with beneficiaries regarding ESG issues and Principles 
potentially differentiates itself from the other elements under Principle six by suggesting that signatories may need 
to seek information from “beneficiaries”, a term that may encompass a variety of stakeholders.  
106
 The Comply or Explain process “requires signatories to report on how they implement the Principles, or provide 
an explanation where they do not comply with them.”  
107
 PRI Principles, supra note 103. 
108
 2011 Annual Report, supra note 104 at 3; OSC, OSC corporate sustainability reporting initiative: Report to 
Minister of Finance, online: OSC <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-
Category5/rule_20091218_51-717_mof-rpt.pdf> at 5, 14 (Accessed August 15, 2013). [OSC Final Report]; PRI Fact 
Sheet, supra note 101. 
109
 Taylor Gray, “Investing for Environment? The Limits of the UN Principles of Responsible Investment” (June 
2009) at 9 University of Oxford, School of Geography. 
110
 PRI, Reporting, online: UNPRI.org <http://www.unpri.org/reporting/> (Accessed August 15, 2013). [PRI 
reporting]. 
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investors.
111
 The survey allows signatories to measure their own performance; ensure the 
accountability of the PRI and its signatories; and encourage signatory transparency on 
responsible investment.
112
 This process is said to provide an “off the shelf” reporting framework 
informing a range of stakeholders, from clients and beneficiaries to customers and the broader 
public.
113
 Informing a broad spectrum of stakeholders also allows the PRI to serve as an 
accountability mechanism. This is reinforced by the fact that the survey becomes mandatory for 
each new participating signatory after its one year grace period.
114
 The survey is also designed 
for the PRI Secretariat to identify “best practices, interesting developments and practical 
implementation ideas” and to incorporate this knowledge into the signatory body to develop 
rolling-best standards.
115
  These reasons reveal why so much importance is placed on the survey, 
and why failure to comply with it leads to a possible public delisting of that member.
116
 
According to the PRI, a common theme associated with greater disclosure is that of increased 
accountability.
117
 Keeping with this theme, in May 2011, the PRI Advisory Council agreed to 
develop a new Reporting Framework to become a better “accountability tool for the PRI and its 
signatories”, “to provide a standardized transparency tool”, “to enable the assessment of 
signatories’ progress and capabilities on [responsible investment].”118 As of 2013, the new 
Reporting and Assessment framework plans on disclosing to the public the responses from the 
surveys and making such disclosure mandatory, without the one-year grace period.
119
 The new 
revised framework adds flexibility and freedom to allow signatories “to share details about their 
activities with their clients and the public at a time that suits them” while providing a consistent 
                                                 
111
 Ibid. 
112
 Ibid.  
113
Ibid. 
114
 Ibid. The monitoring of individual progress helps reveal the level of compliance with the Principles. 
115
 Ibid. 
116
 Ibid. 
117
 Ibid; UN PRI, “PRI Reporting Framework 2013/14 Overview and Guidance” (October 2013), online: 
<http://www.unpri.org/viewer/?file=wp-content/uploads/2013-14_PRI_RF_overviewandguidance.pdf> (Accessed 
April 28, 2014). One of the objectives of the UN PRI is to be an accountability tool. 
118
 PRI, “PRI Reporting Framework: Objectives, Feedback and Next Steps”, (October 2012) online:  
<http://www.unpri.org/viewer/?file=files/2012.10.25%20PRI%20Reporting%20Framework%20Pilot%20Feedback.
pdf> (Accessed March 21, 2014). 
119
 PRI, Reporting Framework Consultation, online: UNPRI.org <http://www.unpri.org/consultation/> or 
<http://www.unpri.org/viewer/?file=files/2012.04.30%20New%20Reporting%20Framework%20at%20a%20glance.
pdf> (Both accessed August 15, 2013). 
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“baseline of information”.120  The new framework includes mandatory elements of public 
disclosure, outlining 12 modules. Each module contains mandatory and voluntary indicators.
121
 
There are two mandatory types of disclosure, one that is mandatory to report and one that is 
mandatory to disclose, and not all information reported is disclosed publicly.
122
 This process 
intends to help PRI signatories, and other users,
123
  
 “provide a clear and coherent account of their responsible investment activities, 
thereby enabling them to showcase areas of strength and best practice”;  
 “generate the data (indicators) that enable the PRI to produce its annual report on 
progress and to track the implementation of responsible investment across PRI 
signatories”; 
 “help stakeholders to make a meaningful assessment of performance across PRI 
signatories”.  
 “simplify reporting by, where appropriate, reducing the indicators to be reported 
against and, more importantly, aligning reporting with the way in which 
investors implement their responsible investment activities.”124  
The upgraded framework includes targeting investors, customers, members and beneficiaries of 
funds,
125
 along with other stakeholders, such as “media, consumers and industry groups, and 
NGOs” who play an intermediary role to further disseminate information to consumers and 
others.
126
 This inclusiveness leads to a greater number of meaningful assessments from different 
stakeholders. 
                                                 
120
 PRI Fact Sheet, supra note 101; U.N. PRI, PRI Reporting Assessment: Overview, Objectives, Process and 
Outputs, online: unpri.org <http://www.unpri.org/viewer/?file=wp-
content/uploads/2013_PRI_RA_OverviewObjectives.pdf> at 2, 4. (Accessed February 28, 2014). [New PRI 
Framework]. Signatories are not required to respond to the voluntary indicators if they do not wish to. 
121
 New PRI Framework, supra note 120. It is only “mandatory to complete a module if you have more than 10% of 
your assets under management in that asset class”; PRI, Reporting Framework, online: UNPRI.org 
<http://www.unpri.org/areas-of-work/reporting-and-assessment/reporting-framework/ > (Accessed August 15, 
2013); PRI FAQ, supra note 93; PRI reporting, supra note 110. This is done by providing a set of standardized, 
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New PRI Framework, supra note 120. “Not all indicators that are ‘mandatory to report’ will be ‘mandatory to 
disclose”. 
123
 2011 Annual Report, supra note 104 at 9. Other potential users can use the Clearinghouse of collaborative 
shareholder engagement. 
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 Ibid at 8, 21. 
125
 Ibid at 1. Readers of reports, such as asset owners and beneficiaries can use this information to help them choose 
their investment managers, and to assess the degree of responsible investment of their pension schemes. 
126
 Ibid.  
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The significance of including ESG issues into corporate investment and decision-making and 
disclosing the impacts of such decision-making is, according to the PRI, that it informs investors 
and stakeholders, compels decision-makers to meet fiduciary duties, and reinforces the 
competitiveness of the firm by addressing and managing risks.
127
 For instance, the PRI claims 
that companies with high ESG scores proved more resilient during the 2008-2009 economic 
slowdown.
128
 This resilience may be attributed to firms becoming aware of trends, tools, 
practices, and issues, and engaging and learning through different stakeholder dialogue.
129
 
1.1.3  United Nations Global Compact  
Similar to the PRI, the U.N. Global Compact is a framework that also contains a set of principles 
looking to provide guidance and global benchmarks. However, the GC is focused towards 
businesses, not institutional investors.
130
 Introduced in 1999 by then-U.N. Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan and officially unveiled in 2000, the U.N. GC outlines ten principles that elaborate on 
human rights, labour, environmental protection, and anti-corruption.
131
 Serving as a multi-
stakeholder learning forum,
132
 the GC relies on reporting and self-regulation to bring together a 
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<http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html> (Accessed August 15, 2013). [About the GC].  
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Coverage & Press Releases <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990201.sgsm6881.html> (Accessed 
August 15, 2013); UNGC, “After the Signature A guide to Engagement in the United Nations Global Compact” 
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(Accessed August 15, 2013); UNGC, About the GC ten Principles, online: UNGC 
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General Assembly, UN Convention Against Corruption, UN DOC A/58/422, online un.org 
<http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf> (Accessed March 1, 
2014). 
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 Tracy James, Teaching Private Governance: A Critical Analysis of the UN Global Compact (M of Arts Thesis, 
University of British Columbia Political Science, 2006) [unpublished] at 52 online:  
<https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/handle/2429/17655/ubc_2006-0206.pdf?sequence=1> (Accessed August 15, 2013). 
[James]; John Ruggie, Global_Governance.net: The Global Compact as a Learning Tool, (2001) 7 Global 
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variety of stakeholders for the purpose of discussing and advancing issues of corporate 
conduct.
133
 
The GC principles are designed to serve the purpose of encouraging and providing benchmarks 
and strategies for businesses to advance markets, commerce, and technology in a beneficial 
manner for societies and communities worldwide.
134
 The recognition of social, political, and 
economic challenges and opportunities, both locally and abroad, has resulted in companies 
joining the U.N. GC to develop collaborative partnerships with governments, civil society and 
the U.N.
135
 The GC contains a growing number of participants (10 000) that includes over 7000 
businesses and stakeholders from more than 145 countries who have signed on to the GC, 
making it the “largest voluntary corporate responsibility initiative in the world”.136 In addition to 
advancing sustainable business models and markets, the GC also incorporates a transparency and 
accountability policy known as the Communication on Progress (COP). The COP is a disclosure 
process that requires participants to post information on the U.N. GC website.
137
 
The COP reports to stakeholders (identified as investors, consumers, civil society, governments, 
among others) the business’ progress achieved in implementing the GC principles.138 Besides 
advancing transparency and accountability, COP disclosure also helps to drive continuous 
                                                                                                                                                             
Governance 371 at 372-373. Companies submit case studies of the implementation of the GC principles in practice, 
in a forum style.  
133
 James, supra note 132at 7, 36; About the GC, supra note 130. 
134
 About the GC, supra note 130; UN High Commission for Human Rights, Forward by the UN High Commission 
for Human Rights, online: UN Global Compact <http://human-rights-and-business-learning-
tool.unglobalcompact.org/> (Accessed August 15, 2013); UNGC, “Embedding Human Rights in Business Practice 
II” (2007) online: UNGC <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/EHRBPII_Final.pdf> at 11, 14 
(Accessed August 15, 2013) [UNGC Collaboration]; Office of the High Commission on Human Rights, Human 
Rights and Business Learning Tool, online:  <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/HR_Learning.htm> (Accessed August 
15, 2013). The UN GC implemented a web-based learning tool on human rights and business applicable to 
principles one and two. This tool serves as an entry level interactive course for managers and CSR professionals 
signed on to the GC, and those who have not to help them understand what human rights are and how they are part 
of their business operations.  
135
 UNGC Collaboration, supra note 134. .   
136
 UNGC, Participants and Stakeholders, online: UNGlobalcompact.org 
<http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/> (Accessed August 15, 2013).  
137
 Ibid; UNGC, What is COP?, online: UNGC <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/COP/index.html> (Accessed 
August 15, 2013). The GC requires the disclosure of information and implementation of the principles online, 
allowing for easy access by stakeholders. [GC, COP]. 
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 Ibid. Disclosure is intended provide information in support of the broad UN development goals. Disclosing 
progress and implementation of the GC principles is an important part of the GC and seen as critical to its success. 
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performance improvement; safeguard the integrity of the GC and the U.N.; and grow a repository 
of corporate practices to promote dialogue and learning.
139
 As a result, the COP is a critical 
component of the GC revealing participating entities’ expression and commitment to the GC and 
its principles.
140
 Due to the importance attributed to the COP, any violation of its policy, such as 
failing to issue disclosure reports, results in that participant being labeled as non-communicative 
or facing the possibility of expulsion from the U.N. GC.
141
 
The COP policy requires annual disclosure of each signatory’s progress in implementing the GC 
principles through a statement by the reporting participant’s chief executive. This includes a 
description of practical action, such as the disclosure of relevant policies and procedures, 
activities completed or planned to be completed, and a measurement of outcomes, in essence a 
report card on how well targets and goals were met in implementing the principles.
142
 A 
reporting participant is also required to provide an explanation of why they failed to address any 
of the ten principles, if relevant, similar to the GRI’s Report or Explain Campaign Forum.143  
The Basic Online COP Template is mainly designed for smaller and less experienced 
companies.
144
 The template provides examples and reference points on different reporting areas 
and allows users and stakeholders to compare different COP disclosures as well as track their 
own progress.
145
 In addition to a step-by-step guide on how to submit a COP report,
146
 the 
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(Accessed August 15, 2013). [Basic Tools Template]. 
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template also includes GRI indicators to help participants implement the GC principles and other 
U.N. goals.
147
 The GC’s advanced reporting tools also use the GRI, specifically the G3 
Guidelines.
148
 This connection between the G3 Guidelines and the COP is intended to bridge any 
gaps between the COP and other SR mechanisms.
149
  Thus, the GRI helps implement the GC and 
the GC provides the overarching goals to be met.
150
 This reveals that the aim of the advanced 
tools is for greater integrated reporting.
151
 An example of this arises from the issue-specific 
reporting component of the GC. The primary focus here is on the environment and human rights, 
with the GC referencing pre-existing frameworks, such as the Carbon Disclosure Project
152
 and 
the Corporate Water Accounting initiatives.
153
 Current Canadian GC participants include 
extractive sector companies Barrick Gold and Goldcorp.
154
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1.1.4  The U.N. Protect, Respect, Remedy Framework and 
Guiding Principles 155 
The U.N. GC is not the only U.N. initiative that targets businesses.
156
 In 2003, the U.N. Human 
Rights Commission also created the Norms on Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises (the Norms).
157
 The Norms imposed on TNCs a requirement to secure, ensure the 
respect of, and to “protect human rights recognized in international [and] national law”, 
obligations traditionally required of nation states.
158
 This ultimately led to a clash between the 
business/private sector, who strongly opposed the Norms, and human rights advocacy groups, 
who strongly endorsed them.
159
 Consequently, the Norms, and their divisive nature, were quickly 
rejected. Following in 2005, John Ruggie was appointed as the Special Representative to the 
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U.N. Secretary-General (now the former SRSG) “on the issue of human rights and [TNCs] and 
other business enterprises” to address and make recommendations regarding operations of the 
growing TNC sector in developing countries and its impact on human rights.
160
 In 2008, the 
former SRSG developed the Protect, Respect, and Remedy Framework (the U.N. Framework).
161
 
This Framework consists of the state duty to protect human rights abuses by third parties (the 
state duty to protect); the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and the access to 
remedy for violations of human rights.
162
 Unanimously adopted by the Human Rights Council, 
the U.N. Framework has been described as providing “the authoritative focal point” missing at 
the international level.
163
 In 2011, the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights for 
Implementing the U.N. Protect, Respect, and Remedy Framework (the Guiding Principles) were 
released for the purpose of “operationalizing” the U.N. Framework, which was endorsed in June 
2011 by the U.N. Human Rights Council.  
The significance of the U.N. Framework and the Guiding Principles is that they distinguish the 
duty and role of states from that of TNCs, and provide normative and legal reinforcement for the 
potential of SR as a means of TNC regulation. This helps promote polycentric governance, 
focusing on communication and suggesting a mixture of mandatory and voluntary as well as 
global and domestic measures.
164
 For example the discussion below outlines that a) the U.N. 
Framework and the Guiding Principles includes flexibility for the state in putting into practice a 
SR requirement through appropriate policies and regulations; b) that state enforced SR, through 
corporate and securities laws, offers a useful tool in risk assessment, and promotes the inclusion 
of stakeholders; and lastly, c) that SR is reinforced by corporate or business due diligence 
                                                 
160
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processes, which like SR look to influence corporate decision-making and subsequent corporate 
actions. 
A. State Duty to Protect 
The state duty to protect arises out of the core U.N. human rights treaties and customary 
international law, and requires “states to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, 
including business, through appropriate policies, regulation and adjudication.”165 A key 
component of this pillar is the requirement of states to cultivate and put into operation corporate 
cultures respectful of human rights.
166
 This culture involves implementing, at home and abroad, 
any available mechanisms open to the state to respect and protect human rights.
167
 The SR 
process is discussed under the “corporate culture” of the State Duty to Protect pillar and is 
explicitly identified as a useful process valuable for stakeholders to examine and compare ESG 
and human rights performance.
168
 This highlights that SR could certainly fall within the options 
available to the state as a mechanism to regulate TNCs. 
Although the state duty to protect arises from the core U.N. human rights treaties, these treaties 
do not articulate a specific state responsibility for human rights violations by private actors, such 
as business enterprises.
169
 Nonetheless, states are required to prevent such violations. Given the 
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flexibility and freedom states enjoy in developing, enforcing, and putting into operation 
provisions protecting human rights,
170
 such legislation could include variations of mandatory or 
voluntary requirements, or a mixture of both. Such a flexible approach is important because it 
serves as a reminder of the unique authority a state government has to exercise in meeting its 
duty to protect. This provides an opportunity to promote SR as a tool to regulate TNCs with 
regard to ESG and human rights.  
B. Disclosure/Reporting under the State Duty to Protect  
“[F]oster[ing] corporate cultures respectful of rights both at home and abroad”, through 
corporate and securities law and policy, is an important component of the state duty to protect.
171
 
When SR is included in the corporate culture, the culture becomes more mindful of human 
rights.
172
 As a result, SR offers a potential means of regulating corporate activity, “at home and 
abroad”, through the disclosure of business operations respecting human rights.173 By 
implementing SR, “governments can support and strengthen market pressures on companies to 
respect rights” and reinforce compliance systems by informing and enabling stakeholders to 
evaluate “rights-related performance.”174 In this view, a SR obligation indirectly compels good 
corporate behavior. 
To clarify the potential of corporate and securities law and the role of SR, including human 
rights due diligence, the former SRSG launched the Corporate Law Tools (CLT) Project.
175
 This 
project involved more than 20 leading global corporate law firms to outline “whether and how 
corporate and securities law in 39 jurisdictions encourages or impedes companies’ respect for 
                                                 
170
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human rights”.176 Directly shaping what companies do and how they act, corporate and securities 
law play a major role in the actions and operations of corporate entities.
177
 The CLT project 
revealed that corporate/securities laws and human rights issues are viewed as divergent 
paradigms but that human rights are recognized to limited extent.
178
 Integrating human rights 
concerns into corporate/securities law has the potential to influence corporate decision-making to 
consider human rights issues. According to the Protect, Respect, Remedy Framework, by 
requiring businesses to implement a disclosure requirement there is potential to not only provide 
stakeholders with information to “better engage with businesses [and to] assess risk and compare 
performance within and across industries,” this would also compel businesses to integrate human 
rights into their core business interests and operations.
179
 
Guiding Principle 3 (GP3), of the 2011 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights for 
implementing the U.N. Framework, is relevant to a SR requirement under the state duty to 
protect because it reinforces the idea of disclosure.
180
 GP3 particularly recognizes that corporate 
and securities laws have a direct impact on shaping business behavior, but at the same human 
rights within these laws are not very well, if at all, understood.
181
 One solution offered by GP3, is 
for increased state guidance to promote more respect for human rights within the current 
system.
182
 State encouragement of SR and disclosure is deemed key in fostering respect for 
human rights from business enterprises, especially if the business is engaged in activities likely 
to impact human rights, such as the extractive sector.
183
 Specifically, state encouragement could 
include guidance and communication on human rights,
184
 such as the disclosure of the impact of 
human rights issues on economic performance and its relationship with materiality in financial 
                                                 
176
 Ibid; Osgoode Hall Law School convenes Expert Consultation in Support of Corporate Law Tools Project of UN 
Special Representative on Business and Human Rights – Toronto 2009. (Toronto: Nov 5-6, 2009 Osgoode Hall, 
2009). In 2009, the SRSG established the Corporate Law Tools (CLT) Project, said to be the first in-depth and 
multi-jurisdictional study looking to the relationship between corporate and securities law and human rights; CLT 
overarching, supra note 86 at 1. 
177
 Ibid. 
178
 CLT ADD, supra note 86 at ¶ 12.  
179
 2008 report, supra note 161 at ¶ 36. 
180
 Endorsed Guiding Principles, supra note 155 at Guiding Principle 3.  
181
 Ibid at Guiding Principle 3 commentary. 
182
 Ibid.  
183
 Ibid.  
184
 Ibid. 
32 
 
 
reporting.
185
 In addition to state guidance, GP3 also looks to other important actors for guidance, 
since it no longer views the state as the sole regulator, but as one whose role is now 
complemented by other important actors.
186
 This view supports the notion of a dialogue between 
businesses and other actors, and of SR as the means of stimulating dialogue. 
The next principle relevant to SR is GP4. This principle claims business enterprises owned or 
controlled by the state or receiving support from the state should only receive support in 
exchange for conducting human rights due diligence.
187
 The implication here is that any violation 
by a business enterprise receiving significant support or service from the state may be attributed 
directly to that state, because the state is viewed as the “primary duty-bearer” of protecting 
human rights. By providing continuous support, financial or otherwise, the state implicitly 
displays support for the actions and activities of the entity, whether good or bad.
188
 
C. Human Rights Due Diligence 
SR includes gathering and examining data in the process of reporting information. This early 
phase in preparing SR may be compared to the process of due diligence as both play a role in 
educating the business entity. Explicitly outlined under the corporate responsibility to respect 
pillar is a due diligence process. By falling under this pillar, it becomes evident that human rights 
due diligence is to be performed by corporate and business entities.
189
 Such due diligence is 
intended to aid in risk management and the prevention of corporate misconduct.
190
 This occurs 
through a “process whereby companies not only ensure compliance with national laws but also 
manage risk of human rights harm with a view to avoiding it.”191 By helping companies address 
their responsibilities to communities, individuals, and shareholders offers an opportunity to 
                                                 
185
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“protect both values and value.”192 Similar to SR, corporate and business due diligence allows 
companies to become “aware of, prevent and address adverse human rights impacts,” permitting 
a company to “know and show” it is meeting the responsibility to respect.193 This collected 
information, like SR, can be relayed through a variety of forms of communication to investors, 
consumers, and other stakeholders. The process of collecting information and addressing 
“potential and actual human rights impacts from a company’s business activities and the 
relationships connected to those activities” helps companies prevent complicity in human rights 
violations and promotes risk management.
194
  
Corporate due diligence processes, and SR, are frequently questioned in terms of how far in 
scope the process should examine without becoming costly and overly burdensome. The former 
SRSG responds to this critique by providing guidance in the 2008 Protect, Respect and Remedy 
Framework. This guidance includes inductive and fact-based limitations within certain factors 
and the use of existing frameworks, such as, as a minimum, the international bill of rights and the 
core conventions of the International Labour Organization.
195
 The 2008 Framework also outlines 
the adoption of certain processes. Such as the formation of human rights policies that include 
detailed guidance where necessary,
196
 followed by impact assessments to consider the impact of 
activities on human rights.
197
 The third element includes integrating information from impact 
assessments into business plans and operations to address and avoid future impacts on human 
rights, 
198 
and lastly implementing performance monitoring and auditing processes.
199
 
GP13 outlines the use and implementation of corporate human rights due diligence as a way to 
help prevent and mitigate adverse business impacts on human rights.
200
 After GP13, the 
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requirements of corporate due diligence are further expanded under GP16 through GP22. This 
includes the formation, and implementation, of corporate due diligence polices and processes, 
the gauging of risks, and engagement of stakeholders;
201
 the preventing, mitigating, and 
addressing of issues and integrating information into internal processes;
202
 and the formation of a 
system of verification and performance tracking to ensure impacts are being addressed.
203
 
Overall, the GPs reveal corporate human rights due diligence aims to prevent and remediate 
cases where violations were unforeseen or unable to be quickly addressed.
204
 The shared goals of 
prevention, engagement, risk assessment, and feedback illustrate parallels between due diligence 
and SR. This allows SR to share in the global acceptance and normative significance of the U.N. 
Framework. This normative significance has also allowed the GPs to influence other CSR 
frameworks as well, as discussed below.
205
 
D. Company-level Non-judicial Grievance Mechanism 
The access to remedy pillar of the U.N. Framework also contains components that illustrate the 
emerging disclosure trend. In particular, company-level non-judicial grievance mechanisms
206
 
have the potential to promote goals similar to those of SR, such as corporate due diligence, 
                                                 
201
 Ibid at 16,17 at Guiding Principle #17-18  
202
 Ibid at 18 at Guiding Principle #19. 
203
 Ibid at 19 at Guiding Principle #20; Ibid at 20 Guiding Principle #21. This includes tracking the effectiveness of 
responses and drawing on feedback from internal and external sources to verify if impacts are being addressed. 
204
 Ibid at 14, 20 at Guiding Principle #22, #14 Commentary. GP 22 provides guidance on remediation where the 
business enterprise has caused or contributed to adverse impacts. GP 14 claims all business entities must respect 
human rights, regardless of their size. The SRSG understands human rights impacts “will be proportional to, among 
other factors, its size” and really its capital. Still, the GPs recognize that SMEs can have serious impacts and “the 
responsibility to respect applies fully and equally to all business enterprises.” 
205
An example of this normative significance can be seen by a Goldcorp commissioned human rights assessment 
which used the Framework as an appraisal model. See further in Chapter 3 for a discussion on GoldCorp. On 
Common Ground, Human Rights Assessment of Goldcorp’s Marlin Mine, at 5 online: csr.goldcorp.com 
<http://csr.goldcorp.com/2011/docs/2010_human_full_en.pdf> (Accessed August 15, 2013); Barrick Gold, CSR 
Advisory Board, online: <http://www.barrick.com/responsibility/csr-advisory-board/default.aspx> (Accessed August 
15, 2013). Providing implicit support for the work of the former SRSG and the GPs, Barrick Gold formed a CSR 
Advisory Board and included the former SRSG, John Ruggie, as a special consultant. 
206
 2008 report, supra note 161 at ¶ 92. In order to be effective, all non-judicial grievance mechanisms should, at a 
minimum, “be legitimate; accessible; predictable; equitable; rights-compatible; and” transparent; Endorsed Guiding 
Principles, supra note 155 at Guiding Principle 31, adds another element to the suggested elements of a 
“operational-level” non-judicial grievance mechanism, which is to provide “a source of continuous learning” and be 
“based on engagement and dialogue”. 
35 
 
 
disclosure, and stakeholder dialogue. This could occur at the operational-level,
207
 where 
“grievance mechanisms are [directly] accessible [by] individuals and communities who may be 
adversely impacted”, or through an external expert or body.208 Under GP29, operational-level 
grievance mechanisms are said to perform two key functions with regard to the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights.
209
 The first is identify “adverse human rights impacts as a 
part of an enterprise’s on-going human rights due diligence”,210 and then “analyzing trends and 
patterns in complaints”, to pinpoint systemic problems and to adjust practices accordingly.211 
The second key function is that once identified, the business entity can address the grievance and 
remediate it, preventing it from escalating.
212
 These functions aid in corporate due diligence, risk 
management, and also stimulate a conversation with stakeholders. In addition to voicing 
concerns, stakeholders can also be included in the decision-making role of grievance 
mechanisms. The inclusion of stakeholders helps to ensure impartiality of the mechanism, 
furthers the potential for disclosure, and “redress[es] imbalances in information and expertise 
between parties” enabling a dialogue and the creation of “sustainable solutions”.213 Overall, 
providing such access to a remedial process, GP29 commentary elaborates that consistent 
communication can be essential to retaining confidence in the grievance mechanism, and that 
providing transparency to stakeholders also demonstrates legitimacy and trustworthiness.
214
 
Although the work of the former SRSG and the work of the United Nations Human Rights 
Council (UNHRC) leading to the GPs focuses on human rights related business impacts, the 
guidance in the GPs and the U.N. Framework can also apply to social and environmental issues. 
This is important because the PRI, the U.N. GC and the GRI explicitly address environmental, 
social, and human rights issues.
215
 This scope of issues is similarly included in the Organization 
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for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and its Guidelines on Multinational 
Enterprises (MNEs), another framework reinforcing the growing disclosure trend. 
1.2  OECD Guidelines for MNEs   
The earlier version of the OECD, referred to as the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC) initially consisted of only industrialized countries and was constructed to 
implement the United States (U.S.)-financed U.S. Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe 
after World War II.
216
 After its success and the recognition of its potential, Canada and the U.S. 
joined the OEEC members, by signing the OECD Convention.
217
 The OECD is an institute in 
which state governments work together towards the goal of improving the economic and social 
well-being of people around the world
218
 through international standards and policies on 
products, practices, and MNEs.
219
 Janda et. al argue the OECD Guidelines “constitute one of the 
most influential voluntary initiatives for [TNCs] (the overwhelming majority of which are based 
in the rich countries making up the OECD)”.220 These Guidelines for MNEs do not stand alone 
and form a part of the larger Declaration on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises.
221
 This declaration is a policy commitment that was signed on to in 1976 by the 
original governments of OECD Member countries.
222
 It requires “governments to provide an 
open and transparent environment for international investment and to encourage the positive 
contribution multinational enterprises can make to economic and social progress”.223 The OECD 
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Guidelines for MNEs, in particular, were developed in 1976,
224
 and since have undergone many 
revisions,
225
 the most significant of which were in 2000 and 2011.
226
 The 2000 Review is seen as 
the most “far-reaching” for a number of reasons.227 First, because it changed the focus of the 
Guidelines from MNE compliance with national laws to a range of international standards”,228 
and second, the review promoted self-regulatory practices and management systems to foster 
stable and trusting relationships between corporations and societies.
229
 It is important to note the 
Guidelines are directed toward corporations, and the “implementation and dispute resolution 
procedures are directed towards governments.”230 
The recent 2011 revision sought the inclusion of greater guidance on disclosure.
231
 This 
disclosure refers to “[TNC] activities, structure, financial situation and performance,” ownership 
and governance,
232
 codes of conduct, risks, stakeholder relationships, and environmental and 
social reporting.
233
 It also includes disclosure of supply chain relationships such as 
subcontractors, suppliers, and joint venture partners, which is considered important as it goes 
well beyond the scope of the GRI, the largest SR framework.
234
 Only recently has the GRI 
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outlined guidance that extends past the subsidiary/affiliate companies to include contractual 
connections in the supply chain to the enterprise.
235
 
Under this process, determining what information to disclose is governed by the concept of 
materiality, defined as “information whose omission or misstatement could influence the 
economic decisions taken by users of information.”236 Although this implies a focus on 
shareholder primacy and profit, the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance do promote 
recognition of rights and active co-operation with stakeholders.
237
 The relationship between the 
OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance and disclosure under OECD Guidelines for MNEs 
is that both share similar disclosure recommendations and an implicit focus on stakeholder 
engagement,
238
 underlining the disclosure process, promoting cooperation, and looking to 
influence subsequent corporate activity.
239
 Similar to SR and its focus on stakeholders, the above 
guidelines also reveal a focus on a variety of stakeholders. This includes a focus on shareholders, 
workers, “local communities, special interest groups, governments, and society” in general, 
reinforcing the trend towards transparency and public interaction and dialogue.
240
  
The 2011 revised OECD Guidelines for MNEs also include a disclosure requirement under its 
Human Rights section. This disclosure requirement is adopted from the Guiding Principles’ 
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corporate due diligence approach under the corporate responsibility to respect pillar of the U.N. 
Framework.
241
 The OECD Guidelines for MNEs view as integral the due diligence process of 
business decision-making and risk management systems. As a result, these Guidelines 
recommend that businesses carry out human rights due diligence by assessing and integrating 
risks, tracking responses, and communicating how risks and impacts are addressed.
242
 Also 
adopted after the 2011 review was the Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains 
of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, which is designed to help mining 
“companies respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their sourcing 
practices.”243 Overall, this guidance intends to foster transparency with supply chains and 
sustainable corporate engagement in the mineral sector as a whole.
244
 
One method of OECD enforcement of the Guidelines for MNEs is through national contact 
points (NCPs). NCP agencies hear inquiries and complaints related to the Guidelines for MNEs 
and are established by state governments that have adopted the Guidelines to promote, protect, 
and implement them.
245
 NCPs assist enterprises and their stakeholders to take appropriate 
measures to promote compliance and observance with the Guidelines.
246
 This observance does 
not imply that NCPs monitor or engage in investigative or quasi-judicial roles to determine 
whether or not companies are following the Guidelines.
247
 Instead NCPs are only intended “to 
facilitate a constructive dialogue between MNEs and those affected by their operations with a 
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view to finding solutions.”248 When MNE compliance is in question it is brought forward in the 
form of a “specific instance”, also known as a complaint.249 The significance of this complaint 
process is that, according to Janda et. al, “the hybrid and interactive nature of the OECD 
Guidelines’ complaint mechanism nicely illustrates the constructive potential of the regulatory 
model of corporate accountability in the shadow of the law”.250 
1.3  Other SR Initiatives 
Beyond the OECD Guidelines for MNEs, the International Council on Mining and Metals 
(ICMM) also adopts a human rights due diligence process. Specifically, the ICMM integrates 
corporate human rights due diligence into corporate risk management processes to influence 
mining corporate governance.
251
 Historically, the ICMM is a product of the Global Mining 
Initiative (GMI).
252
 The GMI was formed to promote “policy learning through the accumulation 
of scientific knowledge about sustainable mining practices and through the dissemination of 
information about best practices in the mining sector”.253  The GMI eventually established the 
ICMM in 2001 for the purpose of improving sustainable development performance in the mining 
and metals sectors, serving “as an agent for change and continual improvement relating to 
mining and sustainable development”.254 
After companies integrate a due diligence process and the appropriate actions in response to 
learned information, the ICMM proceeds to track responses and communicate externally, an idea 
drawn from GP21 of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights for Implementing 
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the U.N. Framework.
255
 The objective of tracking is to ensure the due diligence system is 
effective in achieving its goals and is providing effective responses, an objective similar to the 
goals of SR and stakeholder engagement. The ICMM’s Sustainable Development Framework 
also has a transparency principle,
256
 which broadly applies to sustainability and requires 
“implementation of effective and transparent engagement, communication and [independent 
verification of] reporting arrangements with” stakeholders.257 
Similarly, the International Standard Organization (ISO) has also incorporated the Guiding 
Principles’ due diligence mechanism through ISO 26000. ISO is the largest developer of 
voluntary international standards which are intended to make industry practices and processes 
more efficient and effective.
258
 ISO has developed a number of voluntary standards directly 
relevant to SR. For example, ISO 26000 applies to Social Responsibility; ISO 31000 applies to 
Risk Management; and ISO 14000 applies to Environmental Management.
259
 Although ISO 
26000 is not a sustainability disclosure framework, it still provides guidance and information for 
organizations on how to address sustainability issues. ISO 26000 specifically makes an effort to 
align with the GRI and explicitly promote sustainability disclosure.
260
 ISO 31000 and ISO 14000 
are also significant because they include topics intended to be encompassed in SR. These 
standards aim to promote sustainable development in the society in which it operates,
261
 address 
its organizational impact on the environment,
262
 use a multi-faceted approach to meet the needs 
of different stakeholders,
263
 and promote the benefit of gaining a competitive advantage and 
creation of a positive reputation.
264
 Experts participating in the upgrade of ISO standards 
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believed due diligence was the most important contribution from the former SRSG.
 265
 One 
expert claimed that: 
[a]nother result [of the “Ruggie framework”] is that due diligence has become not 
only an issue within the Human Rights core subject, but also a process step in the 
process of integrating social responsibility into an organization … After the 
discussions at the 7th conference in Quebec we realized the value of exercising due 
diligence regarding all core subjects. So a new sub clause (7.3.1) was accepted at the 
8th and final Conference in Copenhagen on due diligence as a process step.
266
 
1.4 State SR Efforts 
In addition to international CSR frameworks, the growing international transparency and 
reporting trend has also been promoted and displayed by many different countries. For example, 
in 2007 the Swedish government became the first country to require state-owned companies to 
publish sustainability reports based on the GRI,
267
 and as of 2012 Spain does as well.
268
 In 2009, 
Denmark began requiring CSR sections to be included in annual reports of the largest 
companies, mandating companies to promote human rights and a sustainable environment.
269
 
Notably, Denmark excludes companies from this CSR reporting obligation if the company is a 
member of the U.N. GC or U.N. PRI.
270
 China has also made strides in SR. As of 2008, China 
has implemented the Environmental Information Disclosure Act and Guidelines for State-owned 
Enterprises on fulfilling Corporate Social Responsibilities.
271
 The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong 
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Limited has also decided to move towards recommending a ‘comply or explain’ basis of ESG 
Reporting by 2015.
272
 In 2008, the Australia Stock Exchange (ASX) released Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations. This outlined non-mandatory obligations in 
relation to environmental and sustainability risks, which required an explanation in its corporate 
governance statement disclosing the reason for the lack of environmental and sustainability 
disclosure.
273
 South Africa, in September 2009, published its third report on corporate 
governance (referred to as the King III Code).
274
 This code applies to all South African 
companies, including private companies, and includes an “apply or explain” system that was 
adopted by the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) as part of its listing requirements.
275
 Though 
the King III Code is self-regulated and not enforceable in a court of law, the listings 
requirements help ensure that listed companies are contractually bound to adopt the code, with 
any failure to do so amounting to a breach of listing requirements.
276
 More recently, South 
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Africa, together with Brazil, Denmark, and France formed the Group of Friends of Paragraph 47 
in June 2012. This initiative is based on paragraph 47 of the 2012 U.N. Conference on 
Sustainable Development outcome document, acknowledging the importance of corporate SR.
277
 
Next, the U.K. Companies Act explicitly requires the disclosure of social and community 
issues,
278
 and likewise, the United States (U.S.) Dodd-Frank Act also requires the disclosure of 
social information in order to directly address social and human rights issues in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.
279
 After congress adopted the Cardin-Lugar amendment,
280
 the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) put into practice 13(q) of Section 1504 of the Dodd-
Frank Act.
281
 This section requires “resource extraction issuers to disclose payments made to 
governments if the issuer is required to file an annual report with the SEC or if the issuer engages 
in the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.”282 Although a United States 
District Court invalidated Rule 13(q)-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on July 2, 
2013,
283
 some commentators suggest the invalidation is not permanent as the SEC may change 
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the way it enforces the section in question.
284
 In contrast to the U.S. court decision invalidating 
Rule 13(q)-1, the European Parliament in June 2013 voted on legislation similar to the Cardin-
Lugar Amendment, the European Accounting and Transparency Directives, and approved the 
new disclosure initiative applicable to oil, gas, mineral and logging firms.
285
 Similar to the U.S. 
initiative, the European legislation requires oil, gas, mineral and logging firms to provide details 
and the publication of all payments over €100,000 to federal, national and regional 
governments.
286
 
1.5 Why Not Sustainability Reporting? 
The above trend for greater transparency and SR may provide a useful contribution to the 
problem of ESG and human rights violations attributed to Canadian extractive sector TNCs 
operating outside of Canada. However, any implementation of a SR process will first need to 
overcome certain hurdles. For example, although transparency is intended to “empower the 
powerless,” it can also reinforce the powerful and inequality.287 For example, this can be seen 
through various public and private international agreements that call for “sophisticated 
procedures, measurements, auditing and verification arrangements, and reporting.”288 Provisions 
that require particular processes, measurements, and auditing may be relatively easily fulfilled by 
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“richer and more developed states and market parties,” whereas lesser developed, smaller, and 
weakly financed nations and companies will have a harder time meeting such reporting or SR 
requirements.
289
 The subsequent result is the continued empowerment of strong international 
actors and “their position in international politics.”290  
According to Mol, the increase in transparency is argued to only work when users of disclosure 
have access to and the required literacy to understand disclosed information.
291
 For example, 
adversely impacted communities may not be competent enough to decipher reports and so rely 
on “western NGOs” to access, understand, assess, and use such information.292 There is also a 
risk that stakeholders may “drown in disclosure.”293 Secondly, there is a concern that disclosers 
will not be receptive or vulnerable to accusations of poor performance.
294
 Moreover, the 
potential complexity associated with distinguishing information that is true and useful from that 
which is false and not as useful together with a lack of quality assurance and reliability has the 
potential to hinder transparency initiatives.
295
 Lastly, there is the ultimate question of whether or 
not transparency will actually influence or improve corporate performance, and even if there is 
such a potential the ideal elements may not always be available to compel compliance.
296
 
In addition to the above hurdles, some of the initial difficulties involved in implementing a 
disclosure system can include the cost, overall complexity, training of staff, development of new 
processes, changes to older bureaucratic procedures, and the need for continual support to ensure 
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smooth financial and non-financial operations.
297
 The GRI also faces hurdles in its goal of 
mainstreaming disclosure. Corpwatch
298
 argues “it is difficult [for NGOs] to accept transparency 
at face value if [corporations] believe corporate profitability and social responsibility are 
mutually exclusive”299. This reveals the scepticism of NGOs towards GRI reports because they 
believe that information disclosed is not likely to reveal the true social and environmental cost of 
TNC business activity.
300
 Dingwerth and Eichinger claim that the “GRI has had little impact in 
shifting the balance of power in corporate governance toward civil society”301 and that the 
anticipated and expected results associated with transparency, or SR, policies are “unrealistically 
high.”302 Some academics argue, because of the many obstacles and difficulties disclosure “will 
become a disappearing management fad or a public relations tool unless” stakeholder 
participation and the power they wield is “somehow institutionaliz[ed in corporate] 
governance.”303 The suggestion that stakeholder participation be institutionalized raises another 
potential hurdle for disclosure and SR, which is the need for state support to compel SR and 
include stakeholder participation. Further, if a state mandates but fails to enforce, then any 
disclosure or SR measure may lose its credibility. This highlights the fact that the state, 
specifically its unique authoritative capacity, is critical for the success of SR, mandating SR and 
reinforcing SR with stakeholder participation. 
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The importance of state support in mandating disclosure and SR is highlighted in a number of 
studies. The nature, scope, and potential of SR is determined by the country in which a 
corporation is headquartered or listed,
304
 with Chen and Bouvain concluding the role of the state 
is an important component of a non-financial disclosure framework.
305
 For example, Burchell et 
al. reveal that the increase and decrease of reporting in the U.K. is heavily influenced by the 
political agenda of the time, and political factors are often linked with social and cultural 
factors.
306
 Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra note that differences in CSR can be linked to differences 
in governance systems,
307
 a conclusion reinforced by Aguilera et al. who conclude pluralism at 
the national and transnational levels can influence CSR in a country.
308
 As a whole, these 
conclusions support the view that the state and state governance systems can have a major 
impact on SR and its level of disclosure, while also lending support to the view that SR is 
deemed to have a greater chance to thrive with, than without, the support of the state. 
Conclusion  
In summary, various international frameworks, and states, are pushing for the disclosure of ESG 
and human rights information and evolving their frameworks to promote greater transparency. 
The question remains how information disclosure should be used by stakeholders to prevent 
TNCs from engaging in negative behavior and how to hold them accountable. The reflexive law 
and new governance theories discussed next provide a potential rationale for SR and aim to 
provide a justification for the SR and transparency trend. 
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Chapter 2 
2 Reflexive law, New Governance and Sustainability Reporting  
The purpose of this chapter is to document theoretical approaches that have emerged to explain 
the rise of disclosure practices outlined in Chapter 1. It will introduce the idea of global legal 
pluralism and outline the theories of reflexive law and new governance regulation. The chapter 
will further examine sustainability reporting (SR), the potential use of such disclosure, and its 
relationship with corporate governance, defined as “as the process and structure used to direct 
and manage the business and affairs of the corporation”.309 Lastly, this chapter will highlight the 
relationship between the above theories, SR, stakeholders and corporate governance to provide a 
foundation for states to build a state enforced SR-based framework that targets Canadian 
extractive sector TNCs operating abroad. 
2.1  Global Legal Pluralism 
Those in favour of regulated corporate social responsibility (CSR) may point to the traditional 
method of creating and enforcing rules and regulations, that is, through a state’s legal 
framework. Legal pluralism, however, argues there are a number of sources of “laws”, or 
standards, to provide guidance or oversight for CSR. Understanding global legal pluralism is 
useful as a background introduction to the reflexive and new governance theories because of the 
importance placed on stakeholders and the role they play in the formation of principles and 
practices. 
Traditionally, the study of public international law concerned itself with the interaction between 
states.
310
 From this perspective two themes were evident, first that law was mainly considered to 
be the creation of “acts of official state-sanctioned entities [, and s]econd, law was seen as an 
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exclusive function of state sovereignty.”311 However, the view that the state is the sole creator of 
laws has begun to wear away.
312
 As Sally Falk Moore describes her idea of the semiautonomous 
social field she explains that one can:  
generate rules and customs and symbols internally [domestically], but that . . . is 
also vulnerable to rules and decisions and other forces emanating from the larger 
world by which it is surrounded. The semi-autonomous social field has rule-making 
capacities, and the means to induce or coerce compliance; but it is simultaneously 
set in a larger social matrix which can, and does, affect and invade it, sometimes at 
the invitation of persons inside it, sometimes at its own instance.
313
 
Jurgen Habermas
314
, Paul Berman
315
, and Brian Tamanaha
316
 all make a case for global legal 
pluralism. Habermas and Berman share the view of Tamanaha that;  
Legal pluralism is everywhere. There is, in every social arena one examines, a 
seeming multiplicity of legal orders, from the lowest local level to the most 
expansive global level. There are village, town, or municipal laws of various types; 
there are state, district or regional laws of various types; there are national, 
transnational and international laws of various types.
317
   
With the introduction of new rule-making actors it is important to note the role of the state does 
not diminish but shifts from being “the primary or exclusive author of binding norms...to being 
one among [many] other highly influential actors involved in the collaborative, experimental, 
direct and indirect production of norms relevant to particular areas of market activity.”318 For 
example, Melvin Einsenberg observes that the essential parts of corporate law include statutory 
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law, state judge made law, federal law, and notably, private ordering through soft law.
319
 
Similarly, according to Zumbansen, the inclusion of soft law elements reveals that it is “no 
longer possible to limit our perspectives to either traditional (hard-law oriented) or national 
processes of rule creation.”320 “Instead, rules and standards as developed and disseminated by 
transnational actors such as [TNCs], stock exchanges ... or international organizations,” like the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations (UN), 
and the International Labour Organization (ILO) are now seen as important components of the 
transnational law of corporate governance.
321
 
Since the end of the Cold War, many international scholars have argued that the “narrow view of 
how law operates transnationally is inadequate.”322 As a result, more focus has been given to the 
processes of international norm development. Norm development “consider[s] overlapping 
transnational jurisdictional assertions by nation-states, norms articulated by international bodies, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), multinational corporations (MNCs), industry groups, 
indigenous communities,” and other networks of activists.323 For example, under the Third 
World Approach to International Law, Utting has argued the CSR framework has to become 
more “south-centered” in order to include a broad scope of stakeholders and prevent CSR from 
being used to defend corporate activity instead of to promote higher standards.
324
  Arguing the 
“CSR agenda tends to be somewhat northern driven” and focuses on a narrow set of issues, 
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sectors and companies, Utting sees this view from the “north” as potentially reducing the focus 
on social and environmental issues, the business activities of the “south”, and the input and 
concern of workers and communities in developing countries.
325
 
For Teubner the “theory of “global legal pluralism” is required to explain new forms of emerging 
‘global law’,” in which case the new forms of law “grow mainly from the social peripheries, not 
from the political centres of nation-states and international institutions.”326 The state, now in a 
decentred position, should take on an indirect role in governing complex social and economic 
matters and facilitate and motivate the production of norms by non-state actors.
327
 For example, 
the opposition to mining projects has forced TNCs to engage with Indigenous people as a 
political and reputational imperative.
328
 This opposition is compounded by the increased capacity 
and organizational functionality of NGOs and International NGOs.
329
 One example of influence 
from non-state actors/stakeholders was displayed by Barrick Gold’s operations in Tanzania.330 In 
this case, after inheriting the North Mara mine from the purchase of a competitor, Canadian 
mining company Placer Dome, Barrick’s initial efforts to “engage” local stakeholders and 
communities was deemed transactional and “one-way”.331 Consequently, Barrick faced a 
backlash from local stakeholders preventing any subsequent meaningful dealings and dialogue 
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with stakeholders.
332
 In contrast, Placer Dome, in South Africa, taking careful consideration of 
relevant stakeholder concerns was able to dictate its actions accordingly and develop a 
“partnership” arrangement with locals.333 By taking note of the local stakeholder concerns, 
Placer Dome was successful in avoiding adverse criticism being imposed on its business and 
operations.
334
 
The above synopsis of transnational and global legal pluralism reveals the increasing 
consideration of more stakeholders and the principles and practices these non-state actors 
contribute to the field of CSR. The process in which non-state actors produce and promote 
principles and practices “radicalises their semi-autonomous nature.”335 This radicalization336 is 
exemplified in the tension between traditional law and policy making and the “spontaneous 
evolving informal development of norms and principles” from non-state actors in a regulatory 
position. The spontaneity of non-state actors stems from the capability of non-state actors to 
quickly react to issues and propose and establish norms and practices.
337
 Zumbansen illustrates 
this relationship by drawing upon democratic theory and highlighting the tension “between a 
functionally reduced, rubberstamping parliament on the one hand and a fast moving, hardly 
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controllable administration in close contact and interaction with private actors on the other,”338 
emphasizing stakeholder input from those closer to corporate operations and impacts.
339
 
According to Zumbansen, the creation of international corporate governance codes and standards 
have revealed comparable “characteristics of law making processes that have been undergoing 
dramatic changes with regards to the actors involved and the nature of the norms generated.”340 
This includes a “wider inclusion of private actors” in the rule making process.341 Tuebner342, 
Hess
343
, and others
344
 reinforce Zumbansen’s idea and further identify a failure of the “traditional 
state-based legal-political intervention into [MNCs]”.345 This failure “has long served as an 
illustration of the need to develop either distinctly ‘post-national’, institutionalized governance 
forms, or self-regulatory soft instruments of voluntary binding.”346 This leads to reflexive law 
and new governance theories, discussed below. 
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2.2 Reflexive Law   
From the evolution of formal law
347
 to substantive law
348
 and the subsequent advancement of 
substantive law arises reflexive law. Under formal law, “private actors are free to act in any way 
within a set boundary.”349 This contributes to individualism and autonomous activity where 
“substantive value judgments” are made freely by the private actors,350 but within a boundary of 
rules.
351
 When the state begins to increase the amount of intervention and regulation the 
subsequent level of regulation is referred to as substantive law.
352
 Normally, substantive law is 
associated with the growth of the welfare state and increased state intervention,
353
 with laws 
being used “as an instrument for purposive, goal-oriented intervention.”354 In comparison to 
formal law, substantive law aspires to achieve predetermined targets through the development of 
regulations and standards for actors to follow.
355
 The justification of substantive law arises from 
the need of the state to regulate economic and social activities and balance inadequacies of the 
market.
356
 This entails moving away from defining “spheres for autonomous private action”, to 
one where the law “directly regulates social behaviour by defining substantive prescriptions”.357  
Reflexive law emerges when “substantive legal rationality” reaches the tipping point and causes 
“crisis of the interventionist state.”358 This crisis results from the welfare states’ inability to 
satisfy the needs and demands of multiple and “differentiated” components of society.359 
Describing this tipping point, Teubner refers to Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory, which refers 
to the transition of a stratified society to functionally differentiated societies
360
 and demands a 
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parallel transition to a differentiated legal order.
361
 This crisis may implicitly include the inability 
to regulate TNC activity abroad. 
The view from systems theory is that as societies develop and become more complex, society 
separates into distinct subsystems based on function, such as science, religion, education, 
politics, law, etc., and each of these subsystems has their own particular world view and manner 
of discourse.
362
 The separate views and distinct rationality of each subsystem displays a 
movement away from formal law or a stratified society
363
 to a “functionally differentiated 
society” with a number of “relatively autonomous” subsystems.364 As illustrated by the global 
legal pluralism view, “law” itself forms a subsystem amongst various other subsystems.365 
Although these subsystems are mutually independent they all perform at the same level.
366
 The 
role of the law is not necessarily diminished but takes a de-centered position from its original 
arrangement in society.
367
 Teubner states the problem is “[l]egal and bureaucratic structures 
cannot incorporate models of social reality that are sufficiently rich to allow them to cope 
effectively with the crises of economic management.”368 
The problems that force the progression of substantive law to reflexive regulation are twofold. 
First, is increased regulation over the various subsystems, which Teubner refers to as 
“juridification” of social spheres.369 Hess refers to the same problem as cognitive limitation and 
elaborates that this problem, or tipping point, is reached when society, with many subsystems, 
becomes too complex to be effectively regulated by state intervention.
370
 The pitfall of regulating 
a complex society with various subsystems is that substantive law can lead to an accumulation of 
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laws beyond reasonable comprehension.
371
 An example of this accumulation may be found in the 
area of human rights and “[t]he more than 2,500 bilateral investment treaties currently in 
effect”.372 According to the former SRSG, the increase in legal rights of TNCs is beneficial for 
globalization, investment and trade, but has created “imbalances” between TNCs and states, 
negatively impacting human rights.
373
 One such example of a lack of coherence is evident from a 
European mining company in South Africa that challenged black empowerment laws under an 
investment treaty.
374
 The example of national policy incoherency identified by the work of the 
United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) also reveals problems of over-accumulation, 
lack of clarity, and ultimately inconsistency through vertical and horizontal incoherence.
375
 
Specifically, vertical incoherence occurs where governments attempt to address “human rights 
without regard to implementation”, and horizontal incoherence occurs where national or sub-
national government agencies “work at cross purposes with the state’s human rights obligations 
and the agencies charged with implementing them.”376 
The second problem that leads to the crisis of the welfare state is that of normative legitimacy. 
This problem refers to the traditional state procedure of lawmaking being separated from 
democratic measures that underline the legitimacy of state and public institutions.
377
 Hess 
elaborates that this scenario arises when legislators become overwhelmed with the proliferation 
of substantive laws
378
 and become unable to adequately coordinate and reconcile statutes that 
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regulate the same behaviour, in different ways.
379
 The example of black empowerment laws 
above is only one example. Excessive regulation clutters the regulatory scope and fails to reflect 
policy goals. State agencies may also contribute to this issue by being given greater discretion in 
enforcing and interpreting the law.
380
 Normally, state agencies will provide a convenient and less 
bureaucratic method of dealing with a particular subsystem, instead of going through a long 
formal procedure of decision and law making. However, the threat is that government agencies 
will make interpretations of regulations and act without public consultation or discussion.
381
   
The above problems discussed give rise to the crisis of the interventionist state, and lead to the 
creation of reflexive law. Reflexive law “shares with substantive law the notion that focused 
intervention in social processes is within the domain of law but [then] retreats from taking full 
responsibility for substantive outcomes.”382 The justification Teubner provides for reflexive law 
arises from the middle ground between formal and substantive law, in liberal and neo-liberal 
concepts, or a free market role of law, since “it relies on invisible hand mechanisms” with 
regards to a corporation’s social autonomy.383 Reflexive law allows private actors the autonomy 
of formal law to freely make their own decisions and outcomes, but intervenes in social 
processes by creating procedures to guide the behaviour of actors.
384
 In other words, reflexive 
law creates a “regulated autonomy” that includes a self-regulated social system responding to 
stakeholder, or “regulator”, feedback. 385 This results in a decentralized integration of society, 
promoting integrative systems within autonomous subsystems.
386
 This promotes societal 
integration of the various subsystems “without losing the benefits they offer”.387 In this new 
differentiated society the role of law recognizes its limits as a subsystem attempting to regulate 
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other subsystems,
388
 and looks to control social action indirectly by determining organizational 
and procedural principles for future action.
389
 
Promoting individual decision-making and self-regulation through "required procedures,
390
 
reflexive law promotes a self-reflective process encouraging corporations to continuously re-
examine and reform their practices based on most current information from stakeholder feedback 
and experiences.
391
 New information compels corporations to react, build on, and learn from 
impacts to society and stakeholders.
392
 This results in a conscious and self-scrutinizing 
institutional culture with regard to the consequences of a business’ practices.393 Dhir points out 
reflexive law along with new governance theory are not focused on “directly regulating 
corporate behaviour – as through traditional command-and-control models” but instead look to 
affect how corporations are governed.
394
 These theories look to focus on the actor and not the act 
and to “transcend traditional punitive/deterrence-based measures”,395 focusing on norm 
generation and development of “internal self-regulatory capacities”.396 
                                                 
388
 Teubner, Reflexive Elements, supra note 342 at 255. 
389
 Ibid.  
390
 Eric Bregman & Arthur Jacobson, Environmental Performance Review: Self-Regulation in Environmental Law, 
in The Concept and Practice of Ecological Self-Organization 211 (Gunther Teubner et al eds, 1994) cited in Hess, 
Reflexive law, supra note 343 at 42-43, 51. 
391
 Ibid; Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, supra note 359 at 1231-32; Hess, Reflexive law, supra note 343 at 48-
49; Teubner, Reflexive Elements, supra note 342 at 255-56. The evolution from formal law to reflexive law is seen 
with an example of contract law. In a contractual dispute under formal law, the law will only look to see whether the 
elements of establishing a valid contract have been met, that of offer and acceptance and a “meeting of the minds.” 
Under substantive law, the law has the option to alter the terms of the contract between the parties in order to ensure 
the public interest or other socially-desired outcomes are upheld. Finally, in comparing reflexive law to the above 
views, where formal law looks to prior distributions between contracting parties as a means to settle a contractual 
dispute, reflexive law “seeks to structure the bargaining relations so as to equalize bargaining power.” Where 
substantive law seeks to resolve a contractual dispute with a view of maintaining the public interest or policy goal, 
reflexive law “attempts to subject contracting parties to mechanisms of “public responsibility” that are designed to 
ensure that bargaining processes will take account of various externalities.” 
392
 Hess, Reflexive law, supra note 343 at 46. 
393
 Eric W. Orts, “A Reflexive Model of Environmental Regulation” (1995) 5:4 Bus Ethics Q 779 at 780. 
394
 Dhir, Politics, supra note 344 at 60; David Hess, “Public Pensions and the Promise of Shareholder Activism for 
the Next Frontier of Corporate Governance: Sustainable Economic Development” (2007) 2:2 Va L and Bus Rev 221 
at 232. [Hess, Public Pension]. 
395
 David Hess, “Social Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The Prospects of Achieving Stakeholder 
Accountability through Transparency” (2007) 17:3 Business Ethics Quarterly 453 at 453. [Hess, New Governance]. 
396
 Lobel, Renew, supra note 344 at 365.  
60 
 
 
2.3 New Governance Theory  
New governance theory works along the same lines as reflexive law by including more actors 
and focusing on forming normative systems respectful of human rights and CSR. Many 
academics have treated both reflexive law and new governance theories as the same and this 
dissertation will as well.
397
  The common approach between the two models is seen from the fact 
that new governance theory arises from a combination of theories and even encompasses the 
reflexive law approach.
398
 This confluence of theories, under new governance, reflects a move 
away from traditional command-and-control regulation towards a collaborative governance 
based legal regime closer to self-regulation.
399
 The new governance model is normally 
“described as a process-oriented, participatory, and experimental approach.”400 As a form of 
regulation, the new governance approach operates by setting boundaries and outlining processes 
to “allow experimentation to occur at a more local level and allowing the lessons from those 
experiences to update standards and transfer best practices to other areas.”401 “Rolling best-
practices rulemaking”402 is a process whereby minimal standards gradually evolve based on new 
knowledge and experiences. This is an example of experimentalism where results are 
incorporated into a self-regulatory process,
403
 encouraging the evolution of standards and 
practices. The participatory aspect of new governance includes the different sectors of society, 
such as the state, market, and civil society forming relationships with one another and playing 
their role in developing and enforcing regulations.
404
 These relationships aim to emphasize the 
democratic process of the new governance model and make the formation of policy more 
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dynamic between different actors/subsystems who are viewed as regulators and corporations as 
the regulated or self-regulating.
405
 This relationship works through procedures and processes 
promoting the production of norms that focus on the actor, as opposed to goal-oriented 
legislation, which focuses more on the act.
406
 
Generally, the reflexive and new governance theories arise from the limitations associated with 
command-and-control, top-down regulation.
407
 These theories help alleviate the limitations by 
focusing on stakeholders, and their knowledge and experience, and their ability to help create 
norms and standards. The role of SR in this case is to stimulate dialogue by informing these 
stakeholders who then look to influence subsequent corporate behavior, a process aided by 
corporate self-reflection and self-regulation. In addition to rule-making and aiding in corporate 
self-reflection, the reflexive and new governance theories also suggest a role for stakeholders as 
enforcement mechanisms, as discussed below. 
2.4 Neo-Liberalism and Governance 
According to Adam Smith “it is not on the generosity of the butcher, brewer or baker that we 
depend for our dinner, but on their self-interest”.408 Very early on the market failed to take into 
account socio-moral considerations as side-effects of economic actions, such as labour 
exploitation and environmental degradation.
409
 One reason for this lack of moral sense from 
economic actors and enterprises is because of the existence of other social mechanisms, such as 
state governments who “assumed the task of ‘managing populations and things’ according to the 
logic of welfare and security.”410 In other words, the welfare state came to act in the public 
interest as a socio-moral agent addressing negative social externalities of business enterprises.
411
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In contrast, the neo-liberal approach overthrows the distinction between the market and society 
causing the “economization of the social [domain]”,412 resulting in significant side-effects.413 At 
this point, the “widely discredited top-down command-and-control form of authority” shifts 
towards a view of governance. 
Through schemes of governance, governments relinquish some of their 
privileged authoritative positions and are reconfigured as one source of authority 
among many, in fact re-conceptualized as if they operate within a horizontal 
“market of authorities,” placing governments on a par with private sources of 
authority and changing their function from regulators to facilitators.
414
 
The focus of governance is on the facilitation of private forms of authority supplementing, 
not replacing, traditional rule making with a mixture of guidelines, principles, standards, 
and codes of conduct that are not necessarily enforced by the state.
415
 Fundamentally, the 
formation and enforcement of laws and standards “becomes a shared problem-solving 
process” consisting of multiple actors, dialogue, consultation, and democratic 
participation.
416
 Therefore, governance looks to facilitate flexible and efficient best 
practices leaving “the greatest possible amount of control in the hands of those closest to 
the problems.”417 This approach outlines self-regulation, rule making, and enforcement by 
including private actors such as TNCs, industry associations, and standard-setting 
organizations.
418
 The eventual result of industry learning and evolving standards may be 
termed as the “responsibilization” of corporate actors. This concept is defined by Shamir as 
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the expectation and assumption that various actors will have reflexive moral capacities,
419
 
and it links new governance regulation to corporate actors who are subject to such 
regulation.
420
 SR reinforces responsibilization by providing a medium of stakeholder 
feedback and compelling reflexive moral capacities. This potential for self-reflection is 
further discussed below. 
2.5  The Moral Corporation 
Shamir clarifies the new governance position by reasoning socio-legal scholars do not “naively 
assume the supremacy of governance and of private and self-regulation.”421 Studies criticizing 
the new governance/reflexive approaches have normally focused on the efficacy, feasibility, and 
functionality of the theories but not on capitalist interests.
422
 Analyzing CSR as the capitalist 
response to criticism and as a product of a “capitalist crisis of legitimacy”,423 Shamir examines 
the “business case” argument. This argument “stipulates that the pursuit and adoption of CSR 
policies is not simply the morally right thing to do but a sound business strategy on its own 
account”.424 Consequently, it becomes one way of injecting TNCs with a moral capacity, 
simultaneously supporting the idea of corporate self-reflection and the concept of 
responsibilization.
425
 The business case also supports SR through the sharing of similar goals, 
particularly of stakeholder, or market, feedback and corporate self-reflection. 
As “governance becomes the new orthodoxy” the influx of different actors and standards lead to 
an emphasis on “dialogue and persuasion rather than sanctions and adversarial methods” as a 
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means of compliance.
426
 Shamir calls this spread of authority between different actors and the 
moral corporation the “economization of authority”,427 meaning that governments now are one 
source among many.
428
 This economization of authority helps legitimize the moralization of 
corporations through the concept of an open corporation.
429
 Open corporations act in response to 
norms instead of formal prescriptive rules.
430
 This is because corporate management understands 
and adheres to the “business case for social responsibility” and so “integrat[es] social values with 
[its own] commercial practices”.431 This awareness of a commercial add-on value and of external 
stakeholder values and concerns leads to the development of a “corporate conscience”,432 
reinforcing self-regulation and providing a “moral justification for capitalism’s drive to 
profitability”.433 This process helps verify the moral undertaking by an “open” TNC.434  
Canadian extractive sector companies Placer Dome and Noranda and their adoption of CSR 
policies provide a case in point. Through their senior management both Placer Dome and 
Noranda recognized multiple influences in their initial adoption of CSR policies.
435
 This 
included institutional factors recognizing growing public awareness, the concept of sustainable 
development, tightening of government regulations, effectiveness of NGOs in raising awareness, 
and with Placer Dome in particular, experience with its environmental accident in the Philippines 
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and its personal experiences with Indigenous peoples.
436
 In addition to being influenced by 
global CSR norms, both of these companies also engaged in efforts to influence and shape global 
CSR norms as well, as co-founders of the International Council on Mining and the Environment 
(ICME).
437
 The ICME encouraged mining companies to engage with NGOs, to “exert influence 
on global governance processes affecting mining”, to use a “strategic approach to [address] 
environmental and social issues in a unified manner”, and to counter mining’s bad public 
image.
438
 As a whole, this “forward-thinking” process revealed an evolving global normative 
context with mining companies responding to and contributing to the evolution of norms in a 
“bottom-up process”, as described by Dashwood.439 SR fits in this process by providing 
information leading to stakeholder feedback and dialogue in the eventual creation of ensuing 
principles, practices, and corporate governance decision-making. 
In making the argument for the moral corporation, simultaneously providing justification for SR 
and disclosure within the new governance process, Shamir adheres to “the new spirit of 
capitalism” theory.440 A central tenet of this theory is “that capitalism relies on critiques in order 
to alert itself to threats, to neutralize opposition, and to develop new moral justifications for the 
increase of profitability.”441 In addressing critiques and justifying actions it “incorporates some 
of the values in whose name it was criticized”.442 For example, TNC’s operate abroad in an 
unregulated manner, where home state rules and regulations do not apply, and where many host 
states are weak or unable to govern. This has given rise to criticisms of culpable and immoral 
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TNC activity.
443
 As such, CSR has emerged as the capitalist, or corporate, response to criticisms, 
also becoming an argument against government regulation of TNCs.
444
 
2.6 The Voluntary Nature of CSR 
The stakeholder “battle cry”445, or criticism, represents the views of stakeholders that TNCs 
respond to. This criticism is also recognized by national governments and international 
organizations.
446
 Despite government recognition of stakeholder concerns, the TNC, or capitalist, 
response to criticism looks to establish CSR as a voluntary, instead of a regulatory, initiative.
447
 
The defeat of Bill C-300, Canada’s most recent attempt to hold accountable Canadian extractive 
sector TNCs, is one example.
448
 Shamir focuses on the early stages in the institutionalization 
process to reveal “the ability of corporations to shift the terrain of contest and debate from the 
arena of state or international binding regulation” to a voluntary or private regulatory 
framework.
449
 Using this model Shamir identifies a movement by TNCs to “vigorously” promote 
a voluntary and self-regulatory nature of CSR, simultaneously developing opposition to 
governmental legalization of CSR and regulation of business at the national and international 
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levels.
450
 Although the corporate effort to prevent regulation of CSR has been fairly successful, 
there remains persistent pressure to formulate compulsory CSR requirements, as legislative 
examples from Europe and the U.S. demonstrate.
451
 This “push and pull of regulatory 
pressures...and voluntary displays of good citizenship” give rise to a “comprehensive[, yet] 
fragmented, CSR industry”,452 consisting of a variety stakeholders, such as NGOs, corporations, 
governments, international and financial institutions and organizations, consultants, “CSR 
standard-setting organizations, social and environmental auditing firms, and CSR reporting, 
accreditation, and certification agencies”.453 
Despite TNC efforts against legalizing CSR, stakeholders identified in the CSR industry above 
offer an opportunity to become a part of a new governance regulatory approach, similar to the 
multi-stakeholder process underlying the voluntary Global Reporting Initiative.
454
 Such a 
stakeholder regulatory approach has the potential to help “facilitate, directly or indirectly, 
corporate compliance with various standards.”455 Even critics such as Crowther, Laufner, and 
Vogel argue that “new regulatory tools”, such as stakeholder governance and SR, when properly 
deployed reinforce new governance and its idea of democratic governance.
456
 In relation to the 
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capitalist response, these “tools” present business an opportunity to bridge the gap between profit 
and moral decision-making by promoting efficient and due diligent corporate behavior. 
The crux of Shamir’s argument entails the use of the business case for influencing TNC 
corporate governance. The business case
457
 helps “wed corporate conscience to corporate 
financial concerns”, forming a moral corporation.458 This also provides an argument that CSR 
policies can improve a corporation’s reputation; attract consumers and investors;459 strengthen 
relationships between stakeholders;
460
 and, importantly, aid in risk-management strategies.
461
 
Although studies question the link between CSR and profitability, the business case provides 
value in its risk management,
462
 like corporate human rights due diligence and SR.
463
 
The formulation of the business case argument as a commercial instrument and risk-management 
tool reveals important theoretical benefits, in addition to those associated with SR cited in 
chapter 1. First, the business case idea replaces an “idealistic or altruistic” face of CSR with a 
more utilitarian one,
464
 a view justified by the fact it does not run contrary to shareholder 
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establish relationships between Indigenous peoples and mining companies, secure economic benefits for affected 
communities, and reduce the impacts on mining projects. [IBA]; See Chapter 1 for discussion on ICMM and due 
diligence. 
463
 IBA, supra note 462. Impact Benefit Agreements are also viewed in a positive light and even promoted as 
possible means of formulating better dialogue, trust and relationships between Indigenous peoples and the extractive 
sector. 
464
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interests when it provides the potential benefits mentioned above, such as risk management. 
Second, the business case provides an argument against government regulation. Businesses and 
industries argue this ensures corporations are incentivized “to self-regulate to avoid risks that 
come with irresponsible behaviour,” motivating firms to “perform better than competitors” 
whereas state regulation “may stifle such competition.”465 Lastly, the business case “recodes a 
political context of pressure as a business opportunity”,466 which provides a short-term solution 
in getting TNCs to engage in CSR activity, and in the long-term de-politicizes the pressure to be 
socially conscious by co-opting TNCs with civil society and the state in a market-embedded 
system.
467
  
Similar to the business case and moral corporation, the new governance perspective looks to 
strengthen the relationship between corporations and stakeholders, “improve the reputation of the 
corporation”, and overall influence corporate decision-making. Like new governance regulation, 
Shamir insists that the “emergence of a commercial and civic CSR-related regulatory industry by 
no means suggests that formal law is external to the field,”468 implying the state plays an 
important role in a self-regulating stakeholder inclusive regulatory framework. 
2.7   The Need for State Authority 
Overall, in the operation of a reflexive law and new governance framework and in the CSR 
industry as discussed above, the role of the state remains a necessary component. Dhir,
469
 
Karkkainen,
470
 and Seck
471
 all make the argument that the state government should not risk 
                                                 
465
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466
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467
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abdicating its role and its governmental responsibilities.
472
 For example, Dhir does not support 
soft-law tools and voluntary actions and does not simply believe the process of disclosure or SR 
will automatically “result in self-correcting behaviour modification of corporate decision-
makers.”473 Dhir uses the state duty to protect, as defined in the U.N. Framework,474 to suggest 
the state is indeed a critical component when requiring social disclosure.
475
 The blueprint of SR 
legislation discussed by Hess also clarifies any misconception that new governance and reflexive 
approaches can only be based on voluntary or soft law frameworks.
476
  
Critics similarly view the reflexive and new governance approaches by themselves as not enough 
to induce an ethical or CSR reaction from for-profit corporations. They see factors such as lax 
government regulations,
477
 a strong industry lobby
478
, the belief that the market will adjust prices 
and actions accurately, and the basic view that for-profit corporations are accountable only to its 
stockholders as some of the reasons why reflexive law and new governance regulation is unable 
to alter the corporate governance.
479
 For example, these factors contribute to Leo Strine’s strong 
scepticism towards a self-regulatory approach on behalf of for-profit corporations. Strine also 
cites state regulatory authority as a mandatory, and vital, component for there to be any change 
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139 at 196. Direct and vicarious liability and domestic criminal law, under the territoriality principle, also provide a 
route in which to attach to state authority in enforcement.  
472
 Florini 2010, supra note 418 at 125, 128. For Florini the role of the state is a required component for a 
transparency system to work efficiently and effectively. To attract “green” investors, the state’s capacity to mandate 
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 Dhir, Politics, supra note 344 at 73. 
474
 See Chapter 1 for a discussion on the U.N. Framework and the state duty to protect. 
475
 Dhir, Politics, supra note 344 at 77; John Burchill, “Out of the Heart of Darkness: A New Regime for Controlling 
Resource Extraction in the Congo” (2010) 10 Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law 99 at 119, 
122-126, 128-32. Burchill views the role of the Home and Host state as vitally important. 
476
 Hess, Reflexive law, supra note 343 at 64; Hess, Public Pension, supra note 394 at 232.  Hess also demonstrates 
how state support is critical to the implementation of a SR framework for it to successfully meet its goals. 
477
 Leo Strine, “Bailed Out Bankers, Oil Spills, Online Classifieds, Dairy Milk, and Potash: Our Continuing Struggle 
with the Idea that For-Profit Firms Seek Profit” (The University of Western Ontario The Beattie Family Lecture in 
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<https://www.law.uwo.ca/News/News_Documents/Leo_Strine_lecture.pdf> at 3, 4, and 11 (Accessed February 13, 
2012). See also: Leo Strine, Bailed out bankers, Oil Spills and Potash, online: 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TzGx3WsKZcE> (Accessed August 15, 2013). [Strine]; Jeremy P Jacobs, 
“Federal Oil Spill Probe Finds U.S. Regulations Lacking” The New York Times (29 September 2011) online:  NYT 
Energy & Environment <http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/09/29/29greenwire-federal-oil-spill-probe-finds-us-
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in traditional for-profit corporate governance.
480 
Reinforcing the importance of state authority, 
Strine argues that in order for the public interest to even be considered, on top of shareholder 
interest, it will “depend on protection by the public’s elected representatives in the form of 
law.”481 
According to Dhir those sceptical of disclosure still “concede the importance of the 
dissemination of information”.482 For example, Joel Bakan, like Strine, disregards the possibility 
of self-correcting behaviour by TNCs and dismisses shareholder activism as capable of 
facilitating corporate accountability.
483
 Similar to Strine, Bakan implies that these changes to 
corporate governance may be possible with the unique strength of the domestic democratic state, 
again providing reinforcement to the need and role of the state and its unique authoritative power 
to compel a new governance regulatory system, particularly a system motivated by SR.
484
 
2.8 Sustainability Reporting and the Reflexive and New 
Governance Theories  
The “goal is to create a regulatory system that encourages corporations to be socially responsive. 
To accomplish this, corporations must have an understanding of what society expects of them 
and be stimulated to behave in a way that is responsive to those demands.”485 This clarifies that 
SR is not based on one-way communication. Disclosure lacking feedback is not enough for SR to 
fulfill its potential of providing subsequently meaningful output.
486
 Without stakeholder input a 
TNC may not be able to completely learn, mitigate and prevent risks.
487
 Similar to the process of 
                                                 
480
 Ibid at 42.  
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 Newenham-Kahindi, supra note 330 at 268-269, 276-277. Barrick Gold’s operation in Tanzania, discussed 
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securing a “social license” to operate, SR, among other TNC efforts, must engage in a “deep 
understanding” of, and integration with, local communities.488 
As mentioned above, SR fits well with the reflexive and new governance models.
489
 SR shares 
similar goals and looks to take advantage of the benefits of a differentiated society. This includes 
holding corporations accountable to the multiple actors and stakeholders through a SR and 
corporate self-scrutinizing process.
490
 For Hess, SR, as a governance mechanism, has two goals: 
first, of organizational transparency and second, of stakeholder engagement.
491
 Citing the GRI, 
Hess identifies “[a] primary goal of reporting is to contribute to an ongoing stakeholder dialogue. 
Reports alone provide little value if they fail to inform stakeholders or support a dialogue that 
influences the decisions and behaviour of both the reporting organization and it stakeholders”.492 
“If corporations were required to disclose information about their actions affecting 
[stakeholders], then pressure would mount to justify those acts; and justifying one's acts is the 
first step toward improving one's behaviour.”493 The act of providing environmental, social and 
corporate governance (ESG) and human rights disclosure to stakeholders provides them with 
information and promotes increased TNC accountability. This process is intended to do what 
financial reporting does for investors; it allows investors to determine the level of non-financial 
risk associated with an investment. SR, together with the new governance and reflexive theories, 
promotes transparency, stakeholder enlightenment, feedback, and subsequently TNC 
accountability.  
Academics have referred to information regulation,
494
 or regulation by information,
495
 in 
understanding the “significance of reputational capital of companies”; the increased role, 
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489
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importance and “vulnerability of legitimatory capital of” NGOs; the emergence of multiple 
actors; as well as “the power and influence of accountability, transparency and disclosure” in 
governance.
496
 This information regulation has moved from a right-to-know towards a struggle 
for knowledge, access and control of information.
497
 This has become a vital component in 
environmental regulation, since many “environmental controversies and struggles are [locating] 
within the “information scape””, according to Mol.498 This study views social, human rights, and 
corporate governance issues in a similar light. SR provides greater transparency and 
“transparency relates directly to power as it aims to democratize information and empower the 
powerless with access to and control over information and knowledge.”499 
2.9 Disclosure for Whom  
The chapter so far has addressed how SR may be utilized and why. The discussion of global 
legal pluralism, the review of reflexive law and new governance, and the explanation and 
justification provided by Shamir demonstrates that a broad scope of stakeholders is to be 
considered. In the context of TNCs, “stakeholders” is a term that has evolved to include a variety 
of investors, consumers, business industries, suppliers and partners, NGOs, international 
organizations like the UN, state governments, and those directly impacted. With companies 
becoming more concerned about their social image, non-financial factors are now a greater 
concern, as evident in a number of examples, such as corporate sponsors pulling out of 
endorsements with celebrities to TNCs distancing themselves from unethical and human rights 
violations.
500
 Even those state governments that have the political capacity to implement socially 
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conscious legislation have begun to enact such legislation to prevent and eliminate the potential 
of ESG and human rights misconduct.
501
 
Targeting a broad scope of stakeholders increases the potential to hold those TNCs engaging in 
misconduct accountable.
502
 Mol argues the current pluralism and the stakeholder participatory 
approach, together with a forceful and independent civil society, along with technological and 
media enhancements create a strong potential for disclosure initiatives and policies.
503
 The role 
of civil society is particularly emphasized because of its determination to disseminate and 
translate information for others.
504
  This allows stakeholders to comprehend disclosure and react 
to destructive ESG and human rights performance.
505
 In other words, civil society, and other, 
organizations can act as middle-men.
506
 This is important because although a variety of 
stakeholders are targeted the majority of these stakeholders do not necessarily have a direct and 
efficient system to best make use of such empowerment to hold TNCs accountable.
507
 Overall, 
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despite the cited examples and arguments revealing a trend towards SR and new governance, 
Williams argues more examples are needed and ultimately “the future will provide a test of the 
new governance paradigm.”508 Williams summarizes this movement as 
[f]rom theory to practice, then, the new governance paradigm provides an excellent 
account of the CSR movement. The inadequacy of traditional regulation at the 
national level has provided the stimulus for the collection of actions that comprise 
the movement. As the model would predict, the result to date has been a template 
that blurs traditional public/private and state/market boundaries and introduces new 
categories of actors into the regulatory process.
509
 
Conclusion 
Global legal pluralism and the theories of reflexive law and new governance help explain the 
purpose and role of disclosure, justifying the growing SR and transparency trend identified in 
chapter 1. The research established these theories promote and provide benefits similar to those 
associated with SR. Critics, however, are quick to argue that without state enforcement SR and 
new governance elements will remain weak and malleable subject to corporate campaigns. The 
role of the state and its unique authoritative capacity is not intended to be absent from new 
governance theories by any means, and in fact many argue the state is a necessary component to 
compel stakeholder participation, SR, and corporate self-reflection. For this reason, the next 
chapter will examine the Canadian government’s efforts to promote SR and address negative 
extractive sector TNC impacts on ESG and human rights issues. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
to allow disclosure-based regulation systems to work near optimal in regulating targets: First, an audience of 
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Chapter 3 
3 Case Study of the Canadian Extractive sector, its Impacts, and the 
Push for Sustainability Reporting in Canada 
This chapter will examine the global impact of Canadian extractive sector transnational 
corporations (TNCs) and related Canadian efforts to promote Sustainability Reporting (SR). 
Section one will introduce and justify the focus on the Canadian extractive sector. Section two 
will describe the push for disclosure and SR, and section three will then examine the role of SR 
in the structure of the Canadian Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor 
(CSR Counsellor). 
3.1 Why Focus on the Canadian Extractive Sector?  
“Extractive industries (mining and oil and gas) make a major contribution to Canadian 
prosperity.”510 In 2007, mining, oil and gas extraction was the “third largest component of 
Canadian direct investment”, in stocks, abroad; and it rose to number two in 2010.511 The 
Toronto and Vancouver financial markets also serve as the world’s primary source of equity 
capital for the extractive sector in exploration and development.
512
 As of 2008, “over 75% of the 
world’s exploration and mining companies and 43% of all global exploration expenditures came 
from mining and exploration companies based in Canada.
513
 Roughly $60 billion has been 
invested abroad by Canadian extractive companies; mostly in developing countries, with $41 
billion in Latin America and nearly $15 billion in Africa alone.
514
 
Toronto is seen as the mining finance capital of the world, and when combined with Vancouver, 
forms part of the global economic hub for the extractive sector.
515
 In 2012, the Toronto Stock 
                                                 
510
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commerciaux/topics-domaines/other-autre/csr-strat-rse.aspx?lang=eng> (Accessed August 15, 2013). [Extractive 
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Exchange (TSX)
516
 housed 57% of the world’s public mining companies,517 which as of January 
2014 amounted to 326 mining issuers.
518
 This is complemented by 259 listed oil and gas
519
 
issuers as well. To illustrate the concentration of mining financing and value on the TSX and 
TSX Venture Exchange (TSXV)
520
, in 2012 the TSX and TSXV had 1700 financings or 70.5% 
of all global mining equity financings,
521
 the Australian Securities Exchange
522
 was second with 
559 financings making 23% of the global total, and the London Stock Exchange Alternative 
Investment Market (LSE-AIM)
523
 had 147 financings and 6.09% of the global total.
524
 The 
TSXV normally houses new, smaller, and growing companies. Even so, the TSXV together with 
the TSX (part of the TMX group)
525
 is a global leader in the extractive industry. The global reach 
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of TMX mining companies is evident as nearly 50% of the 9000 mining exploration projects by 
TSX and TSXV companies, as of December 2013, were outside of Canada.
526
 
With the increase in globalization and the spread of the Canadian extractive sector, the Canadian 
government has recognized that this “sector faces many social and environmental challenges, 
[especially] when operating in developing countries.”527 Extractive sector businesses operate 
where economically viable deposits are found, and many such sites are found in developing 
countries.
528
 This has the potential to lead to greater environmental, social, political, and human 
rights issues because policies on risk in these countries are either “developing,” “weak, or non-
existent”.529 In addition, many local communities in developing countries also do not have the 
resources to “engage effectively with foreign extractive sector companies, and companies 
themselves lack experience in these complex and challenging [, environmental, social and human 
rights] circumstances.”530 Overall, the size and power of the Canadian extractive sector and the 
inherently intrusive nature of its operations creates a delicate relationship between extractive 
sector TNCs, developing countries, and local interests.
531
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 Canada, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Fourteenth Report: Mining in 
Developing Countries, 38th Parl. 1st sess. (June 2005) at 1 [SCFAIT Report]. 
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L.J. 177 at 202. The CERD conclusion highlights that the delicate relationship between Indigenous/local interests 
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Even though the Canadian extractive industry is seen as a global leader, it has not been immune 
from allegations of culpable activity. These allegations range from direct and indirect complicity 
in human rights violations,
532
 environmental pollution
533
 and disregard for social issues, norms, 
and development.
534
 Here, social issues are broadly construed to include human rights and local 
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 US, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy, Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, 07-0016 in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (26 February 2007), online: <http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Categories/Lawlawsuits/Lawsuitsregulatoryaction/LawsuitsSelectedcases/TalismanlawsuitreSudan
> (Accessed August 15, 2013). [Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief]. A case was brought against Talisman in the U.S. for 
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2010. In the end, Talisman was not held liable for any violations; Sally Neighbour, “The Kilwa Incident Transcript” 
ABC: Four Corners, (June 6, 2005) online: ABC <http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2005/s1386467.htm> 
(Accessed August 15, 2013); “Australian Mining Company Implicated in Deaths of DRC Villagers” ABC TV, (6 
June 2005) online: Mines and Communities <http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=275> (Accessed 
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Dem Rep of Congo, online: <http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Categories/Lawlawsuits/Lawsuitsregulatoryaction/LawsuitsSelectedcases/AnvilMininglawsuitreD
RC> (Accessed August 15, 2013). In November 2010, a civil class action against Anvil Mining in the Quebec 
Superior Court was launched. In January 2012 the Quebec Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the decision to 
hear the case. The appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was also refused, failing to hold the Anvil accountable for 
its participation in the Kilwa incident; Jen Moore, “Corporate Rights over Human Rights: Canadian Mining in 
Central America”, (January 2011) online: MiningWatch Canada <http://www.miningwatch.ca/article/corporate-
rights-over-human-rights-canadian-mining-central-america> (Accessed August 15, 2013). The Phoenix nickel 
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15, 2013).  
533
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Mining in Costa Rica in the Era of Globalization”, (2002) 21:4 Canadian Woman Studies 148 at Interview with 
Sonia Torres; Recherches Internationales Quebec v Cambior Inc., [1998] QJ No 2554 (QL). 
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 Aloysius Marcus Newenham-Kahindi, “A Global Mining Corporation and Local Communities in the Lake 
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268-69. 276-77; Frederick Bird, “Project CARE: Placer Dome’s Efforts to Help Laid-off South African Miners Find 
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and national concerns that occur before, during, and after the completion of extractive 
projects.
535
 For example, many proposed extractive projects threaten to significantly influence 
and harm the traditional economic and cultural means of local populations, who also face the fear 
of, or actually suffer, the displacement of their community. Social and human rights violations 
and environmental destruction are further aggravated when those for and against extractive 
projects turn to threats, intimidation, and violence to promote their views.
536
 
Mentioned above, many extractive projects take place in developing countries. As a result, these 
projects face issues and risks associated with weak and corrupt governments and rural economies 
of local communities.
537
 For example, since extractive projects provide a critical source of host 
country revenue, weak and corrupt governments look to strongly safeguard their interest in such 
revenue. Therefore, these extractive projects undergo a “securitization”538  process to protect the 
project and capital. Due to the, often, close proximity of such projects to Indigenous 
communities, which usually have weak and rural economies that rely on local land and 
resources, extractive projects require security to prevent theft and sabotage from those opposed 
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(2007) 6 Indigenous Law Journal 101 at 110.    
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[Carsten and Hilson]; Matthew Smith, “Environmental Militarism: Burma’s Extractive Industries” (October 2007) 
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<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/02/01/gold-s-costly-dividend-0> (Accessed August 15, 2013). In February 2011, 
allegations of violence, human rights abuse, corruption and environmental damage in Papua New Guinea were 
attributed to, Canadian and TSX listed, Barrick Gold Corp. [Gold’s Cost]. 
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 John Ruggie, February 2007: Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility 
and Accountability for Corporate Acts, A/HRC/4/35 at ¶ 3, online: SRSG Portal, <http://www.business-
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to the project.
539
 This also usually entails protection from protests, illegal mining, and 
trespassing, among other concerns.
540
 
This security normally consists of either local police or national military personnel.
541
 These 
forces often clash with, control, and suppress opposition and thieves and, importantly, are duty-
bound to deal with the backlash arising from adverse impacts of the project on local community 
life, environment, and human rights.
542
 The variety and complexity of issues that can arise and 
the lack of adequately trained and equipped security forces to deal with such complexity can 
result in serious social side effects.
543
 Some of these side effects can, and allegedly already has, 
subjected locals to rape,
544
 violence,
545
 torture
546
, and forced displacement,
547
 among other 
serious violations.
548
 The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
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Extraction: Indigenous Peoples, Local Communities and the Role of Law in Economic and Social Sustainability” 
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Report, discussed below, highlighted the negative impacts of the Canadian extractive sector and 
proposes mechanisms to address such misconduct. 
A. Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
Report (SCFAIT Report). 
Released in June 2005, the SCFAIT Report brought to the attention of the Canadian government 
the adverse impacts associated with its unregulated extractive sector operating internationally. 
Just as important, the SCFAIT Report proposed one of the first Canadian efforts to regulate the 
Canadian extractive sector. After identifying impacts on the environment, local communities and 
residents, and their economic and social well being, particularly in developing countries,
549
 the 
SCFAIT proposed a set of recommendations to regulate the extractive sector, as follows. First, 
SCFAIT recommended forming a multi-stakeholder process to create new, and strengthen 
existing, programs and policies.
550
 These included monitoring mechanisms dealing with 
irresponsible social and environmental activity and human rights violations by Canadian mining 
companies abroad.
551
 Second, the SCFAIT Report proposed the need for “clear legal norms” to 
create accountability for social and environmental corporate misconduct and human rights 
violations.
552
 The third recommendation identified the need to inform, and improve the 
knowledge of, mining companies operating in developing countries on Canadian and 
international CSR and human rights standards and obligations, as well as the political, social, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
issues in relation to artisanal mining such as employment, land disputes, and displacement. Also see Daniel Franks, 
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551
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552
 Ibid at recommendation 4. 
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cultural contexts in which companies operate.
553
 Although the SCFAIT Report did not propose 
disclosure or SR, it did provide momentum in the creation of further Canadian efforts. 
B. Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada
554
 (PDAC) 
Report  
Before discussing the Government response to the SCFAIT recommendations, it is useful to 
discuss the PDAC Report. The October 2009 PDAC Report plays a similar role to the SCFAIT 
Report in that it identifies adverse side effects attributed to the extractive sector and proposes 
solutions to mitigate and prevent misconduct in the future. PDAC, an extractive industry 
association, commissioned the report to discuss the accountability and transparency of mining 
and exploration firms in developing countries.
555
 This involved examining extractive sector 
incidents between 1999 and 2009, highlighting the extractive sector relationship with social, 
environmental, and human rights issues.
556
 The Report was also, notably, used to determine 
whether CSR was evolving and helping to prevent mining and exploration companies from 
causing adverse impacts.
557
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Social Responsibility: PDAC responds to media coverage of leaked report, (20 October 2010) online: Canadian 
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media-coverage-of-leaked-report/1000389375/> (Accessed August 15, 2013); Marilyn Scales, “Leaked PDAC 
Sponsored Corporate Social Responsibility Report Flawed”, Republic of Mining (20 October 2010) online: 
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What the PDAC Report revealed was that the Canadian extractive sector was involved in roughly 
56 of the total 171 incidents examined.
558
 As a result, the report called on the Canadian 
extractive sector to shift its current CSR strategy.
559
 This outlined a need to improve its image 
and relationships with local communities, governments, and civil society in order to avoid 
further misconduct.
560
 One suggestion was for a form of measurement, review, and evaluation of 
CSR performance,
561
 with reporting and auditing suggested as possible solutions.
562
 As a whole, 
the PDAC Report deemed reporting and auditing to be central to CSR evaluation and for 
“increasing CSR’s clout within industry and with civil society.”563 The Report concluded  
“voluntary uptake of global CSR norms needs to be instituted in tandem with 
appropriate government accountability mechanisms in order to ensure that Canadian 
companies improve their practices in the developing world. Government regulation, 
stiff accountability mechanisms and CSR frameworks cannot stand alone. Regulation 
must not be divisive and unilateral, but should come from collaborative dialogue.
564
  
In other words, the PDAC Report envisioned a combination of hard law with soft law 
obligations and processes, reinforced with stakeholder input and knowledge, supporting the 
notion of SR to inform and stimulate a dialogue with stakeholders. 
3.2  Disclosure 
A. The Government Response to the SCFAIT Report  
The Government Response to the SCFAIT report (Government Response) was issued in October 
2005 and it rejected many of its recommendations. The Government did, however, “agree that 
more could be done to ensure” Canadian businesses abroad have the “necessary knowledge, 
                                                 
558
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 Ibid. 
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564
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support and incentives to achieve positive financial, social and environmental results” in their 
business operations.
565
 For example, the government proposed increasing “corporate 
transparency and reporting on social and environmental performance” by supporting and 
participating in international reporting initiatives, monitoring the approaches and models of other 
states, and increasing dialogue with stakeholders.
566
 This proposal was intended to be in direct 
response to the SCFAIT recommendation of making government financial support conditional 
upon the satisfaction of defined CSR practices. However, such a conditional support mechanism 
was impractical because Canada clearly lacked the required CSR standards to begin with.
567
 The 
Government also noted that the majority of Canadian investment abroad occurs without 
government support,
568
 and therefore, a strict focus on conditional government services would 
significantly limit any implemented measures to those in need of government financial support. 
Consequently, the Government identified CSR efforts needed to mainly target the private 
sector.
569
 The private sector can include TNCs incorporated or headquartered in Canada or listed 
on a Canadian stock exchange, each with varying citizenship consequences.
570
 
The Government Response also revealed that stakeholders are increasingly considering financial 
risks and opportunities associated with environmental and social issues.
571
 Greater investor 
demand for more information encourages the private sector to engage in CSR disclosure and 
reporting.
572
 This investor need for information was supported by the Government Response 
which pledged support for the integration of CSR and due diligence issues into Canadian 
business operations.
573
 For example, the Government Response highlighted the need for greater 
guidance and promised to take active steps to provide informational toolkits, packages, and 
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training modules to educate and better prepare Canadian businesses operating abroad to manage 
and evaluate risks.
574
 This anticipates a form of regulation where “market-based demands reward 
corporate leadership, while [receiving encouragement] to meet market expectations.”575 
Disclosure and reporting creates a similar process in which stakeholders, and the market, create 
greater market accountability, through information disclosure. 
In addition to transparency, the Government Response raises the idea of greater TNC 
accountability to stakeholders. This is important because one SCFAIT recommendation the 
Government Response did accept was to convene a consultation to strengthen current programs 
and develop new ones. This multi-stakeholder consultation was referred to as the National 
Roundtables on CSR and the Canadian Extractive Industry in Developing Countries (the 
Roundtables).
576
 The outcome document of the roundtables was a multi-stakeholder advisory 
group report, which explicitly makes references greater reporting, discussed below.
577
 
B. Advisory Group Report  
The Advisory Group Report (AG Report) made many recommendations applicable to the 
Canadian extractive sector. Of the many recommendations, the proposal for reporting is the most 
relevant for this study.
578
 The AG Report argued that reporting can assist companies to 
understand the value of CSR for their business and help manage environmental and social issues 
openly and systematically.
579
 If such reporting is “credible, comparable and comprehensive” it 
permits investors, consumers, communities, and other stakeholders to recognize and voice 
                                                 
574
 Ibid at Response to Recommendation #2, #5. This proposal was in response to the SCFAIT recommendation of 
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 Ibid.  
576
 Ibid. The multi-stakeholder consultation process included five roundtables across Canada. Halifax Initiative, 
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concerns, and ultimately to reward or punish.
580
 Supporting such a relationship incentivizes 
companies to build and improve on reporting and transparency.
581
 Despite this potential, there is 
no systematic CSR or SR framework in Canada. As a result, the AG Report recommended for 
the Government of Canada to endorse and expect the Canadian extractive sector, including 
junior, exploration, and senior companies to use the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) or a 
similar system.
582
 This recommendation similarly outlined for financial institutions, investors, 
insurers, and other market actors to promote the use of the GRI when considering investment 
risks.
583
 Collaboration with securities regulators to make GRI reporting a prerequisite for 
extractive companies to list on a stock exchange was also suggested to further infuse the concept 
of reporting as a norm.
584
 Tax incentives and credits, or an equivalent, were also proposed to 
entice compliance with the reporting obligation.
585
 
The concept of materiality under Canadian securities disclosure regulations and its relationship 
with ESG and human rights issues was also discussed,
586
 and it was concluded that in practice, 
ESG issues are not normally considered to be “material”.587 The ensuing recommendation was 
for the Government of Canada to work with securities regulators to consider ESG and human 
rights issues as material information, and to increase ESG disclosure for federally regulated 
pension funds.
588
 It was also recommended for the government to “engage, facilitate, and 
encourage the business and financial sectors along with other stakeholders to identify and 
develop the link between ESG performance and financial value to help make this more relevant 
                                                 
580
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to financial sector decisions.”589 Along the same lines, the AG Report also promoted the concept 
of Socially Responsible Investment (SRI). The SRI shares goals similar to SR by suggesting 
investors consider financial and non-financial risks and opportunities associated with the 
environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) performance of investments.
590
 Similar 
to the proposal for reporting, the SRI’s consideration of ESG issues in institutional investments 
looks to provide more information for investors and to introduce integrity and accountability into 
business operations.
591
 
Lastly, it is important to note the Roundtables failed to continue the promotion of “binding and 
enforceable criminal and civil legislation”,592 a recommendation originally proposed in the 
SCFAIT Report.
 593
 The corresponding recommendation in the AG Report was for the 
development of a voluntary CSR Framework,
594
 which clearly fell short of requiring any legal 
                                                 
589
 Ibid at 40.  
590
 Ibid at 34, 36. The integration of SRI principles grew the most with institutional investors. The AG Report 
reveals that fiduciary duties permit and in some cases require ESG considerations to be taken into account when 
making investment decisions. This highlights that ESG requirements are not well known, justifying participant 
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jurisdictions, such as the U.K. (assuming reference to the Companies Act 2006 (U.K.), 2006, c 46 s 417, which 
requires the consideration of a range of environmental and social risks, opportunities for their shareholders, and risks 
down supply chains to be reported by publicly listed companies as part of its mandatory “business review” of the 
annual financial reporting. However, this disclosure is subject to exceptions) and Australia (assuming reference to 
the Corporations Act 2001, S299(1)(f), which requires providing details of breaches of environmental laws and 
licenses in the annual report; and ss1013(A) to (F), which requires providers of financial products with investment 
components to disclose the extent of labour standards, environmental, social or ethical considerations in investment 
decision making) and their social and environmental laws targeting value maximization and risk reduction. 
591
 Ibid at 37. Requesting investment to provide ESG and human rights disclosure compels research into those areas 
of concern in order to provide such disclosure.  
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 Grahame Russell, “Canadian Round-Table Process Ensures Continuation of Impunity for Global Mining 
Companies” (April 2007), online: rightsaction.org <http://intercontinentalcry.org/canadian-round-table-process-
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 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Evidence for Mining in 
Developing Countries and Corporate Social Responsibility, (June 2005), online: 
<http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=1714445&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=38&
Ses=1> (Accessed August 15, 2013). 
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 AG Report, supra note 528 at iii, 6, 23-24, 40, 60-63.  This voluntary framework includes using “existing 
international standards supported by ongoing multi-stakeholder and multilateral dialogue”; CSR reporting 
obligations based on the GRI; an independent ombudsman office focused on operations of Canadian extractive 
companies abroad; a tripartite Compliance Review Committee to review compliance with the Framework; and lastly 
the development of policies and guidelines to measure “serious failure by a company to meet the Canadian CSR 
Standards”. The Independent Ombudsman and the Tripartite Compliance Review Committee make up the 
compliance aspect of the Canadian CSR Framework. 
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disclosure obligation.
595
 Despite the failure to create binding “legal norms”, this voluntary CSR 
Framework ultimately became the focus of a new government policy document, continuing 
Canada’s promotion of CSR and SR, discussed below.596 
3.3 Building the Canadian Advantage
597
    
In March 2009, two years after the AG Report, the “Building the Canadian Advantage: A CSR 
Strategy for the International Extractive Sector” was introduced.598 This initiative aims to 
increase the competitive advantage of Canadian extractive sector companies operating in 
developing countries by informing and advising them on how to meet their social and 
environmental responsibilities.
 599
 This includes providing a set of standards and indirectly 
pressuring those companies lacking the commitment to manage their social and environmental 
risks to meet the proposed standards or otherwise risk “underminin[g] the competitive position of 
other Canadian companies.”600 
For the Canadian Advantage initiative “transparency and accountability in developing countries 
is critical” for the extractive sector to help alleviate poverty and contribute “to a business and 
investment environment conducive to responsible corporate conduct.”601 In addition to 
transparency within developing countries, investors, insurers, consumers and other market actors 
outside of the host state also seek a greater amount of reliable information.
602
 This includes 
information on extractive sector investments, business operations, and the management of social 
and environmental impacts.
603
 This perspective was outlined by the CSR Centre of Excellence, a 
                                                 
595
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596
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597
 Government of Canada, Building the Canadian Advantage: A Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Strategy for 
the Canadian International Extractive Sector (March 2009), online: Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/other-autre/csr-
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component under the Canadian Advantage initiative.
604
 Although the Canadian Advantage 
recognizes that companies are increasingly responding to this demand for greater disclosure, this 
does not mean companies are providing quality or consistent disclosure.
605
 This is partially due 
to the lack of an overarching, in-depth disclosure framework regarding social, environmental, 
and human rights issues in Canada. This may offer an explanation of the Office of the Extractive 
Sector CSR Counsellor and its adoption of the GRI. 
A. The Office of the Extractive Sector CSR Counsellor 
A key element of the Canadian Advantage is on the Office of the Extractive Sector CSR 
Counsellor (CSR Counsellor).
606
 Essentially the sum product of the Advisory Group and 
SCFAIT reports, the CSR Counsellor only targets Canadian extractive sector TNCs.
607
 The 
order-in-council setting out the scope and authority of the CSR Counsellor elaborates that a 
Canadian extractive sector company specifically means “an oil, gas or mining company that has 
                                                 
604
 CSR Centre of Excellence, Home, online: cim.org <http://web.cim.org/csr/menuPage.cfm?menu=48> (Accessed 
August 15, 2013). The Centre of Excellence references the ‘Toward Sustainable Mining’ (TSM) strategy, which 
includes Crisis Management, or due diligence, indicators; Mining Association of Canada, Towards Sustainable 
Mining, online: mining.ca <http://www.mining.ca/site/index.php/en/towards-sustainable-mining.html> (Accessed 
August 15, 2013); The Centre also references Industry Canada and its CSR initiative. This includes an 
Implementation Guide for Canadian Business, notably providing guidance for small business, in addition to ‘all 
businesses’. Industry Canada, Corporate Social Responsibility: An Implementation Guide For Canadian Business, 
online: ic.gc.ca <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/csr-rse.nsf/eng/rs00126.html> (Accessed August 15, 2013); The Centre 
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CSR Centre of Excellence, Additional CSR Frameworks, online: 
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 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Evidence for Mining in 
Developing Countries and Corporate Social Responsibility, (June 2005), online: 
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Ses=1> at section I. (Accessed August 15, 2013). There is a disconnect between the SCFAIT and the CSR 
Counsellor. The SCFAIT focuses on developing countries, whereas the CSR Counsellor includes a much broader, 
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(Accessed March 22, 2014). [CSR Counsellor Backgrounder]. The CSR Counsellor officially opened to undertake 
complaints in Toronto in March 2010. Dr. Marketa Evans was appointed in an order-in-council in October 2009, 
who resigned on October 18, 2013; Trinh Theresa Do, “Ottawa’s responsible mining review awaited by NGOs”, 
CBC News (26 February 2014) online: cbc.ca <http://www.cbc.ca/m/touch/canada/story/1.2543080>  (Accessed 
March 22, 2014). The CSR Counsellor resigned, without providing a reason, on October 18, 2013; AG Report, 
supra note 528 at 6, 40; Appointment of Marketa Evans as CSR Counsellor, PC 2009-1678, (2009) C Gaz, 1625. 
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been incorporated in Canada or that has its head office in Canada.”608 It is important to point out 
that TSX and TSXV listed companies are permitted to list on an exchange without having to 
incorporate or have any other relationship to Canada.
609
 This is significant because the world’s 
largest source of equity capital for extractive sector companies in exploration and development 
are the Toronto and Vancouver markets.
610
 Evidently, the CSR Counsellor potentially fails to 
target foreign incorporated or headquartered extractive sector companies listed on and 
benefitting from the TSX and TSXV markets. 
The CSR Counsellor’s mandate involves reviewing the CSR practices of Canadian extractive 
sector companies operating outside Canada and also advising stakeholders on the 
implementation of performance guidelines.
611
 The review portion of the mandate involves the 
CSR Counsellor acting as an “impartial advisor and facilitator [and] … honest broker that brings 
parties together to help address problems and disputes.”612 The rationale for this approach is to 
form a credible, impartial, and transparent process for “win/win options to resolve disputes.”613 
With regards to advising stakeholders, the Counsellor’s role entails promoting and informing 
TNCs of performance guidelines, which include the International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
Performance Standards on Social & Environmental Sustainability;
614
 the Voluntary Principles on 
                                                 
608
 Order-in-Council, supra note 607 at section 1. Canadian extractive sector company means an oil, gas or mining 
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609
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duty to address CSR issues of “Canadian extractive sector TNCs operating outside Canada” in both developing and 
developed countries only if that TNC is incorporated or headquartered in Canada. If this is the case, it has the 
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Security and Human Rights;
615
 and the GRI.
616
 The Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) are also 
referenced by the CSR Counsellor as part of the performance guidelines.
617
 These standards are 
the benchmarks Canadian extractive companies operating abroad are requested to meet.
618
 
B. Review Process  
Recognizing the Office cannot realistically offer a “solution to all troubles”, the Counsellor 
simply focuses on being voluntary, low-cost, and easy-to-access.
619
 Included in the review 
process is a dispute resolution mechanism that aims to “foster dialogue and to create constructive 
paths forward” for the parties involved in an alleged dispute.620 The Review Process is 
administered by rules of procedure (Rules),
621
 which provide the parties with guidance on what 
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miningwatch 
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(Accessed August 15, 2013); Government of Canada, CSR Counsellor: About Us (March 2009), at section 6, online: 
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processus_examen.aspx?lang=eng#howdoes> (Accessed August 15, 2013). [Review Process]. 
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to expect and clarification that an individual or organization may aid or assist an individual, 
group, or community in making a request to the CSR Counsellor.
622
 
In order for the CSR Counsellor to hear a Request for Review, it must first be reviewed to ensure 
it relates to the performance standards outlined under the Counsellor’s mandate.623 The request 
must be received from an individual, group, or community “that reasonably believes it is 
adversely affected by the activities of a Canadian extractive sector company operating outside 
Canada” and considered inconsistent with the performance guidelines.624 The next step aspires to 
cultivate a dialogue. The party submitting the request must be willing to enter into a constructive 
dialogue with the responding party and the CSR Counsellor.
625
 This pre-condition is important 
because building dialogue and trust underpins the dispute resolution framework and moves the 
review process along. Failing to commit undermines the purpose and authority of the CSR 
Counsellor and highlights a weakness of the review process; that it is entirely voluntary in 
nature. In this way, a review may only be permitted with the express written consent of all of 
parties involved,
626
 and under no circumstances reviewed on the Counsellor’s own initiative.627 
Although limited in its scope, the Review Process has the potential to provide stakeholders with 
a mechanism to provide feedback and compel corporations to justify their actions and impacts. 
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Such a review mechanism, similar to SR, looks to ultimately influence subsequent corporate 
decision-making and prevent misconduct in the future. 
C. The CSR Counsellor and the GRI   
SR under the CSR Counsellor’s mandate is evident in the GRI.628 The GRI is included in the 
performance guidelines to increase CSR reporting from the extractive sector and “to enhance 
transparency and encourage market-based rewards for good CSR performance.”629 Since the 
majority of extractive sector projects occur in developing countries, many of the rules and 
regulations governing extractive projects are still developing, weak, or non-existent.
630
 
Moreover, the creation and implementation of non-legal extractive sector strategies and CSR 
policies that include ESG sustainability and human rights responsibilities are also part of the 
challenges developing countries face. Rather than address these challenges, many developing 
states, understandably, opt to focus on the potential revenue extractive projects can bring.
631
 The 
GRI as a “proactive disclosure” mechanism addresses the lack of sustainability by host states in 
which TNCs operate. As a development assistance program, the GRI provides greater 
transparency, accountability, and efficiency of business operations, and improves relationships 
with stakeholders. This provides a potential means to help countries address ESG and human 
rights related challenges and reduce unethical and negative side-effects attributed to the 
Canadian extractive sector.
632
 In particular, the GRI and its multi-stakeholder input process also 
                                                 
628
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allows it to address new problems as they emerge,
633
 putting pressure on Canadian extractive 
sector TNCs to continuously improve, report, and disclose information.
634
 
The inclusion of the GRI in the CSR Counsellor’s mandate may imply that new or more 
disclosure rules and regulations are needed or on the other hand imply a need for the GRI’s 
normative significance. A follow up question the GRI raises is whether its guidance contradicts, 
supplements, or reinforces the disclosure of ESG and human rights rules and regulations 
currently outlined in Canada. In any case, GRI guidance works towards satisfying stakeholders’ 
need for greater information and provides guidance where Canadian legislative efforts end.
635
  
The GRI provides guidance for SR through economic, social, environmental, human rights, 
sector specific,
636
 and materiality threshold guidance. Similar to the role played by materiality 
under Canadian securities laws, materiality under the GRI correspondingly provides direction on 
disclosing information that satisfies the GRI material threshold.
637
 GRI materiality covers topics 
and indicators
638
 reflecting the business “organization’s economic, environmental, and social 
impacts that would substantively influence the assessments and decisions of stakeholders.”639 
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The multi-faceted guidance and reference to stakeholders, not shareholders, reveals a broader 
definition of materiality than in Canadian securities laws.
640 
The importance of the GRI cannot be underestimated because it provides useful guidance to 
better manage risks and avoid violations. Since its inclusion in the CSR Counsellor’s mandate, 
the role of the GRI has seemingly become more relevant in Canada, especially with regard to the 
Canadian extractive sector. For example, the review by the Ontario Securities Commission 
(OSC) reveals a “disclosure gap” arising when there is a deficiency from what is expected from 
what is actually disclosed.
641
 Initiatives such as the GRI help mend this gap.
642
 Moreover, the 
GRI is a comprehensive and continuously evolving disclosure framework that includes the 
benefits of up-to-date information.
643
 In comparison to the other performance standards, which 
are useful for their intended purposes, the GRI, along with the OECD Guidelines for MNEs and 
its explicit disclosure obligations, discussed in Chapter 1, help promote the awareness and 
consideration of ESG, human rights, and stakeholder enlightenment. This transparency is 
designed to increase the integrity, and accountability, of the Canadian extractive sector TNCs.
644
 
Overall, the relationship and the mechanics between the CSR Counsellor, its dispute resolution 
and Review Process, and the adoption of the GRI remain unclear for a couple of reasons. The 
first question that arises is whether the adoption of the GRI and the creation of the review 
process allows those local to, or impacted by, the business activities of Canadian extractive 
sector TNC to bring forward a request to review. This could possibly include a Request to 
Review for the failure of a TNC to report accurately and truthfully; for providing intentionally 
misleading reports; or for failing to report at all under the GRI. The next question is whether the 
review process permits investors the option to bring a Request to Review the business activity of 
                                                 
640
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a company in which they are investing. The potential reasons for an investor to request a review 
could range from ensuring accuracy of disclosure documents; disclosure of environmental, social 
or human rights issues; increasing transparency generally; or simply to increase the level of 
accountability of a company. Looking at the cases submitted to the CSR Counsellor, there have 
been a total of six Requests for Review.
645
 Out of these six Requests, only one referenced the 
GRI.
646
 This particular Request to Review was raised by two non-government organizations on 
issues related to the GRI, as well as other performance standards. However, the closing and 
interim reports on the CSR Counsellor’s website failed to elaborate on details on the applicability 
of the GRI.
647
 
3.4  Extractive Sector Payment Disclosure 
This recently proposed disclosure initiative directly targets Canadian extractive sector TNCs and 
their financial disclosure, further revealing the level of Canadian disclosure efforts. This new 
initiative, if and when implemented, is designed to create a mandatory reporting standard that 
provides transparency of payments from the Canadian extractive sector to foreign governments.
 
648
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recommendations-imp> (Accessed August 15, 2013). [Transparency draft]. 
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foreign governments was released in June 2013.
649
 This draft was followed up by Canadian 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s public declaration that Canada will enhance its reputation as a 
world leader in promoting transparency and accountability in the extractive sector, at home and 
around the world.
650
 The premise of this initiative “is to ensure wherever you have material 
expenditures, there [is] transparency so citizens [in oil, gas and mineral producing countries] can 
see where this money is going”.651 The importance of this initiative is that it is outlines a 
mandatory reporting requirement and mirrors similar initiatives in the U.S. and the European 
Union (E.U.). Like the U.S. and E.U. initiatives, the draft Canadian framework aims to mandate 
extractive sector companies disclose payment information through the securities disclosure 
framework. Overall, like the initiatives examined above this framework highlights the growing 
use of disclosure and SR in Canada in relation to Canadian extractive sector TNCs operating 
internationally.
652
 
3.5  Broten Resolution
653
 
The Ontario Broten Resolution and the subsequent review of corporate disclosure requirements 
by the OSC and the Hennick Centre for Business and Law further reveal Canada’s effort to 
outline greater disclosure of environmental, social, and human rights information. In March 
2009, the Canadian Advantage initiative was tabled in the Canadian parliament. One month later, 
Member of Provincial Parliament Laurel Broten called for a review of Ontario’s corporate 
                                                 
649
 Transparency draft, supra note 648 at 4; Waldie, Canada, supra note 648. The draft views the most appropriate 
venue, or “home” for Canadian disclosure requirements through mandatory disclosure in the securities regime. 
650
 Prime Minister of Canada Stephen Harper, News Release, “Canada commits to enhancing transparency in the 
extractive sector”, (12 June 2013), online: pm.gc.ca 
<http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=1&featureId=6&pageId=26&id=5525> (Accessed August 5, 2013);  
Canadian Press, “Harper announces mining, oil and gas companies to face tougher rules on payments to foreign 
governments” National Post (13 June 2013), online: news.nationalpost.com 
<http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/06/12/harper-announces-mining-oil-and-gas-companies-to-face-tougher-rules-
on-payments-to-foreign-governments/> (Accessed August 15, 2013). “By establishing new mandatory reporting 
standards for Canadian companies operating in [the extractive] sector.” Prime Minister Harper made this 
announcement in London, England ahead of a G8 meeting in June 2013. [Harper Announcement]. 
651
 Harper Announcement, supra note 650. 
652
 See further chapter 1 re U.S. and E.U. initiatives; Publish What You Pay, Draft Framework for Consultation, 
online: Publish What You Pay <http://www.pwyp.ca/images/documents/Working_Group/RRTWG_-
_Draft_for_Consultation_-_June_14th_2013.pdf> at 3 – context for framework. (Accessed August 5, 2013). 
653
 Hennick Centre for Business and Law at York University and Jantzi-Sustainanalytics, Corporate Social 
Performance: Reporting Roundtable Consutltation Paper, online: Hennick Centre 
<http://hennickcentre.ca/documents/discussionpaper.pdf> at Appendix A (Accessed August 15, 2013).  
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disclosure reporting requirements and the level of compliance with these requirements (the 
Resolution).
654
 Following the approval of this resolution, the Ministry of Finance and the OSC 
agreed to undertake the review and make recommendations (OSC Review).
655
 One of the 
motivating factors for this review entailed “institutional and retail investors not hav[ing] access 
to a sufficient level of ESG information”,656 and therefore seeking more information through 
shareholder proposals and other means.
657
 The OSC Review also focused on corporate decision-
makers and “the need for better information, incentives and institutions to encourage decision-
makers to take a broad, long-term view to identify and confront risks in an integrated manner 
before they erupt systemically.”658 This reveals an effort to address corporate governance 
practices and due diligence to prevent future incidents and allegations of misconduct; goals 
shared with the process of SR as well. 
The OSC Review included a consultation on CSR and ESG standards focusing on disclosure 
requirements for reporting issuers under the Ontario securities legislation.
659
 The eventual 
recommendations arising from the OSC Review looked to provide greater transparency for 
investors and the Canadian market place in general.
660
 The recommendations focused on the 
nature and extent of environmental risks and issues as well as nature and adequacy of an issuers’ 
corporate governance practice.
661
 Some participants in the review argued that ESG disclosure is 
not necessarily complete, reliable, verified, or audited and the lack of consistency among issuers 
fails to allow comparisons to past performance or with other issuers.
662
 A related view was that 
                                                 
654
 OSC Final Report, supra note supra note 639 at 5, 14. 
655
 Ibid. 
656
 Ibid at 2 of Schedule 2 – Summary of roundtable discussion September 18, 2009.  
657
 Ibid at 37; Aaron Dhir, “The Politics of Knowledge Dissemination: Corporate Reporting, Shareholder Voice, and 
Human Rights” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 47 at 67. There is a growing use of shareholder proposals as a 
method of gaining more information and to influence corporate behaviour. 
658
 OSC Final Report, supra note 639 at 9. 
659
 Ibid at 5. 
660
 Ibid at 9. 
661
 Ibid at 9, and 2, 5, 9-10 of Schedule 2 – Summary of roundtable discussion held on September 18, 2009. 
Participants in the consultation also argued that social matters may just as likely as environmental issues equate to 
material information for investors and stakeholders, which are “inextricably linked,” so it is inappropriate to strictly 
consider environmental issues, which the review focused on, without considering social issues. 
662
 Ibid at 14. The UN PRI and its principles were created due to a “growing view among investment professionals 
that ESG issues can affect the performance of investment portfolios and that investors fulfilling their fiduciary (or 
equivalent) duty therefore need to give appropriate consideration to these issues”; CFA Institute, “Environmental, 
Social and Governance Factors at Listed Companies: A Manual for Investors” (2008) at 3, online: cfapubs.org 
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consistency and quality issues could be resolved by the adoption or creation of universal 
standards and requirements or sector specific performance indicators.
663
 The need for increased 
monitoring to ensure compliance with disclosure obligations and to continue and improve 
educational outreach to issuers was also recommended. For example, one view suggested for the 
OSC to work together with the TSX to provide guidance to reporting issuers
664
 through 
workshops and direction and to ensure regulators are adequately equipped to provide guidance. 
Ultimately, the OSC Review and its recommendations did not propose major changes with 
regard to the disclosure of non-financial information under Canadian securities laws.
665
 This was 
a view shared by the majority of participants who felt that although amendments were not 
necessarily required issuers would benefit from greater guidance.
666
 
Conclusion 
Despite the negative impacts of the Canadian extractive sector operating abroad, Canada, and its 
leading extractive sector, is not void of CSR efforts to address extractive sector misconduct. The 
research illustrates that there is a growing movement promoting greater CSR and SR. This was 
seen by the many requests for disclosure and transparency in the AG and PDAC Reports, the 
adoption of the GRI under the CSR Counsellor, the OECD Guidelines for MNEs and its 
disclosure obligations, the draft foreign payments disclosure initiative, as well as the proposal to 
ensure the level of compliance with non-financial disclosure under Canadian securities laws. 
This movement supports the potential for Canada to build a framework capable of regulating 
Canadian extractive sector TNCs with SR. Currently, the GRI under the CSR Counsellor is part 
                                                                                                                                                             
<http://www.cfapubs.org/toc/ccb/2008/2008/2> (Accessed August 15, 2013). “A growing number of investors have 
begun to focus on ESG factors to arrive at a more thorough understanding of the risks and opportunities that face the 
companies” they invest in,” because they believe such factors can have an impact on investment performance. 
663
 OSC Final Report, supra note 639 at 4. 
664
 Securities Act (Ontario), R.S.O. 1990, c S 5, s 1(1) “reporting issuer”. Discussed further in Chapter 4. 
665
 OSC Final Report, supra note 639 at 18. One conclusion reached by the OSC Review is that Canadian disclosure 
requirements are comparable to those in other jurisdictions. 
666
 Ibid at Summary of Roundtable discussion at 7. The OSC Report reveals investors have been requesting 
environmental issues directly from issuers in addition to the information already provided through regulations. The 
OSC Report revealed  that of the 101 shareholder proposals and resolutions filed in 2009 12 “covered topics such as 
monitoring of greenhouse gas emissions, participation in the Carbon Disclosure Project and reporting on the effect 
of, or exposure to risks relating to climate change”; OSC Final Report, supra note 639 at 15. Poor compliance with 
the existing disclosure obligations was expressed by the participating stakeholders as the primary reason for 
inadequate disclosure, a view that was supported by previous OSC, CSA and third party reviews as well. 
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of a voluntary mechanism. This offers a reminder of the role of the state and its unique 
authoritative power. The proposition of a state-backed SR framework that focuses on ESG and 
human rights disclosure is appealing because it attaches to the notion of state authority to compel 
disclosure. This subsequently suggests investigating the role for state involvement. As a result, 
the next chapter will examine disclosure obligations under securities laws and regulations in 
order to ascertain whether the securities regulatory framework could indeed offer a foundation 
on which to establish SR. 
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Chapter 4 
4  Canadian Securities Disclosure and the Global Reporting Initiative  
The basis for examining Canadian securities regulations arises from the pre-existing disclosure 
framework embedded within the unique regulatory power of the state.
667
 As a result, this chapter 
explores the mandatory disclosure requirements and the concept of materiality under Canadian 
securities law. This inquiry is intended to reveal the level of state mandated environmental, 
social and human rights disclosure. In the process, this examination sets up a comparison with 
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), and ultimately leads to a determination of how capable 
Canada is in developing a sustainability reporting-based framework in line with the reflexive and 
new governance theories. 
4.1 Canadian Securities Laws and Regulations 
This section will first provide an overview of securities regulation in Canada, and then briefly 
examine exemptions to disclosure requirements under Ontario securities law. This overview is 
followed by an examination of one of the main securities disclosure obligations in Canada, 
national instrument 51-102 – continuous disclosure obligations, and the related threshold concept 
of materiality.
668
 
                                                 
667
 Cynthia Williams, “The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency” (1999) 112 
Harv L Rev 1197 at 1211-1223. A further justification arises from the fact that sustainability reporting may also be 
linked with securities regulations through the intellectual background of the United States (U.S.) securities laws in 
the early 1900s. This is because leading academics “championed disclosure as a regulatory method to increase 
accountability to shareholders and the general public arguing for greater corporate social transparency.” This is 
notable because U.S. securities laws serve as model for Canadian securities regulations. [Williams]; Ontario 
Securities Commission, OSC corporate sustainability reporting initiative: Report to Minister of Finance, at 10 
online: OSC <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category5/rule_20091218_51-717_mof-rpt.pdf> 
(Accessed August 15, 2013). Another reason why examining the Canadian securities framework is important is 
because investors “would welcome regulatory action” in the disclosure of governance practices of corporations and 
non-financial risks, such as environmental and related risks. This coincides with the “disclosure trend” identified in 
chapter 1. [OSC Final Report]. 
668
 The process of disclosing “relevant” information entails excluding “non-relevant” information. Issues then arise 
when environmental, social, and human rights issues do not consistently meet this threshold. Materiality is discussed 
in greater detail below. 
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A. Securities Regulation   
The largest securities regulators in Canada are Ontario, British Columbia (B.C.), Alberta, and 
Quebec.
669
 The trading of securities of public corporations, such as the shares of a corporation, 
normally takes place on stock exchanges. The Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) is Canada’s senior 
equities market,
670
 and the TSX Venture Exchange (TSXV) is Canada’s junior listings market.671 
The Canadian National Stock Exchange (CNSX), recently renamed as the Canadian Securities 
Exchange (CSE), is another Canadian stock exchange.
672
 The CSE offers a “full service, national 
stock exchange” as an alternative equities673 market to the TSXV by targeting emerging, small 
capital companies.
674
  
                                                 
669
 Stikeman Elliot LLP, Canada: Corporate Law Tools, at ¶ 1, online: SRSG Portal <http://198.170.85.29/Corp-
law-tools-Canada-Stikeman-Elliott-for-Ruggie-Sep-2009.pdf> (Accessed August 15, 2013). These are the primary 
securities regulators, based on the size and sophistication of the particular markets. [CLT Report]; Maxime-Olivier 
Thibodeau, “Proposed Federal Securities Regulator” in Economics and Finance (30 April 2012), online: 
Parliamentary Library <http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/2012-28-e.htm> (Accessed 
August 15, 2013). In 1999, the major exchanges agreed the Toronto Stock Exchange would become the sole 
exchange for trading senior equities, the Montreal Exchange assuming responsibility for the trading of derivatives, 
and the Canadian Venture Exchange, formed through a merger between the Vancouver, Alberta (and later 
Winnipeg) stock exchanges to handle the trading of junior equities.   
670
 Ibid; TSX, About the TSX, online: TSX <http://www.tmx.com/en/about_tsx/> (Accessed August 15, 2013). The 
TSX provides senior issuers with access to public equity. [TSX About]. 
671
 TSX About, supra note 670. The TSX Venture Exchange provides companies in their early stages of growth 
funding opportunities. The TSXV formed with the merger between the B.C. and Alberta stock exchanges. 
672
 Barbara Shehter, “Yes, Canada has another stock exchange, and it’s called the CSE” Financial Post (6 January 
2014), online: business.financialpost.com <http://business.financialpost.com/2014/01/06/yes-canada-has-another-
stock-exchange-and-its-called-the-cse/> (Accessed January 9, 2014). In addition to the TSX, the TSXV, and the 
CSE, there is also the Montreal exchange (MX), known as the Bourse de Montréal, owned by the TMX group, and 
the ICE Futures Canada.  TMX, Montreal Exchange Canadian Derivative Exchange, online: m-x.ca 
<http://www.m-x.ca/accueil_en.php> (Accessed January 10, 2014); ICE, About ICE, online: theice.com 
<https://www.theice.com/about.jhtml> (Accessed January 10, 2014). 
673
 Equities are usually referred to as stocks or shares. 
674
 Canadian Securities Exchange, About CSE, online: cnsx.ca <http://www.cnsx.ca/CNSX/About-CSE/Who-We-
Are/Default.aspx> at “Who We Are” (Accessed January 9, 2014); Canadian Securities Exchange, CNQ re-launches 
as CNSX, the Canadian National Stock Exchange, offering faster and cheaper competition in Canada’s securities 
markets, online: CNSX markets <http://cnsxmarkets.ca/News/2008/11/06/CNQ-re-launches-as-CNSX.aspx> 
(Accessed January 9, 2014). The CSE is designed to “facilitate an easier, faster and less expensive listing for 
Canadian issuers without the red tape associated with exchanges built on older market structures”; Letter from 
Timothy Baikie, “Re: Application to Amend the Recognition Order of Canadian Trading and Quotation System Inc. 
("CNQ")” (29 July 2005), online: OSC  
<https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Marketplaces_cnq_20051007_application.jsp> (Accessed January 10, 2014); CSE, 
Rule 1: Interpretation and General Provisions, online: cnsx.ca 
<http://www.cnsx.ca/cmsAssets/docs/Trading%20Rules/Rule%201%20-
%20Intepretation%20and%20General%20Provisions.pdf> (Accessed January 10, 2014) at 6 “securities act”. The 
CSE complies with similar national instruments and definitions as those outlined under the Ontario Securities Act. 
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Securities in Canada are regulated at the provincial level.
675
 If securities are sold in a specific 
jurisdiction, the securities regulations of that provincial jurisdiction govern.
676
 As an “umbrella 
organization” of provincial securities regulators the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) is 
also a relevant organization. The purpose of the CSA is to promote consistency, harmonization, 
and streamlining of the regulatory process,
677
 and the sharing of ideas and policies across Canada 
in order for the securities industry to operate as smoothly as possible.
678
  One method in which 
this streamlining occurs is through the creation of national and multilateral instruments. These 
are the CSA’s attempts to eradicate duplicate regulations for businesses dealing in more than one 
province.
679
 Securities regulations are not formed or enforced by the CSA. Instead, the rule-
making, adoption, and enforcement process is the responsibility of the provincial securities 
regulator. In this case, securities commissions will first publish and then allow interested persons 
and companies to comment on proposed rules.
680
 After commissions review the comments, the 
final step of the rule making process requires approval from the finance minster.
681
 This 
comment process is intended to provide feedback on financial rules and regulations.
682
 In 
                                                 
675
 Mary G. Condon, Anita I. Anand & Janis P. Sarra, Securities Law in Canada: Cases and Commentary, 2d ed 
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2010) at 151. [Condon, Anand, Sarra]; Ontario Securities Act, RSO 
1990, c S 5 at s 21(5). [OSA]. 
676
 Condon, Anand, Sarra, supra note 675 at 1; Reference re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66. The Supreme Court of 
Canada (SCC) considered the constitutionality of a new proposed Securities Act that would allow the federal 
government to regulate the securities industry in Canada; The SCC held this “Securities Act as “not valid under the 
general branch of the federal power to regulate trade and commerce under s. 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867”.  
677
 Canadian Securities Administrators, About CSA Overview, online: securities-administrators.ca 
<http://www.securities-administrators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=45&linkidentifier=id&itemid=45> (Accessed January 
10, 2014). 
678
 Canadian Securities Administrators, Who we are, online: CSA/ACVM <http://www.securities-
administrators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=77> (Accessed August 15, 2013); Condon, Anand, Sarra, supra note 675 at 21. 
The CSA was formed by securities regulators in each of the 10 provinces and 3 territories.  
679
 Condon, Anand, Sarra, supra note 675 at 22. A national instruments (NIs) is adopted by all provinces and 
territories, whereas a multilateral Instruments (MIs) is an instrument adopted by some but not all provinces. A 
province is required to enact the instruments in order for it to be binding and enforceable in that province. 
680
 Ontario Securities Commission, Rule-Making in Ontario, online: OSC 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category0/backgrounder_rule_making.pdf> (Accessed January 
24, 2014). [OSC Rule making]; OSA, supra note 675 at s 143(1); Alta Reg 115/1995, online: canlii.org 
<http://www.canlii.org/en/ab/laws/regu/alta-reg-115-1995/latest/alta-reg-115-1995.html> (Accessed January 24, 
2014); BC Reg 195/1997, online: bclaws.ca   <http://www.bclaws.ca/Recon/document/ID/freeside/57_195_97> 
(Accessed January 24, 2014). 
681
 OSC Rule making, supra note 680. 
682
 The comment process could potentially provide a process in which stakeholders provide non-financial feedback 
from SR. At the same time, the comment process may not provide a suitable prospect for non-financial input from 
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addition to rule-making and the adoption of regulations and policies, provincial securities 
regulators also enforce. Private stakeholders can also play a role in enforcement of securities 
laws, and therefore, private enforcement can supplement public (provincial) securities 
regulation.
683
 
One particularly relevant national instrument (NI) is NI 51-102 - Continuous Disclosure 
Obligations. NI 51-102 outlines the disclosure obligations and documents that must be disclosed 
by companies that are reporting issuers. A reporting issuer is not determined by whether or not 
the company is listed on a stock exchange.
684
 In Ontario, a company can become a reporting 
issuer by filing a prospectus and receiving a receipt from the Director;
685
 by filing a securities 
exchange take-over bid circular; by listing and posting securities in Ontario on any Ontario 
securities commission (OSC) recognized exchange; by offering its securities to the public and 
being the subject of the Business Corporations Act; by amalgamation, arrangement or other 
statutory procedure “where one of the amalgamating or merger companies or the continuing 
company has been a reporting issuer for at least twelve months; or by designation if the OSC 
“considers that it is in the public interest” and makes such an order.686 Reporting issuers are 
required to provide NI 51-102 disclosure through different documents, such as the quarterly and 
annual financial statements, the management discussion and analysis (MD&A), and the annual 
information forms (AIF).
687
 
                                                                                                                                                             
stakeholders simply because of the financial nature of the provincial securities regulator, its governing legislation, 
and the interest in the pertinent financial rules and regulations. 
683
 Christopher C. Nicholls, "Civil Enforcement in Canadian Securities Law” (2009) 9:2 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 367 at 401, 407-8. Nicholls also identifies that despite the development of a Canadian statutory civil remedy 
for securities law enforcement for investors, it is not very robust. This is due to judicial aversion and existing 
enforcement mechanisms. The use of the civil remedy process, however, has not been completely undermined. As of 
January 2009, 12 proceedings have been commended under the new provisions. The private enforcement process 
contributes to the feedback and enforcement dimension of SR. 
684
 OSA, supra note 675 at s 1(1) “reporting issuer”. 
685
 Ibid. Director refers to the “Executive Director of the [OSC], a Director or Deputy Director of the [OSC] or a 
person employed by the [OSC] in a position designated by the Executive Director”. 
686
 Ibid at (1) “reporting issuer”, 1(11). A company can become a reporting issuer in British Columbia under similar 
circumstances, see Securities Act, RSBC 1996, c 418, s 1. 
687
 Continuous Disclosure Obligations, OSC NI 51-102 (2011) online: OSC 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category5/rule_20111031_51-102_unofficial-consolidation-
post-ifrs.pdf> (Accessed August 15, 2013). [NI 51-102]; Securities Law, supra note 698 at 141 
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It is important to distinguish between companies listed on the TSX and TSXV. This is because of 
the particular mandatory disclosure obligations associated with listing on a particular 
exchange.
688
 Without consistency and a similar level of guidance to disclose non-financial 
information on both the TSX and TSXV, different extractive sector companies face different 
disclosure requirements. This is particularly relevant as private placement investment is a 
significant source of capital for extractive sector companies listed on the TSXV.
689
 This 
necessitates examining the level of non-financial disclosure from non-reporting issuers who rely 
on a prospectus exemption
690
 (through private placements
691
) and public investments (through 
prospectus disclosure and the continuous disclosure obligations)
692
, in addition to non-financial 
disclosure required in both private and public settings (specific disclosure applicable to 
extractive sector companies)
693
. 
                                                 
688
 TMX, Global Leader in Mining, online: tmx.com <http://www.tmx.com/en/listings/sector_profiles/mining.html> 
(Accessed November 28, 2013). There were 1290 mining issuers on the TSXV and 338 mining issuers on the TSX. 
[TMX mining]; <http://www.tmx.com/en/listings/sector_profiles/energy.html> (Accessed November 28, 2013). 
There were 264 oil & gas issuers on the TSXV and 110 oil & gas issuers on the TSX. [TMX oil]. 
689
 OSC Notice - Exempt Market Review OSC Notice 45-712, (2012) at 14 online: OSC 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category4/sn_20130828_45-712_progress-report-c-capital-
raising-canada.pdf> at 2. (Accessed November 22, 2013). [OSC Notice 45-712]. “Private placements are an 
important method through which listed issuers, especially those listed on the TSXV, raise capital”; Douglas 
Cumming, “Private Equity: Fund Types, Risks and Returns, and Regulation” (New Jersey: Wiley Publishing, 2010) 
at 131. In 2004, more than 50% of all private placement financing was by the resources and oil and gas sectors.  
[Cumming]; Letter from Ross Gallinger PDAC Executive Director to The Secretary of the Ontario Securities 
Commission (27 September 2013) Re: OSC staff notice and request for comment regarding proposed structure of 
trading facilities of a new exchange proposed to be established by Aequitas Innovations, online: OSC 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Marketplaces/com_20130927_aequitas_pdac.pdf> (Accessed April 24, 
2014). “A major portion of the capital raised by the mining and exploration industry is done by selling of such 
securities through the private placement mechanism.” 
690
 Although reporting issuers who have filed a prospectus may rely on a prospectus exemption to raise additional 
capital, the focus here is on examining disclosure from non-reporting issuers who have relied on a prospectus 
exemption and reporting issuers who are required to comply with the continuous disclosure obligations.  
691
 Private placement investment occurs when an issuer relies on a prospectus exemption. 
692
 See section B for discussion on Prospectus disclosure and section C for discussion on NI 51-102. 
693(“[S]ecurities laws apply to all entities that distribute/trade securities, whether the company or issuer is a listed 
entity or not. Private companies should ensure that when distributing securities, they comply with an available 
exemption to the prospectus requirement”). British Columbia Continuing Legal Education Society, Securities for 
Junior Lawyers and Legal Support Staff: A Basic Overview of Securities Regulation in British Columbia, online: 
cle.bc.ca <http://www.cle.bc.ca/PracticePoints/BUS/securities%20overview.pdf> at 1.1.6 (Accessed December 2, 
2013). [BC CLE]; See section 4.2 for discussion on extractive sector specific disclosure. 
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B. Prospectus Disclosure and Exemptions 
All companies seeking to raise capital from the general public must normally provide 
prospective investors with a prospectus disclosure document that has been vetted by securities 
regulators.
694
 The prospectus is one document that includes not only financial disclosure but also 
a level of non-financial information to which prospective investors are entitled.
695
 The purpose of 
such disclosure is to inform potential investors of relevant information regarding an impending 
investment opportunity in the primary market, meaning securities are being directly offered by 
the issuing company.
696
 To avoid the prospectus requirement it may be possible for companies 
raising capital to rely on a prospectus exemption. For example, instead of offering securities to 
the public, a company may instead rely on a select group of investors to raise capital.
697
 The 
prospectus requirement therefore looks to provide greater protection through greater disclosure 
when a company wishes to access the general market of public investors. 
For the purpose of this discussion, the prospectus mandates an expansive view of non-financial 
information disclosure. Under Form 41-101F1, section 5.1(4) requires the disclosure of 
implemented social or environmental policies that are fundamental to the issuer’s operations.698 
                                                 
694
 OSA, supra note 675 at s 1(1), Part XV section 56(1). A prospectus is a detailed disclosure document that 
provides information about the company issuing securities. It gives potential investors information needed to make 
informed decisions. Without a prospectus an issuer is unable to offer securities to the general public. The prospectus 
includes financial statements and a certificate verifying the prospectus contains full, true and plain disclosure of all 
the material facts relating to the securities proposed to be distributed or already issued by the reporting issuer. 
Before a company is obligated to comply with NI 51-102, it must provide a prospectus document to enter into the 
securities market; Janis Sarra, “Disclosure as a Public Policy Instrument in Global Capital Markets”, (2006) 42 
Texas International Law Journal 875 at 882. [Sarra, Public Policy].  
695
 Jeffrey G. MacIntosh and Christopher C. Nicholls, Securities Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002) at 139. The 
prospectus document is normally not read by the general public investors, it is read by financial analysts and their 
lawyers of those investment banks and securities dealers, and others who then distribute securities on a commission. 
[Securities Law]. 
696
 Securities Law, supra note 695 at 139. Condon, Anand, Sarra, supra note 675 at 146-7. The secondary market is 
essentially the stock market, where the public has access to purchase and sell stocks on the stock exchange.  
697
 OSA, supra note 675 at section 73.4. This is known as the private issuer exemption, and is one of many 
prospectus exemptions, as displayed in Part XVII and Prospectus and Registration Exemptions, OSC NI 45-106 (18 
September 2009), online: OSC <https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category4/rule_20090918_45-
106_3238-supplement.pdf> (Accessed November 24, 2013). [NI 45-106]. 
698
 General Prospectus Requirements, OSC NI 41-101 (22 December 2006), online: OSC 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category4/rule_20061222_41-101_gen-pro-requirements.pdf> 
at Item 5, s 5.1(4). (Accessed August 15, 2013). [41-101F1]; Securities Law, supra note 695 at 139; Janis Sarra, 
Modernizing Disclosure in Canadian Securities Law: An Assessment of Recent Developments in Canada and 
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This includes anything related to the issuer’s relationship with the environment, to communities 
in which the issuer does business, or to any of its human rights policies.
699
 Section 21.1(1) of 
Form 41-101F1
700
 lists risk factors to be disclosed. This includes risks to the issuer and its 
business, “such as… the general risks inherent in the business carried on by the issuer, 
environmental and health risks, … regulatory constraints, economic or political conditions… and 
any other matter that would be likely to influence an investor’s decision to purchase securities of 
the issuer.”701 Similarly, subsection (3) of 21.1 outlines a requirement to disclose risks, not 
otherwise outlined in 21.1(1) “that a reasonable investor would consider relevant to an 
investment” and likely to influence the investor’s decision.702 Despite the explicit reference to 
non-financial disclosure and the relevance to sustainability reporting (SR), as mentioned above, 
there are exemptions that exist from the prospectus requirement, meaning the above non-
financial disclosure provisions are not always required.
703
 
Certain exemptions are permitted where it is deemed the protection offered by a prospectus is not 
needed due to the nature of the security or the purchaser’s sophistication, knowledge or financial 
position.
704
 The main categories of prospectus exemptions are the Capital Raising Exemptions 
and Transaction Exemptions.
705
 When relying on a prospectus exemption, the initial level of 
disclosure from a company therefore will not necessarily be equivalent to the disclosure required 
when distributing securities to public investors. Securities distributions under such exemptions 
                                                                                                                                                             
Selected Jurisdiction, (May 29, 2006) at 57 online: tfmsl.ca <http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/V2(1A)%20Sarra.pdf> 
(Accessed August 15, 2013). [Sarra, Modernizing Disclosure]. 
699
 41-101F1, supra note 698 at Item 5 s 5.1(4). 
700
 Form 41-101F1 sets out specific disclosure requirements in addition “to the general requirement under securities 
legislation to provide full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts relating to the securities to be distributed. 
Certain rules of specific application impose prospectus disclosure obligations in addition to those described in Form 
41-101F1.” 
701
 41-101F1, supra note 698 at 21.1(1) Item 21: Risk Factors of Form 41-101F1. 
702
 Ibid at (3). 
703
 Condon, Anand, Sarra, supra note 675 at 318, 320-321, 326-329; For a complete list of available prospectus 
exemptions refer to OSA, supra note 675 at Part XVII and NI 45-106, supra note 697 at Part 2; Ontario Prospectus 
and Registration Exemptions, OSC Rule 45-501, (28 September 2011), online: OSC 
<https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category4/rule_20110928_45-501_amend-restated.pdf> 
(Accessed April 16, 2014). [OSC Rule 45-501]. 
704
 Condon, Anand, Sarra, supra note 675 at 317. 
705
 NI 45-106, supra note 697. The other categories of exemptions include: Investment Fund Exemptions; Employee, 
Executive Officer, Director and Consultant Exemptions; and Miscellaneous Exemptions. 
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are known as private placements.
706
 A private placement “occurs when an Issuer issues securities 
from treasury for cash in reliance upon exemption from the Prospectus and registration 
requirements” under securities laws.”707 For example, under the Ontario Securities Act this 
would refer to the “Exemptions From the Prospectus Requirement” under Part XVII708 and the 
Ontario specific OSC Rule 45-501 – Ontario Prospectus and Registration Exemptions, as well as, 
NI 45-106 – Prospectus and Registration Exemptions would apply.709 
In order to use a prospectus exemption an issuer must first meet the conditions of that exemption, 
and this can be done by issuers on the TSX and TSXV. For example, when using the Offering 
Memorandum (OM) Exemption an OM must be prepared.
710
 The OM exemption is unique 
because the only jurisdiction in which it remains unavailable is Ontario.
711
 When NI 45-106 was 
introduced, Ontario rejected OM exemption considering the lack of disclosure associated with 
the exemption to not provide enough protection to investors and thus “too risky for retail 
investors”.712 As such, the OM exemption represents a prospectus exemption not fitting into the 
                                                 
706
 Ontario Securities Commission, Information for: Companies – Private Placements, online: OSC 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Companies_private-placements_index.htm> (Accessed November 22, 2013). [OSC 
Private Placement]. 
707
 TMX Venture Exchange Corporate Finance Manual, Policy 4.1 – Private Placements, online: tmx.com 
<http://www.tmx.com/en/pdf/Policy4-1.pdf> at Policy 4.1 (Accessed December 2, 2013); Under the TSX Company 
Manual a private placement is “an issuance of treasury securities for cash consideration or in payment of an 
outstanding debt of the listed issuer without prospectus disclosure, in reliance on an exemption from the prospectus 
requirements under applicable securities laws.” TMX, TSX Company Manual - Section 607 Private Placements, 
online: tmx.com <http://tmx.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2072&element_id=274> (Accessed 
December 2, 2013). 
708 OSA, supra note 675 at Part XVII; OSC Private Placement, supra note 706. “[R]egistration and prospectus 
exemptions are available for companies that, subject to certain conditions, distribute securities to “accredited 
investors” or their own employees, or in connection with a business combination or reorganization”; NI 45-106, 
supra note 697. 
709
 OSC Rule 45-501, supra note 703; BC CLE, supra note 693. “National Instrument 45-106 Prospectus and 
Registration Requirements contains most of the commonly used exemptions”; NI 45-106, supra note 697. As a NI, 
NI 45-106 is also applicable is Ontario. However, OSC Rule 45-501 was introduced in 1998 and includes those 
“local exemptions that have not been included in NI 45-106”. See Ontario Securities Commission, National and 
Ontario Prospectus and Registration Exemptions Notice: Request for Comments, online: OSC 
<https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category4/rule_20041217_45-106_prspcts-reg-exempt.pdf> 
(Accessed April 25, 2014). [NI 45-106 2004 Proposal]. and Ontario Securities Commission, Notice of Proposed 
Rule, Policy and Forms under the Securities Act Rule 45-501, online: OSC 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_rule_19971017_45-501_n_pr_pcp.htm> (Accessed April 25, 2014).  
710
 NI 45-106, supra note 697 at Part 2, s 2.9. 
711
 NI 45-106 2004 Proposal, supra note 709 at section 4(a), “Ontario carve-outs”. When NI 45-106 was published 
for comments Ontario had taken the position of not adopting the offering memorandum exemption. 
712
 Ibid; FairCanada, Proposed OM exemption not supported by the facts, online: faircanada.ca 
<http://faircanada.ca/top-news/proposed-om-exemption-not-supported-by-the-facts/> (Accessed April 16, 2014). 
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general rationale for providing exemptions, which normally arise due to the purchaser’s 
sophistication, knowledge or financial position.
713
 The OM exemption is intended to allow “an 
issuer to sell its securities to anyone, regardless of their relationship, wealth or the amount of 
securities purchased”.714 The justification for offering this freedom to target “anyone” in raising 
capital is to encourage the growth of private and early stage businesses and “facilitate access to 
capital by small businesses.
715
 Therefore, in order to use the OM exemption an issuer is required 
to disclose information as outlined by the OM.
716
 The disclosure of information is outlined in 
two forms of OMs, Form 45-106F3, which may be used by qualifying issuers, and Form 45-
                                                                                                                                                             
“The rationale for regulatory exemptions is that some investors are sophisticated and not in need of protection.” 
Since the OM exemption is permitted to apply to all investors, not just sophisticated investors or those in a strong 
financial position, the OSC deemed the lack of disclosure for the majority of investors as “too risky”; Ontario 
Securities Commission, Exempt Market Review Backgrounder (March 20, 2014), online: OSC 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/News/nr_20140320_osc-proposes-four-capital-raising-backgrounder.pdf> 
(Accessed April 16, 2014). [2014 OM Proposal]; Letter from Borden Ladner Gervais LLP (21 March 2005) BLG 
Comments on Proposed NI 45-106 Prospectus and Registration Exemptions, online: OSC 
<https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category4/rule_20050321_45-106_com_blg.pdf> (Accessed 
April 16, 2014). 
713
 Condon, Anand, Sarra, supra note 675 at 317. 
714
 British Columbia Securities Commission, Private & Early Stage Business, online: BCSC 
<http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/privateplacements.asp?id=2004#OM> (Accessed April 16, 2014). 
715
 Ibid; Alberta Securities Commission, Multilateral CSA Notice 45-311- Exemptions from Certain Financial 
Statement-Related Requirements in the Offering Memorandum Exemption to Facilitate Access to Capital by Small 
Businesses, online: Alberta Securities <http://www.albertasecurities.com/Regulatory%20Instruments/4392270-v9-
CSA_Multilateral_Notice_45-311_re_OM_blanket_order.pdf> (Accessed April 16, 2014). “The OM exemption was 
intended to provide a variety of issuers, including early stage businesses and other SMEs, with a cost-effective 
capital-raising option”; NI 45-106 2004 Proposal, supra note 709 at 4(a) “Summary of NI 45-106 Materials – 
Ontario “carve-outs”. The OM exemption is implemented in all jurisdictions in Canada, except Ontario, and there 
are two primary models “the BC model” and “the Alberta model”. The BC model is viewed as the most liberal and 
the Alberta model is viewed as not as flexible; OSC, Introduction of Proposed Prospectus Exemptions and Proposed 
Reports of Exempt Distribution in Ontario Supplement to the OSC Bulletin, (March 20, 2014) Volume 37, Issue 12 
(Supp-3), online: OSC <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category4/csa_20140320_45-106_rfc-
prospectus-exemptions.pdf> (Accessed April 16, 2014) at Appendix A, A-2. Ontario compares its current OM 
proposal to the Alberta model; NI 45-106, supra note 697 at 2.9(1) and (2). The Alberta model is more restrictive 
because it requires purchasers to be “eligible investors” and be limited to an acquisition cost of $10 000. The BC 
model does not have similar restrictions. Since western Canada, B.C. and Alberta, regulate and form part of the 
TSX-V, which generally consists of new, smaller and medium sized entities, this could offer an explanation for 
B.C.’s and Alberta’s adoption of the OM exemption. This view is supported by the policy rationale to prevent and 
avoid “burdens” to growth for the TSX-V listed issuers; Letter from John Stevenson, (March 8, 2013) re: OSC Staff 
Consultation Paper 45-710, online: OSC <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category4-
Comments/com_20130308_45-710_skaugec_pettipasc.pdf> (Accessed April 16, 2014). The National Exempt 
Market Association (NEMA) also offers support for current Ontario proposal to introduce the OM prospectus 
exemption because it “enhances the ability to raise capital for Small & Medium Enterprises (SMEs).” 
716
 NI 45-106, supra note 697 at 3.9 (1) – (2), Companion Policy 45-106CP s 3.8 (1) – (2). Alberta, Manitoba, 
Northwest Territories, Nunavut, P.E.I, Québec, Saskatchewan, and Yukon give OM exemptions if certain conditions 
are met. 
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106F2, which must be used by all other issuers.
717
 Qualifying issuers are those issuers who have 
filed an AIF under NI 51-102 and non-qualifying issuers are those who have not.
718
 In any case, 
an oil and gas issuer, even if relying on the OM exemption, would still be required to disclose 
information about their oil and gas activities, as would a mining issuer. These extractive sector 
disclosure obligations are outlined in NI 51-101 – Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas 
Activities and NI 43-101 – Standards of Disclosure for Mineral Projects.719 Both NI 43-101 and 
NI 51-101 illustrate that these relevant disclosure obligations apply regardless of whether an 
issuer on the TSX or TSXV relies on a prospectus exemption. 
The importance of the extractive sector-specific disclosure from NI 43-101 and NI 51-101 is 
highlighted by the fact that TSXV extractive sector companies not only have the option to rely 
on a prospectus exemption, they are also not obligated to provide AIF disclosure, a disclosure 
document which also explicitly requires environmental, social, and human rights disclosure.
720
 A 
large majority of extractive sector companies are listed on the TSXV. This includes 1290 mining 
issuers and 264 oil and gas issuers.
721
  By the end of 2004, more than 50% of all private 
placements originated from the resources and oil and gas sectors.
722
 Though the proportion of 
                                                 
717
 NI 45-106, supra note 697 at “qualifying issuer”, Form 45-16F2 and Form 45-106F3. A qualifying issuer is a 
“reporting issuer in a jurisdiction of Canada that” is a SEDAR filer; one who has filed “all documents required to be 
filed under the securities legislation of that jurisdiction, and”; filed an AIF, even if not required to file an AIF, for its 
most recently completed financial year “and copies of all material incorporated by reference in the AIF not 
previously filed”. 
718
 NI 45-106, supra note 697 at Form 45-106F3 Item 2 (2.1), A.2, A.5, D.1(i), D.1(j), D.2; Also see 45-106, supra 
note 697 at Companion Policy 45-106CP s 3.8(3) of 45-106CP. Material Change Reports, discussed below, also 
apply to Form 45-106F2 and 45-106F3. See section D Materiality for more on Material Change Reports; (No 
continuous disclosure obligations apply when relying on the OM exemption) Saskatchewan Legal Education 
Society, Continuous Disclosure for Saskatchewan Issuers, online: redengine.lawsociety.sk.ca 
<http://redengine.lawsociety.sk.ca/inmagicgenie/documentfolder/ac4668.pdf> at 21 (Accessed December 2, 2013). 
However, to use Form 45-106F3, a venture issuer would be required to file an AIF (and NI 43-101 or NI 51-101, if 
applicable), or otherwise use Form 45-106F2.  
719
 NI 45-106, supra note 697 at Form 45-106F2 and F3; Standards of Disclosure for Mineral Projects, OSC NI 43-
101 (24 June 2011), online: OSC <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_ni_20110624_43-101_mineral-
projects.htm> at Part 2 (Accessed August 5, 2013). Non-financial information mainly refers to: environmental, 
social and human rights. [NI 43-101]; Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas Activities, OSC NI 51-101 (15 
October 2010), at Part 5, online: OSC 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category5/noa_20101015_51-101_disc-oil-gas.pdf> (Accessed 
August 5, 2013). [NI 51-101]. 
720
 See section C for a further discussion of the AIF. NI 51-102 – Continuous Disclosure Obligations. 
721
 TMX mining, supra note 688. There were 338 mining issuers on the TSX; TMX oil, supra note 688. There were 
110 oil and gas issuers on the TSX. 
722
 Cumming, supra note 689 at 131. 
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capital raised through private placements listed on the TSXV declined from 88% in 2007 to 67% 
in 2012, there was still an increase in the total capital raised through private placements.
723
 In 
any case, TSXV issuers “rarely conduct prospectus offerings or use the prospectus exemptions 
intended for sales to retail investors.”724 This is attributed to the time and cost involved in 
arranging the necessary offering documents normally applicable when selling to the public retail 
investors.
725
 Another impediment associated with prospectus disclosure is that in practice, “[the] 
complexity of prospectuses make them virtually inaccessible to anyone other than financial 
analysts and their lawyers.”726 This means, from the perspective of different stakeholders, the 
prospectus disclosure document cannot be easily deciphered by the majority of shareholders, and 
other stakeholders. As such, the prospectus intrinsically fails to meet the goals of SR, which is to 
inform stakeholders. 
                                                 
723
 OSC Notice 45-712, supra note 689 at 2, 6, 12. Since 2009, the overall “capital raised in the exempt market has 
consistently increased” in the TSXV, and this includes a 20% increase from 2011 equating to approximately $104 
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exchanges push to relax private placement rules”, online: reuters.com 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/20/canada-venture-financing-idUSL2N0HG1FH20130920> (Accessed 
November 22, 2013)  
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 British Columbia Securities Commission, Proposed Prospectus Exemption for Distributions to Existing Security 
Holders, BCSC CSA Notice 45-312 (21 November, 2013), at 1, online: bcsc.bc.ca 
<http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/uploadedFiles/securitieslaw/policy4/45-312_%5BMultilateral_CSA_Notice%5D.pdf> 
(Accessed November 22, 2013). 
725
 Ibid. These difficulties of a lack of time and significant cost eventually resulted in a proposal from the majority of 
Canadian securities regulators, except Ontario and Newfoundland, seeking to allow TSXV issuers to raise capital by 
targeting retail investors through a new prospectus exemption. The comment period for the 45-312 proposal to 
expand the private placement rule only recently ended on January 20, 2014. In order to meet this new proposed 
prospectus exemption the TSXV issuer is required to have (i)  “a class of equity securities listed on the TSX-V”; (ii)  
“filed all required timely and periodic disclosure documents”; (iii) “the offering consists only of the class of equity 
securities listed on the TSX-V or units consisting of the listed security and a warrant to acquire the listed security”; 
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disclosure record, even if the issuer voluntarily provides an offering document. 
726
 Securities Law, supra note 695 at 139. 
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C. NI 51-102 - Continuous Disclosure Obligations 
Condon et al. recognize that “the concept of a reporting issuer carries an enormous amount of 
regulatory weight.”727 Once a company becomes a “reporting issuer” securities regulators require 
that issuer “to continuously disclose information to investors.”728 This continuous disclosure 
obligation is only applicable in the secondary market for securities,
729
 where the majority of 
capital market activity occurs.
730
 The purpose of this disclosure is to allow investors to make 
educated investment decisions.
731
 This disclosure takes place through financial statements, the 
MD&A, the AIF, and material change reports (MCRs).
732
 
To be subject to the continuous disclosure obligations, a corporation must be a reporting issuer, 
which as discussed above is a status that can be achieved in a number of ways.
733
 Listing on a 
stock exchange is not, however, necessary for a company to become a reporting issuer.
734
 It is 
also important to note that as long as companies remain as private issuers,
735
 by initially relying 
on a prospectus exemption, they are not obligated to comply with the continuous reporting 
obligations in NI 51-102. Listed on an exchange or not, since a “trade”736 is broadly defined, 
privately held companies may become subject to certain securities obligations. This means if a 
private issuer/company distributes securities, then in order to remain a private issuer and to avoid 
                                                 
727
 Condon, Anand, Sarra, supra note 675 at 68; TMX, “Filing Guide: TSX Venture Exchange, Q2 2012”, online: 
tmx.com <http://www.tmx.com/en/pdf/TSXV_FilingGuide_2012.pdf> (Accessed November 25, 2013). “Each listed 
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 Condon, Anand, Sarra, supra note 675 at 68. 
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 Securities Law, supra note 695 at 141; Condon, Anand, Sarra, supra note 675 at 146-7. 
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Canada was in the secondary market; Condon, Anand, Sarra, supra note 675 at 146-7, 355. In 2009-2010 about 94 
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 Securities Law, supra note 695 at 254-255. 
732
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 Condon, Anand, Sarra, supra note 675 at 68; OSA, supra note 675 at s 1(1) “reporting issuer”, 1(11). 
734
 OSA, supra note 675 at s 1(1) “reporting issuer”, 1(11). 
735
 NI 45-106, supra note 697 at 2.4 (1) “Private Issuer” is an issuer, in part, “that is not a reporting issuer or an 
investment fund”. The exemptions set out in the OSA are largely superseded by NI 45-106, which refers to “the 
corporation” as a “private issuer”; (Discussion of how to define a private issuer See Law Society of Upper Canada, 
How to Structure the Share Provisions of a Corporation, online: lsuc.on.ca <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/For-
Lawyers/Manage-Your-Practice/Practice-Area/Business-Law/How-to-Structure-the-Share-Provisions-of-a-
Corporation/> at Appendix D (Accessed January 11, 2014)). 
736
 OSA, supra note 675 at 1.1 at “trade”. 
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the prospectus disclosure obligation the private issuer must only distribute securities to those 
principal purchasers outlined by the particular prospectus exemption.
737
 Of course, nothing 
prevents a company that is already a reporting issuer from issuing additional securities on a 
prospectus-exempt basis,
738
 in reliance on a prospectus exemption. If an issuer loses its private 
issuer status, it does not automatically become a reporting issuer and so obligated to file a 
prospectus and meet the continuous reporting obligations.
 739
 
In contrast to prospectus disclosure, the ongoing disclosure obligations under NI 51-102 play a 
critical and more functional role not just for investors and issuers but possibly for a greater 
number of other stakeholders by providing a foundation on which to base SR.
740
 The goal of the 
continuous disclosure obligations is to inform, educate, and protect potential investors. SR shares 
in these goals as well, but also looks to take advantage of operating under a regulatory authority 
capable of disciplining non-compliance. An important distinguishing factor from prospectus 
disclosure is that the continuous disclosure obligations inform and protect investors without the 
complexity normally associated with the prospectus, making it easier for stakeholders to 
understand. Greater comprehension supports the underlying purpose of SR, which is to inform 
                                                 
737
 NI 45-106, supra note 697 at 2.4 (2), 2.10. Certain exemptions only permit selling to certain purchasers who 
purchase as principals. For example, 2.4(2) of Part 2, the Private Issuer exemption only allows the sale of securities 
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738
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 British Columbia Securities Commission, Private & Early Stage Businesses, online: BCSC 
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740
 OSA, supra note 675 at s 1.1(a) – “Purposes of Act”. Securities acts are intended to protect investors from 
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and stimulate a dialogue and feedback.
741
 This suggests NI 51-102 can serve as a foundation on 
which to base SR, with the added benefit of enforcement. 
Every reporting issuer is required to file an MD&A.
742
 This disclosure document conveys 
information related to annual and quarterly financial statements.
743
 Since financial statements 
“do not provide investors or prospective investors with the subjective insights about an issuer’s 
business that managers possess,” the MD&A provides a clear, accurate, and understandable 
depiction of corporate information from the perspective of corporate management.
744
 Similar to a 
corporation’s financial statements, the annual MD&A must be approved by the board of directors 
and the interim MD&A by an audit committee before being filed with a securities regulator.
745
 
Laying out “reflective” and “prospective” elements, the MD&A intends to provide readers with a 
narrative from corporate management of the historical and prospective analysis of the “material 
information,” such as contingent liabilities, of the business.746 As well as providing an 
explanation of the difficult to read financial statements, which are normally out of date by the 
time investors receive them, the MD&A allows investors to see current and future prospects 
through the “eyes of management”747 
Currently, only Part 2 of section 1.4(d) of the MD&A, Form 51-102F1 of NI 51-102, mandates 
discussion of social or environmental information.
748
 The instruction in section 1.4 elaborates 
that subsection (d) should specifically include “any factors that have affected the value of the 
project(s) such as change in commodity prices, land use,” and political or environmental 
issues.
749
 Although section 1.4 is the lone reference to any social, environmental, or political 
disclosure, an argument can be made that the instructions of section 1.4 could easily be applied 
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to other general provisions listed under Part 2 of Form 51-102F1.
750
 The Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants (CICA) also provides guidance on MD&A disclosure,
751
 which the four 
major securities regulators in Canada have endorsed and advised reporting issuers to use when 
preparing MD&As.
752
 
CICA outlines that the MD&A is meant to be transparent and should “discuss the complete range 
of possibilities and possible outcomes” and explicitly report both bad and good news.753 CICA 
MD&A guidance includes key performance drivers, which are deemed essential factors for the 
“successful implementation of the entity’s strategy and achievement of its goals.”754 The key 
performance drivers are divided into internal and external performance drivers.
755
 The internal 
performance drivers include, among others, workforce, customer satisfaction, leadership and 
governance, innovation, reputation and brand equity, safety, and environmental responsibility.
756
 
External performance drivers are those factors that are normally outside the control of the 
reporting issuer.
757
 Despite the lack of explicit reference to social and human rights issues under 
the drivers, these concerns could, arguably, fall under a risk management component of MD&A 
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Canadian Securities Law” (2009) 47 Canadian Business Law Journal 435 at 444. [Dhir, shadows]; NI 51-102, supra 
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disclosures-about-social-environmental-and-ethical-see-issues-background-paper-for-the-capital-markets-and-
sustainablity-program-of-the-national-round-table-on-the-environment-and-the-economy/oclc/70718028> at 15 
(Accessed August 15, 2013). [CICA 2004 Report]. 
752
 Ibid; CLT Reporting, supra note 669 at 6 ¶ 4.1. The four major securities regulators in Canada are: the Ontario, 
Alberta, Quebec and B.C. stock exchanges; These four are also members of the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO); Mary Condon, “Canada’s Role in Expanded IOSCO Principles” (July 9, 2012) 
<https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/News/sp_20120709_canada-role-iosco-principles.pdf> at 3 (Accessed 
January 12, 2014).  
753
 Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, “Management’s Discussion and Analysis: Guidance on Preparation 
and Disclosure Comprehensive Revision – July 2009 Update #3” (July 2009) Canadian Performance Board, online: 
CICA <http://www.cica.ca/publications/list-of-publications/manual/item29637.pdf> at p 25 s 2.3. (Accessed August 
15, 2013). [CICA 2009 Report].  
754
 Ibid at 35. Section 3.3 Key Performance Drivers. 
755
 Ibid.   
756
 Ibid at 35-36. Environmental responsibility includes greenhouse gas emissions.  
757
 Ibid at 35. External performance indicators include: raw material prices, foreign exchange rates, and interest rates 
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disclosure.
758
 A risk management approach would incline entities to disclose their primary “risks 
and related risk management strategies to [allow] MD&A readers to understand and [assess] the 
risks” associated with the reporting issuer and its decision-making regarding those risks.759 This 
is outlined to include risks the entity faces to its core businesses, the strategies undertaken to 
manage those risks, and the potential and actual impact on the results and capabilities, capital 
resources, and liquidity.
760
 CICA also suggests the MD&A include information even if such 
information is disclosed and discussed elsewhere.
761
 
For fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 2011, financial statements are to be prepared 
and filed in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
762
 
Considered to be a “principles-based” set of standards,763 the IFRS intends to bring stability, 
standardization, and overcome obscure accounting comparisons.
764
 Although the IFRS may share 
similarities with Canadian GAAP, there are many differences as well. For example, the IFRS 
does not provide sector-specific reporting guidance. This is relevant because the Canadian 
GAAP framework outlined specific standards applicable to oil and gas companies.
765
 Also 
relevant is that under the IFRS, unlike the GAAP, all subsidiaries controlled by a parent are 
                                                 
758
 Ibid at 46 section 3.6 Risk.  
759
 Ibid. 
760
 Ibid. This includes looking to the depth of a risk, its likelihood, and potential impact on finance and operations. 
761
 Ibid at 46-7.  Specifically, the guidance outlines that even if information is discussed in financial statements or 
corporate governance disclosure, the MD&A should still discuss that piece of information.  
762
 Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Issues in 
Institutional Investor Decision Making¸ (July 2010) online: CICA <http://www.cica.ca/publications/list-of-
publications/manual/item41881.pdf> at 16 (Accessed August 15, 2013). [CICA ESG]; Deloitte, GAAP IFRS: Which 
standards to choose, (January 2010) online: Deloitte GAAP IFRS 
<http://www.fmi.ca/uploads/1/Deloitte_David_GAAP_IFRS.PDF> at 8 (Accessed August 15, 2013). Adopting the 
IFRS is largely explained by the increased pressure from a connected and smaller global community that has since 
made it easier for cross-border mergers to occur, for investors to seek investment opportunities worldwide, and to 
list on foreign stock exchanges, which has begun making up a large percentage of corporate capitalization. 
763
 Government of Scotland, International Financial Reporting Standards, online: Scotland.gov.uk 
<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Government/Finance/ifrs> (Accessed August 15, 2013); Chartered 
Accountants of Canada, IFRS – FAQs, online: cica.ca <http://www.cica.ca/ifrs/faqs/item2423.aspx> (Accessed 
August 15, 2013). 
764
 CICA ESG, supra note 762 at 16.  
765
 Deloitte, IFRS 6, online: iasplus.com <http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/standard46> (Accessed August 15, 
2013). The IFRS addresses Exploration and Evaluation phases of a project under IFRS 6, but there are no oil and gas 
related standards.   
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“consolidated”; 766 meaning parent corporations must disclose information of any subsidiary 
along with that of the parent company.
767
 
Previously under GAAP principles, CICA recommended that ethical, social, and environmental 
factors be integrated into financial statements in certain circumstances. This included the 
integration of current financial or future obligations that are either known or can be accurately 
estimated (for example, clean up and reclamation).
768
 Under the IFRS, reporting issuers may now 
be obligated to recognize greater environmental liabilities in higher amounts than the GAAP, and 
thus provide more disclosure regarding certain liabilities in financial statements.
769
 For extractive 
sector corporations in particular, the IFRS has been said to “have a material effect on the total 
amount of environmental liabilities reported and the way in which they are expensed over 
time.”770 However, the potential for increased disclosure of environmental liabilities and how 
they are expensed are envisioned to be offset by mitigating factors.
771
 A related, and notable, 
similarity between the GAAP and the IFRS is that where financial obligations are unable to be 
quantified or estimated and where the exclusion of such information would provide an inaccurate 
and misleading picture, the GAAP recommended alternative is for information to be disclosed in 
                                                 
766
 International Account Standard 27, Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements, online: ec.europa.eu 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/docs/arc/2009-01-30_ias27_annex_en.pdf> at ¶ 12 (Accessed 
August 20, 2013). 
767
 Ibid; CA magazine, Analysis of certain key Canadian GAAP-IFRS differences, (June 2009), online: 
<http://www.camagazine.com/images/2009/jun/camagazine41017.jpg> (Accessed August 15, 2013). Another 
difference between Canadian GAAP and the IFRS is that the GAAP fails to discuss expense presentation. The IFRS, 
IAS1 outlines “expenses can be presented according to either their nature or their function”. This means that when 
presenting an income statement by function, there must be supporting documentation regarding the nature of the 
expenses within that function. Though expenses may be presented by function in Canada, Canadian GAAP does not 
have an equivalent rule. This rule may be satisfied by providing additional disclosures in notes to the financial 
statements.  
768
 CICA 2004 Report, supra note 751 at 11-12. 
769
 CICA ESG, supra note 762 at 16. 
770
 Thomas Schneider, “Accounting for Environmental Liabilities under International Financial Reporting 
Standards” (2011) Oil Sands Research and Information Network, OSRIN Report No. TR-9 at 1. 
771
 Ibid at iv, 1. 
 “The actual settling of these liabilities will occur in the coming decades. Under old Canadian GAAP 
and IFRS, these liabilities are recognised in the financial statements based on their present value. This 
is typically done by using a discount rate and the usual methods of calculating the present value of a 
future obligation. The new IFRS rules are very sensitive to the discount rate used and there is some 
debate as to exactly how the new discount rate should be calculated. Thus, although the new 
accounting standards under IFRS dictate that more specific environmental liabilities be recognised in 
the financial statements, this may be offset by changes in the way that they are quantified.”.  
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notes supplemental to the financial statements, if not in the MD&A.
772
 The IFRS includes a 
parallel provision under International Accounting Standards (IAS) 1 and 37.
773
 
In addition to the MD&A, the AIF, Form 51-102F2 of NI 51-102, is another important disclosure 
document providing material information about the reporting issuer, its past business and 
possible future development.
774
 Similar to the prospectus, the AIF requires disclosure of the 
issuer and its history, operations, financial affairs, prospects, risks, and other external factors 
impacting the company.
775
 Except for venture issuers, all publicly listed corporations are 
obligated to file an AIF.
776
 Venture issuers are normally newer or smaller, or “emerging 
companies”.777 Therefore, in order to encourage the growth of venture issuers and to prevent 
“burdens” that would hinder their growth, venture issuers are exempted from providing AIF 
disclosure.
778
 This omission of TSXV venture issuers is key because a significant number of 
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 CICA 2004 Report, supra note 768 at 11. Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, “The CICA’s Guide to 
IFRS in Canada” at 26 (October 1, 2007) online: cica.ca 
<http://ocaq.qc.ca/pdf/ang/6_presse/infoca/2007/InfoCA1185_Guide_EN.pdf> (Accessed August 15, 2013).  
773
 Ibid at 12. 
774
 NI 51-102, supra note 687 at 51-102 s 6.1, NI 51-102F2 part 1(a). 
775
 Condon, Anand, Sarra, supra note 675 at 387.   
776
 NI 51-102, supra note 687 at 51-102 s 6.1 and 1, 1.1 at “venture issuer”. “Venture issuers” are those reporting 
issuers that did not have, “at the applicable time”, any of its securities listed or quoted on the TSX, any U.S. 
marketplace, or any other market place outside of the U.S. and Canada. The definition of “venture issuer” includes 
those issuers listed on the TSXV, the LSE-AIM, and the PLUS markets; ICAP, Further re. Acquisition of PLUS 
Stock Exchange Plc, online: ICAP.com <http://www.icap.com/news/2012/further-re-acquisition-of-plus-stock-
exchange-plc.aspx> (Accessed August 15, 2013). 
777
 TMX, “A Capital Opportunity”: Guide to Listing, online: TMX 
<http://www.tmx.com/en/pdf/Guide_to_Listing.pdf> at 12 (Accessed February 12, 2014). 
778
 Proposed National Instrument: NI 51-102 – Continuous Disclosure Obligations, OSC (21 June 2002), online: 
OSC <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category5/rule_20020621_51-102.pdf> at Part 5 s 5.1(1), 
(2) (Accessed February 12, 2014). The original proposal for NI 51-102 and its continuous disclosure obligations 
display the intent of the OSC to avoid the burden of AIF disclosure by outlining an exemption for a “small business” 
that “has an aggregate market value of less than $75 million”. By the time NI 51-102 received ministerial approval, 
this section read as “[a] reporting issuer that is not a venture issuer must file an AIF” [Proposed NI 51-102]. See 
Request for Comments National Instrument 51-102 – Continuous Disclosure Obligations, OSC (20 June, 2003), 
online: OSC <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category5/rule_20030620_51-102_continuous-
disclosure.pdf> at s 5.1 (Accessed February 12, 2014); Notice of Request for Comment: NI 51-102  Continuous 
Disclosure Obligations, OSC (21 June 2002), online: OSC  
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_rule_20020621_51-102_roc.htm> at “Summary of the Rule and 
Anticipated Costs and Benefits” ¶ 6, “Request for Comment” ¶ 9, 10 (Accessed February 12, 2014). In 2002 from 
the initial NI 51-102 proposal, the view of the OSC was that “[w]e believe that the costs and other restrictions on the 
activities of reporting issuers that will result from [NI 51-102] are proportionate to the goal of timely, accurate and 
efficient disclosure of information about reporting issuers”. This cost/benefit analysis was not deemed proportional 
for “small businesses”, later referred to as “venture issuers”. The cost/benefit was viewed by the OSC as to not 
provide more benefit than the cost of providing AIF disclosure. See also Notice and Request for Comment: NI 51-
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extractive companies are listed on the TSXV, and the AIF requires greater non-financial 
disclosure than the MD&A.
779
 Unlike the MD&A and the corporation’s financial statements, 
there is no requirement of any approval from the board of directors or any audit committee prior 
to the filing of an AIF with a securities regulator.
780
 Although the AIF is disclosed on the System 
for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval, there is no obligation to distribute such 
information to securities holders.
781
 
The AIF explicitly outlines the disclosure of social and environmental information.
782
 For 
example, section 5.1(1)(k) of 51-102F2 requires disclosure relating to “[t]he financial and 
operational effects of environmental protection requirements on capital expenditures, earnings 
and competitive position of [a corporation] in the current” and future financial years.783 Section 
5.1(4) requires that the social, environmental, and human rights policies a company has actually 
implemented, which are fundamental to its operations, are revealed.
784
 Moreover, section 5.2 
also requires the disclosure of risk factors that relate to the corporation and its business.
785
 Item 5 
of section 5.2 includes disclosing “environmental and health risks, regulatory constraints, 
economic or political conditions, and any other risk that would likely have an impact on an 
investor’s decision to purchase securities of a particular company.”786 Section 5.4(1)(d), (e), and 
(f) focus on companies involved in mineral projects and mandates disclosure of all 
                                                                                                                                                             
102 – Continuous Disclosure Obligations, OSC (20 June 2003), online: 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_rule_20030620_51-102_notice-roc.htm> at Appendix B – Summary 
of Comments and CSA Responses ¶ 10 (Accessed February 12, 2014). 
779
 TMX mining, supra note 688; TMX oil, supra note 688. 
780
 NI 51-102, supra note 687 at 51-102 s 6.1; 51-102F2 at 1(a). 
781
 SEDAR, Background Information on SEDAR, online: sedar.com 
<http://www.sedar.com/sedar/background_on_sedar_en.htm> (Accessed August 15, 2013). “SEDAR (the System 
for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval) is the system used for electronically filing most securities related 
information with the Canadian securities regulatory authorities. Filing with SEDAR is mandatory for most reporting 
issuers in Canada.” 
782
 NI 51-102, supra note 687 at 51-102F2 Part 2, Item 5, sections 5.1(1)(k), 5.1(4), and 5.2;  BCSC, Companion 
Policy 51-102CP – Continuous Disclosure Obligations, online: BCSC <https://www.bcsc.bc.ca/uploadedFiles/51-
102CP.pdf> (Accessed March 2014). The companion policy does not elaborate on non-financial disclosure. 
783
 NI 51-102, supra note 687 at 5.1(1)(k). 
784
 Ibid at 5.1(4). Section 5.1(4) asks companies to describe the policies and the steps taken to implement policies.  
785
 Ibid at 5.2. Section 5.2 requires disclosure in order of seriousness to the business and the company. 
786
 Ibid. Section 12 outlines a requirement to disclose any legal proceedings the reporting issuer is a party to or 
whether any of its property is the subject of, or may be contemplated by the issuer, and to include all the parties 
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“environmental liabilities to which the project is subject; the location of existing tailing ponds, 
waste deposits”, as well as natural features; and the permits acquired or still needed, or still 
needed to work in the specific location.
787
 Section 5.4(2) requires the disclosure of the proximity 
of the project to the population centre, as well as the disclosure of surface rights, “sources of 
power, water, mining personnel,” and potential tailings storage areas.788  Section 5.4 further 
outlines the disclosure of the history of ownership; the development of land and changes in 
ownership; environmental conditions; and applicable taxes during operations.
789
  
As a whole, the above summary of the MD&A and the AIF reveal the extent of environmental, 
social, and human rights disclosure under NI 51-102. It is important to note, however, that 
environmental disclosure guidance under the MD&A and AIF, as of late 2009, at which time the 
Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) undertook a corporate SR review, was deemed 
comparable to other jurisdictions.
790
 
D. Materiality  
The concept of materiality arises from recognition that issuers cannot realistically reveal every 
single piece of information that a stakeholder may find interesting or significant in their decision-
making process.
791
 Materiality allows issuers to determine what information, financial or non-
financial, is material and therefore required to be disclosed. This explains why the concept of 
materiality is the threshold test used to determine the information to disclose.  
Under NI 51-102, material change is defined as “a change in the business, operations, or capital 
of the reporting issuer that would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the 
market price or value of any of the securities of the reporting issuer.”792 This definition includes 
any decision to apply a change made by the board of directors or by senior management of the 
reporting issuer where management believes that confirmation of the decision by the board of 
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 OSC Final Report, supra note 667 at 18. 
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 Condon, Anand, Sarra, supra note 675 at 74.  
792
 NI 51-102, supra note 687 at s1.1 – “material change” (a)(i). 
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directors is probable.
793
 The occurrence of a “material change” also triggers the obligation to file 
a MCR, under Form 51-102F3.
794
  Although NI 51-102 includes many different disclosure 
documents, the primary documents examined here are the MD&A, the AIF, and MCRs.
795
  
Under Part 7 of NI 51-102, a reporting issuer must issue and file a news release, as well as file 
Form 51-102F3 (MCR) when a material change occurs that satisfies the above definition of 
material change.
796
 MCR disclosure is mandatory unless the reporting issuer can meet the 
exception in section 7.1(2).
797
 It is important to note that materiality associated with MCRs 
focuses on “a significant effect on the market price or value of any of the securities” of the 
issuer.
798
 In contrast to this definition of “material change”, the MD&A depicts a different 
materiality threshold. The goal of the MD&A is to discuss and focus on “material 
information”.799 What is considered material information is determined by asking “[w]ould a 
reasonable investor’s decision whether or not to buy, sell or hold securities in [the reporting 
issuer’s] company likely be influenced or changed if the information in question was omitted or 
misstated.”800 Here, materiality is not determined solely by its impact on the value or price of 
securities of the issuer, but rather by whether or not a “reasonable investor’s” decision to buy, 
sell or hold securities would be influenced. The AIF, sharing a similar definition of materiality 
with the MD&A, focuses on providing “material information about the reporting issuer’s 
company and its business at a point in time in the context of its historical and possible future 
development,” among other objectives.801 
 The definition of “material change” under NI 51-102, cited above with regards to MCRs, is 
similarly defined under the Ontario Securities Act (OSA), as it is in most other provincial 
                                                 
793
 Ibid at (a)(ii). 
794
 Condon, Anand, Sarra, supra note 675 at 360; NI 51-102, supra note 687 sec 1.1, Form 51-102F3; See Section I 
below for the discussion of this definition of “material change” in reference to prospectus amendments. 
795
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 NI 51-102, supra note 687 at Section 7.1 of Part 7 of NI 51-102 – Publication of Material Change. 
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800
 Ibid at Part 1 (f). 
801
 Ibid at Form 51-102F2 Part 1(a). [Emphasis added]. 
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securities legislation.
802
 In addition to the concept of material change, provincial securities 
legislation also includes the concept of “material fact”, which is relevant in a number of other 
disclosure contexts. A “material fact” is defined as “a fact that would reasonably be expected to 
have a significant effect on the market price or value of the securities.”803 
Material change and material fact both define materiality with regards to market price or value of 
the reporting issuer’s securities, a standard referred to as the “market impact” test.804 This means 
that materiality in this case must be determined with reference to how the change would be 
expected to affect the price or value of the company’s securities.805 In contrast, the MD&A and 
the AIF define materiality with reference to the “reasonable investor” test. 806 
Although the market impact test at first glance seems to represent a narrow threshold, because of 
its focus on market price and value, there is a potential for overlap with the reasonable investor 
test. This is because if information has the potential of affecting the security’s value, under the 
market impact test, it is considered material, and what is material in this sense will always be 
information a “reasonable investor” will want in considering whether or not to buy, sell or hold 
securities.
807
 This view is supported by Cornish v Ontario Securities Commission and its 
reference to National Policy (NP) 51-201 – Disclosure Standards.808 According to NP 51-201, 
“[d]espite [the] differences [between the market impact and the reasonable investor tests], the 
two materiality standards are likely to converge, for practical purposes, in most cases.”809 
Although there is a relationship between the two materiality standards they are unique concepts. 
The market impact test applies to issues of “misrepresentation”, “material fact”, and “material 
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803
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804
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Journal 875 at 890. [Sarra, Public Policy]. 
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 Re Coventree Inc,(2011), 24 OSCB 11374, online: canlii.org 
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Price is Not Enough”, online: canadianappeals.com <http://www.canadianappeals.com/2013/04/08/full-disclosure-
share-price-is-not-enough/> (Accessed August 15, 2013). 
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 Disclosure Standards, OSC NP 51-201 (12 July 2002), s 4.1 of Part IV, online: OSC 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_pol_20020712_51-201.jsp> (Accessed August 5, 2013). [NP 51-201]. 
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change”, as well as civil litigation arising from those causes of action outlined in securities 
legislation and certain regulatory allegations.
810
 On the other hand, the reasonable investor 
threshold test is “a standard relevant to whether disclosure was “misleading” for the purpose of 
regulatory liability.”811 The Canadian approach, which uses both the market impact and the 
reasonable investor test, differs from the approach taken under U.S. securities law which uses 
only the reasonable investor test.
812
 
I. Material Fact vs. Material Change  
The distinction between material fact and material change is important, especially in the primary 
market.
813
 This distinction first becomes evident with the prospectus document, which requires 
“full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts”.814 Once an issuer receives a receipt for its 
prospectus the disclosure obligation ends, at which point updates of material facts are no longer 
required during the offering period.
815
 In contrast, the obligation to disclose a material change 
continues.
816
 It is important to note there is no explicit uniform definition of material fact in 
Canada within the different provincial securities statutes.
817
 In Ontario, the definition of a 
material fact refers to a forward-looking, rather than a retrospective, process that considers “any 
fact reasonably expected” to significantly affect a securities value.818 
                                                 
810
  
BCSC, “NIN97/42 Proposed Changes to the Definition of Material Fact and Material Change and Proposed 
Introduction of a “Loser-Pays” Cost Rule Under Securities Legislation [NIN Rescinded]” (31 October 1997), online: 
BCSC <http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/histpolicy.aspx?id=3660&cat=> (Accessed April 26, 2014). One example of a 
regulatory allegation may include failure to make timely disclosure of a material change in a MCR. 
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812
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814
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816
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817
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Material fact is also relevant to the concept of “misrepresentation” when linked to “an untrue 
statement of material fact” or “an omission to state a material fact” necessary to make a 
statement not misleading.
819
 The concept of misrepresentation is also relevant in secondary 
market disclosure for liability purposes. For example, under section 138.3(1) of the OSA, any 
documents released by a responsible issuer or a “person or company with actual, implied or 
apparent authority” acting on the responsible issuer’s behalf may expose the issuer to liability in 
an action for damages should those documents contain a misrepresentation.
820
 This is also the 
case under 138.3(2), where a responsible issuer, person or company “with actual, implied or 
apparent authority” makes public oral statements.821 Section 138.3 in its entirety applies to the 
core documents in the secondary market, such as the AIF, the MD&A, financial statements, and 
shareholder meeting materials.
822
 
In comparison to material fact, material change is a narrow concept. This is because unlike 
material change, not all material facts are a product of a “change in the business, operations or 
capital of the issuer.”823 Under the continuous disclosure obligations there are two fundamental 
components. The first is periodic disclosure, which consists of quarterly and annual financial 
statements, MD&A’s, AIFs, and shareholder meeting materials.824 The second component is to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Year Review Committee Final Report, Reviewing the Securities Act (Ontario), (21 March 2003), online: 
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Scott Bell, Canada: Securities Act Amendments Coming into Force on April 7, 2003, online: mondaq 
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126 
 
 
provide timely and accurate disclosure of “material changes” experienced by the issuer.825 
“Material change”, then, is primarily of importance in the context of a reporting issuer’s timely 
disclosure obligations.
826
 The concept of material change then is particularly relevant to MCRs. 
Section 75 of the OSA outlines that subject to one exception, once a material change occurs in 
the affairs of a reporting issuer the only way for such an issuer to disclose the material change is 
for that reporting issuer to “forthwith” issue and file a news release along with a MCR.827 In 
comparison to periodic disclosure, the timing of which is mandated by national instruments, 
securities legislation, and regulation, MCRs are subject to timely disclosure, which normally 
means “forthwith”, “as soon as practicable”, or in other cases “no later than ten days”.828 This 
timely disclosure also includes the obligation to “immediately issue and file a news release.”829 
The role of MCRs is to promote an active capital market and enhance investor protection.
830
 At 
the same time, MCRs also provide issuers with limited relief for any material change disclosure 
that is “unduly detrimental” to their interests.831 In such a case, the issuer has the option to keep 
the MCR confidential.
832
 When deciding to keep a MCR confidential the issuer is obligated to 
report this decision to the securities regulator in writing, and in any event within ten days of the 
material change.
833
 The reporting issuer must also comply with an ongoing obligation to report to 
the securities regulator and explain why the report should remain confidential “every ten days 
thereafter until the material change is generally disclosed in” the preferred manner.834 This 
ongoing obligation to report and explain helps counteract the ability of the issuer to unreasonably 
withhold information it deems “unduly detrimental”. 
The extent of the MCR disclosure requirement is outlined in Part 2 of Form 51-102F3. This 
includes providing a level of information that enables a reader to appreciate the “significance and 
                                                 
825
 Condon, Anand, Sarra, supra note 675 at 355. 
826
 Ibid at 365.  
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 OSA, supra note 675 at s 75 (1), (2). 
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 Ibid; Condon, Anand, Sarra, supra note 675 at 365; NI 51-102, supra note 687 at Part 7, 7.1(1)(a). 
829
 Ibid; Condon, Anand, Sarra, supra note 675 at 365; NI 51-102, supra note 687 at Part 7, 7.1(1)(a). 
830
 Ibid at 399.  
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 Ibid at 401; OSA, supra note 675 at s 75 (3). The determination that a material change disclosure would be 
“unduly detrimental” must be made in a reasonable manner. 
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 Condon, Anand, Sarra, supra note 675 at 401; OSA, supra note 675 at s 75 (3). 
833
 OSA, supra note 675 at s 75 (2). 
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 Condon, Anand, Sarra, supra note 675 at 401. 
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impact of the material change” without having to reference other material.835 The type of 
material required to be disclosed includes “dates, parties, terms and conditions, description of 
any assets, liabilities or capital affected, purpose, financial or dollar values, reasons for the 
change,” as well as comments on any likely impact on the issuer or its subsidiaries.836 Despite 
these explicit examples of types of data, the guidance fails to include non-financial disclosure 
guidance. The Kapusta decision from the Alberta Securities Commission and the Coventree 
decision from the OSC,
837
 do however suggest external events outside the control of an issuer 
can indeed trigger a material change in the issuer’s business.838 
A comparison of the definitions of material fact and material change reveals the differences 
between these two concepts. However, according to Sarra, a “blurring” of the above distinction 
emerges with the concept of “material information” in regards to regulatory compliance.839 For 
example, in practice TSX listed issuers already comply with a material information standard 
through the TSX listing requirements.
840
 This is important to note because for these issuers the 
distinction between material fact and material change only becomes a concern where there are 
allegations of failing to satisfy statutory requirements or a civil liability claim.
841
 More 
specifically, since material change is narrower than material fact,
 842
 an issuer alleged to have 
breached its continuous disclosure obligations may try to characterize a change that was not 
originally disclosed as a material fact, rather than a material change.
843
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 Ontario Securities Commission, “Notice of Amendments to NI 51-102 National Instrument 51-102 Continuous 
Disclosure Obligations: Supplement to the OSC Bulletin”, online: 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category5/rule_20061013_51-102_supplement.pdf> (Accessed 
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 Pezim v British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 SCR 557, at 597. Iacobucci J articulates that 
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to significantly affect” the market price or value of the securities of an issuer, and not only changes in the “business, 
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The reason for ensuring a clear delineation between material change and material fact and the 
market impact and reasonable investor test is because each concept and test results in important, 
and different, consequences.
844
 For example, the market impact test seems less likely, than the 
reasonable investor test, to require disclosure of non-financial environmental, social, and human 
rights concerns. This would be due to the financial focus of the market impact test.
845
 Unless 
environmental, social, or human rights concerns were deemed to have a negative or positive 
impact on the issuer’s market value, then these non-financial topics would not necessarily require 
disclosure under the market impact test. This financial impact from non-financial events, issues, 
or concerns could occur because of litigation, protests, and environmental issues. In any case, 
even absent litigation or other non-financial issues or concerns, an adverse impact on an issuer’s 
securities could arise if a significant number of investors were to object to holding shares in a 
corporation that is engaged in certain practices.
846
 This discussion helps illustrate how the 
reasonable investor test has the potential to accommodate SR and to help disseminate non-
financial, environmental, social, and human rights impacts and information attributed to 
Canadian extractive sector TNCs. The reasonable investor test sets itself apart because it is 
considered a broader definition and capable of capturing a wider scope of information not 
directly linked with market value.
847
 This distinction is evident from section 2.1 in CSA Staff 
Notice 51-333 – Environmental Reporting Guidance. Under this staff notice environmental 
matters are included in the definition of the reasonable investor test, suggesting non-financial 
concerns can be relevant.
848
 Cynthia Williams proposed a similar argument, in relation to the 
United States (U.S.). Williams argues that a legislative intent exists not just for consideration of 
financial concerns in securities disclosure for investor protection but a broader public interest 
                                                 
844
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 If corporate management reasonably believes a considerable number of investors would object to holding shares 
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 Sarra, “Public Policy”, supra note 694  at 889; Dhir, shadows, supra note 750 at 462. 
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 Environmental Reporting Guidance, OSC CSA Staff Notice 51-333 (27 October 2010), s 2.1, online: OSC 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category5/csa_20101027_51-333_environmental-
reporting.pdf> at 5-7 s 2.1 (Accessed August 15, 2013). [SN 51-333]. The staff notice also reviews CICA 
publications and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s guidance on disclosure related to climate change. 
The SN states it is not meant as legal or other advice on whether a particular environmental matter is material. 
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goal as well.
849
 This view would allow investors to make decisions on financial and non-
financial issues.
850
 The caveat with this argument is that it is based on the U.S. securities 
disclosure framework, which generally uses the reasonable investor test. Although U.S. 
securities laws often serve as a model for the Canadian provincial securities administrations, the 
U.S. reasonable investor test contrasts with the market impact test used for many purposes in 
Canadian provincial securities legislation. As discussed above, the market impact test is much 
more challenging as it strictly focuses on material factors expected to have an effect on the 
security’s market value, and more likely to prevent the consideration of a wider scope of issues 
by investors.  
II. Other Concerns with Materiality 
In addition to the regulatory and practical issues
851
 and the constraints discussed above, a lack of 
guidance, poor compliance, and weak enforcement are also issues associated with the concept of 
materiality. One problem is that events that should be considered material are not being 
classified as such by issuers, and so are left undisclosed. This may be the result of a lack of 
guidance and clarity in initially determining whether certain environmental, social, and human 
rights issues need to be disclosed, as this type of information may not fit common conceptions of 
what is deemed material. A lack of disclosure may also be attributed to issuers “simply following 
the letter of the law,” instead of its spirit and intent, or due to a deliberate ignorance. These 
concerns highlight issues of compliance and the need for guidance for issuers to understand 
whether environmental, social, and human rights issues meet the material threshold; issues that 
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 Williams, supra note 667 at 1204, 1229-30, 1236-7.  Williams describes the public interest grant of power in the 
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or for the protection of investors” and flexibility to tailor securities disclosure. In recognition of its broad authority 
to require disclosure “necessary or appropriate in the public interest” the SEC interpreted its public interest 
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the Securities Act of 1933. Williams argues this does not constrain the SEC from requiring expanded disclosure. 
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 Some practical issues include private issuers not being obligated to provide AIF or MD&A disclosure. The 
materiality threshold also acts as a practical hurdle because it does not allow the disclosure of all information, only 
the information meeting the threshold of “material”. 
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are also highlighted at the international level. The corporate law tools (CLT) project of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), now the former SRSG, was designed to 
identify “whether and how corporate and securities principles and practices” encourage 
companies to respect human rights.
852
 The project revealed that most of the 39 national 
jurisdictions it surveyed, including Canada, agreed “that human rights impacts may in some 
cases reach the materiality thresholds applicable to ordinary financial reporting, which would 
make it compulsory for companies to disclose such human rights impacts to their 
shareholders.”853 However, a lack of guidance “on how and when to make [such] 
determinations” prevents such inclusion in corporate reporting.854 This lack of guidance 
increases the probability of failing to comply with disclosure obligations, misrepresentation and, 
potentially, liability.
855
 
The timeframe in which issues of materiality are considered is another concern. As evidenced in 
the review by the OSC, part of the problem is that the reporting issuer may have a short-term 
financial focus instead of long-term sustainability.
856
 This provides a glaring contrast to SR and 
its inherently long-term focus. The OSC consultation and review suggested that reporting issuers 
disclose the method used to determine the definition of materiality when providing disclosure.
857
 
This would inform users whether a narrow or broad definition, or interpretation, of materiality 
leads to the disclosure of a certain level and type of information.
858
 Other suggestions included 
revealing the definition of materiality used and the time perspective to provide standardized 
                                                 
852
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and-corporate-law-23-may-2011.pdf> (Accessed August 15, 2013). This project assessed how well corporate and 
securities law of different jurisdictions shape and guide company behaviour [CLT Overarching Trends].  
854
 Ibid.  
855
 Ibid; CLT Report, supra note 669 at 15. ““[M]isrepresentation” meaning an untrue statement of material fact, or 
an omission to state a material fact that is required to be stated or that is necessary to make a statement not 
misleading in the light of the circumstances in which it was made.” 
856
 OSC Final Report, supra note 667 at page 2 of Schedule 2 – Summary of discussion held on September 18, 2009.  
857
 Ibid at 3. 
858
 Ibid. 
131 
 
 
disclosure.
859
 These ideas arise from the view that an issue may appear not to be material in the 
short term, but is in the long term.
860
 Alternatively, uniform regulatory direction on a particular 
issue is another solution. For example, unlike Staff Notice 51-333 – Environmental Reporting 
Guidance, discussed below, the U.S. federal Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
released interpretative guidance requiring companies “to disclose impacts that business or legal 
developments related to climate change would have on its business.”861 These suggestions guide 
and help address the problem of determining whether or not a non-financial event is material. 
E. Implications of the Lack of Clarity regarding Materiality 
Condon, Anand, and Sarra argue that disclosure provides “sufficient warning” of corporate 
activity that has potential to adversely affect an investor and the subsequent option to exit the 
investment or voice one’s concern.862 Inaccurate or incomplete disclosure of environmental, 
social, and human rights information eliminates the communicative value of disclosure as an 
adequate warning system. The analysis of securities disclosure obligations by the OSC (OSC 
Review) and the Hennick Center
863
 revealed that although no new rules are necessarily 
needed,
864
 guidance and enforcement were still recognized as major concerns.
865
 For example, 
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<http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=de6c3083-5193-4029-9889-976fe7220b91> (Accessed August 15, 
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any “short-term advantage gained from a liberal interpretation of non-material”, would fail to 
include as complete information as possible.
866
 Condon et al. also argue that by following the 
“letter of the law” of continuous disclosure obligations without meeting its “spirit and intent”, 
issuers may not be providing investors with complete and accurate information to allow for 
informed decisions.
867
 This potentially leads to a loss in investor and market confidence with 
negative impacts for the investor and issuer.
868
 
Failing to explicitly require and enforce the disclosure of material environmental, social, or 
human rights events, decisions, or transactions creates, arguably, “ex ante incentives on the part 
of corporate officers to externalize the costs of some activities, [resulting] in the activity either 
not being reported or reported as benefits to the issuer.”869 This may be evident where there is a 
purchase of, or expansion on to, previously occupied land over a mineral/oil reserve without 
taking into consideration social or political information.
870
 Without requiring such non-financial 
disclosure a company is unlikely to provide an accurate explanation of the atmosphere in which 
business operations are conducted.
871
 Consequently this also fails to compel issuers to engage in 
due diligence of environmental, social, political, and human rights issues, while also potentially 
externalizing the cost of the event or transaction. Condon et al. reason this “externalization of the 
cost” occurs because certain harms are considered before hand to not be relevant. Since 
materiality primarily “refers to events or transactions that may affect share or property value”,872 
when harms are “externalized” they “need not be costed on the issuer’s balance sheet and are not 
required to be reported as material because they allegedly do not have a material impact on 
                                                                                                                                                             
865
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shareholder value”.873 Similarly, harms considered part of the realm of public law, such as 
violations of labour, environmental law, or international human rights standards are also argued 
by Condon et al. to end up classified outside of the securities sphere, unless the event, decision, 
or transaction is deemed to have a material impact on share value.
874
 Under this view investors 
are less likely to be provided with disclosure of environmental, social or human rights costs of 
the issuer,
875
 as was discussed earlier above. 
Another issue that may arise is when an event does not meet the materiality threshold, and 
therefore does not impact the market price or value of securities, yet investors still want and seek 
relevant non-financial information. An example of such a scenario was illustrated by Goldcorps’ 
investors and its activities in Guatemala, discussed later below. Despite making the argument 
that environmental, social and human rights issues can and should be understood as meeting the 
materiality thresholds, the above obstacles are likely to re-emerge when investors seek non-
material non-financial information. Consequently, similar to the lack of clarity with material 
non-financial information, the impetus for corporations to provide non-material disclosure is 
likely to be minimal or decrease in comparison. This request for non-material non-financial 
information may suggest a reconsideration of who the “reasonable investor” might be and what 
kind of information the reasonable investor would want to know. 
4.2 Canadian Securities Disclosure and Extractive Sector-
Specific Disclosure Guidance  
The above section identified that not all disclosure obligations are applicable all the time or to all 
listed or non-listed issuers. For those TSX issuers required to comply with the AIF, and its social 
and environmental disclosure, Dhir argues that the AIF terms should be read in-sync with NI 43-
                                                 
873
 Ibid. Once events, decisions, transactions, or “harms” are externalized, they are not required to be taken into 
account on financial statements, or MD&A’s, and so are not required to be reported as material, because they 
allegedly do not have a material impact on shareholder value. 
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101.
876
 Even if AIF disclosure is not required from a reporting issuer, for example because a 
reporting issuer is listed on the TSXV, that issuer is still obligated to comply with NI 43-101 if 
engaged in a mineral project.
877
 It is worth mentioning that oil & gas activities, governed by NI 
51-101, do not have the same reporting obligations as NI 43-101.
878
 Unlike NI 51-102 and its 
continuous reporting obligations, NI 43-101 and NI 51-101 apply consistently to any issuer 
engaged in mineral and oil and gas projects, regardless of whether an issuer is a venture or non-
venture or reporting or non-reporting issuer.
879
 Just as important, the consistent application of 
these instruments also provides support to the notion of SR by identifying a foundation on which 
base the reporting requirement. 
NI 43-101 provides mineral mining project guidance and sets out the standards of disclosure for 
such projects.
880
 For example, section 4.1(1) of Form 43-101F1 of NI 43-101 requires a reporting 
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 Dhir, shadows, supra note 750 at 446; Ontario Securities Commission, Repeal and Replacement of NI 43-101 
Standards for Disclosure for Mineral Projects, online: OSC 
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878
 NI 51-101, supra note 719 at 1.3 Part 1.Neither NI 51-101 or section 5.5 of NI 51-102F2 , which discuss 
Companies with Oil and Gas Activities, make any reference to environmental, social, or human rights issues. 
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The Canadian Business Law Journal 173 at 180 – 189; Joseph Groia, Jennifer Badley and Alexandrea Jones, “The 
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issuer to file a technical report for “each mineral property material to the issuer”881 and section 
14(d) of the same Form requires “a general discussion on the extent to which the estimate of 
mineral resources and mineral reserves may be materially affected by any known 
environmental… legal… socio-economic… political or other relevant issues…”882 With the 
recent repeal and replacement of NI 43-101, Item 20 of Form 43-101F1 now requires reporting 
issuers to discuss and disclose “reasonably available information” on environmental studies and 
known environmental issues that could have a material impact; plans for waste, tailings disposal, 
monitoring, and water management during and post project; permitting requirements; any 
potential social or community related requirements and plans for the project; and lastly mine 
closure (remediation and reclamation) requirements and costs.
883
 Another relevant change 
entailed the elimination of “the requirement to disclose the results of relevant market studies and 
similar analyses” in Item 19 of Form 43-101F1.884 This section was replaced with an obligation 
for the “qualified person to discuss the general nature of the studies, and to confirm they have 
reviewed the studies and that the results support the assumptions made in the technical report.”885 
One observation of this change is that a discussion of the general nature of the studies runs the 
risk of overlooking relevant information, particularly as the qualified person may not be familiar 
with environmental, social, and human rights concerns. Similarly, the repeal of the requirement 
to disclose the results of a market study potentially disregards details on risks, potential, and 
other non-financial factors prior to undertaking a project. Despite the potential to reinforce a SR 
mechanism by raising awareness, informing, and guiding subsequent concerns, as well as its 
consistent application, the selective highlights from a “qualified person” unqualified in 
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environmental, social and human rights issues outlines a process that is seemingly counter-
intuitive to the goal of disseminating information and informing stakeholders.
886
 
In those cases where there is no “scientific or technical information” relating “to a mineral 
project on a property material to the issuer”, there does not appear to be a requirement to provide 
a technical report.
887
 Evidently, NI 43-101 reveals a focus mainly on mineral resources or 
mineral reserves. This omits the disclosure of any relevant environmental and social side effects 
of carrying on a mineral mining project. Another pitfall recognized by the revised NI 43-101 is 
that business operations, or more specifically a “production decision”, may still be undertaken 
without feasibility or technical reports.
888
 Historically, according to companion policy (CP) 43-
101, projects failing to create a feasibility or technical report have had a significantly higher risk 
of economic or technical failure.
889
 To avoid misleading or inaccurate disclosure, CP 43-101 
claims that an issuer “should disclose that it is not basing its production decision on a feasibility 
study... and should provide adequate disclosure of the increased uncertainty and specific 
economic and technical risks of failure associated with its production design.”890 However, 
failing to include obligatory language to compel compliance reintroduces issues of enforcement 
and compliance, issues that are further highlighted in Staff Notice (SN) 43-705. 
SN 43-705 outlines the results of an OSC conducted review of disclosure concerns with 
Technical Reports. The OSC examined 50 out of 460 Technical Reports filed by 238 Ontario 
mining issuers filed on SEDAR, and discovered these reports are not consistently satisfying its 
intended goals.
891
 From the Technical Reports examined, 40% displayed at least one major non-
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 NI 43-101, supra note 719 at Part 1 section 1.1. A “qualified person” is defined to be an engineer or geoscientist. 
Although the focus of a technical report is on minerals, it provides a potential avenue in which related 
environmental, social and human rights issues may also be disclosed.  
887
 Ibid at 4.2(1). 
888
 National Instrument 43-101 “Companion Policy”, in NI 43-101 at 4.2(6). [CP 43-101]. 
889
 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. [Emphasis added]. 
891
 CSA Staff Notice – 43-705 Report on Staff’s Review of Technical Reports by Ontario Mining Issuers, OSC CSA 
Notice, (27 June 2013), online: OSC <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_sn_20130627_43-705_rpt-tech-
rpt-mining-issuers.htm> at s 2.1 (Accessed August 5, 2013). [Staff Notice 43-705]. 27 of the Technical Reports 
were by issuers listed on the TSX and 16 were from the TSXV. The remaining were issuers either listed on the 
Canadian National Stock Exchange or unlisted; Brian E. Abraham, “Canada: OSC Staff Notice 43 705 Review of 
Technical Reports by Ontario Mining Issuers” Mondaq (3 July 2013), online: mondaq 
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compliance concern, another 40% had some concerns, with only the last 20% adequately 
complying with Form 43-101F1.
892
 The topics with significant deficiencies included 
environmental studies, permitting, social or community impacts, economic analysis, and 
interpretation and conclusions.
893
 Regarding “advanced properties”894, 32% of the reports failed 
to address, at all, environmental studies; permitting, social, and community impacts; and 
remediation and reclamation matters.
895
 37% of the reports on advanced properties also failed to 
disclose the impact of taxes on projects
896
 and 36% “did not disclose specific project risks on 
potential outcomes and mitigating factors.”897 Overall, SN 43-705 supports the view there exists 
a lack of guidance, compliance and enforcement in Canadian securities disclosure regulations. 
CP 43-101 and NI 43-101 do however provide constructive guidance with the underlying goal of 
informing and protecting investors through disclosure of non-financial issues. Canadian 
companies engaged in mineral mining are legally obligated to comply with NI 43-101 because it 
is mandated by regulators, and reinforced by the threat of penalties. Penalties may include “staff 
requests for re-filings, additional disclosure, or other staff action, where appropriate.”898 
Moreover, a failure to file or a deficient technical report may also result in a delay of the 
issuance of a prospectus receipt, and in severe circumstances the possibility of facing cease trade 
orders.
899
 This authority and the non-financial focus of NI 43-101, nonetheless, provide support 
                                                                                                                                                             
<http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/248348/Securities/OSC+Staff+Notice+43+705+Review+Of+Technical+Report
s+By+Ontario+Mining+Issuers&email_access=on> (Accessed August 5, 2013). [Summary 43-705].  
892
 Staff Notice 43-705, supra note 891 . Of the 50 reports reviewed, 59% of the issuers were at the mineral 
resources stage, 26% at the development of productions stage and 15% at the exploration stage. 
893
 Ibid.  
894
 NI 43-101, supra note 719 at Part 1, 1.1 definition of “advanced property”. An advanced property is a property 
that has (a) mineral reserves or (b) “mineral resources the potential economic viability of which is supported by a 
preliminary economic assessment, a pre-feasibility study or a feasibility study.” 
895
 Staff Notice 43-705, supra note 891.The remaining 68% of reporting issuers are not necessarily deemed to be 
providing adequate disclosure. 
896
 Summary 43-705, supra note 891. 
897
 Ibid; Staff Notice 43-705, supra note 891 at Item 25. Item 25 explicitly requires a Technical Report to “[d]iscuss 
any significant risks and uncertainties that could reasonably be expected to affect the reliability or confidence in the 
exploration information, mineral resource or mineral reserve estimates, or projected economic outcomes.” 
898
 Staff Notice 43-705, supra note 891 at Summary of results and future action, s 6. These penalties arise “if an 
issuer and qualified person have not fully met the requirements of Form 43-101F1 and NI 43-101.” 
899
 OSA, supra note 675 at section 70(1) and 61(2); OSC, OSC Proceedings, online: 
OSC<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Proceedings_index.htm> (Accessed December 7, 2013); OSC, Guide to 
Enforcement Proceedings, online: OSC 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Proceedings/osc_20120210_guide-enf-proceedings.pdf> (Accessed 
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to the idea of using the securities disclosure framework as a foundation on which to base the SR 
process. This power to compel compliance under NI 43-101 is uniquely placed in comparison to 
similar instruments globally. 
The U.S. and Australian frameworks similar to Canada’s NI 43-101 lack a similar level of 
modern guidance and the state support that NI 43-101 enjoys. For example, the Australasian 
Code for Reporting of Exploration Results, Mineral Resources and Ore Reserves (The JORC 
Code),
900
 which sets out minimum standards for reporting exploration results, mineral resources 
and ore reserves, is compulsory for listed companies in Australia and New Zealand.
901
 Although 
the stock exchange listing rules are not deemed to be part of the law in Australia,
902
 the JORC 
Code is still given some status as an official standard as the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission can require compliance with the Code.
903
 The U.S. version of the JORC is the 
Society for Mining, Metallurgy, and Exploration, Inc., (SME) Guide for Reporting Exploration 
Results, Mineral Resources and Mineral Reserves, 2007 edition (SME Guide).
904
 However, the 
U.S. SEC does not recognize the SME Guide or any other standard from the international 
Committee for Mineral Reserves International Reporting Standards (CRIRSCO).
905
 Instead the 
                                                                                                                                                             
December 7, 2013). Overall, the OSC and BCSC have broad powers to enforce their respective securities acts. For 
example, if an issuer fails to file a technical report a securities commission could allow extra time to comply or be 
subject to a cease trade order. If a technical report contains deficiencies or a misrepresentation, the issuer may be 
asked to revise the technical report. If a technical report has been filed on SEDAR and the technical report omits 
material information or includes a misrepresentation, the issuer and the qualified person who signs off on the report 
may be subject to civil liability to investors; OSA, supra note 675 at s127(1). S 127 lists the orders a commission 
may make; Kevin J. Thomson, Melanie A. Shishler, and Richard Fridman, “Ontario Securities Commission Staff 
Releases Report on Mining Technical Reports” (28 June 2013), online: dwpv.com  
<http://www.dwpv.com/en/Resources/Publications/2013/Ontario-Securities-Commission-Staff-Releases-Report-on-
Mining-Technical-Reports> (Accessed December 7, 2013); 
900
 Joint Ore Reserves Committee, Australasian Code for Reporting of Exploration Results, Minerals Resources and 
Ore Reserves, online: jorc.org <http://www.jorc.org/docs/jorc_code2012.pdf> at 2 (Accessed October 30, 2013). 
The JORC was established in 1971 and the first edition of the Code was released in 1989. Later versions were 
released in 1992, 1996, 2004, and the 2012 version is the more recent version taking effect in Dec 2013. 
901
 The CSR Centre for Excellence, “Standards & Guidelines for Resources and Reserves” online: web.cim.org 
<http://web.cim.org/standards/MenuPage.cfm?sections=185,188&menu=202> (Accessed October 30, 2013). [CIM]. 
902
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 CRIRSCO, The SME Guide for Reporting Exploration Results, Mineral Resources, and Mineral Reserves, 
online: crirsco.com <http://www.crirsco.com/usa_sme_guide_2007.pdf> at 2. (Accessed October 30, 2013); CIM, 
supra note 901. Industry Guide 7 was published more than 25 years ago and has since not undergone revisions or 
received updates, and is deemed to “significantly” differ from CRIRSCO-style reporting standards. 
905
 CRIRSCO , About CRIRSCO, online: crirsco.com <http://www.crirsco.com/background.asp>  (Accessed October 
30, 2013) 
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SEC promotes Industry Guide 7 (IG7), which requires a Description of Property by Issuers 
Engaged or to Be Engaged in Significant Mining Operations, and compliance with SEC 
interpretations of the guide.
906
 At the same time, IG7 is argued by the SME
907
 to lack the 
disclosure required by similar mechanisms, such as NI 43-101 and the JORC Code, and to be 
outdated, since it has remained the same as when it was originally brought into force in 1982.
908
 
The IG7 does, however, contain an exception, permitting Canadian companies listed in the U.S. 
and engaged in mineral projects to offer NI 43-101, rather than IG7, disclosure.
909
 Overall, 
despite the advantages of NI 43-101, this does not mean the U.S. and Australian mechanisms are 
weaker or stronger than NI 43-101. Prior to 1999, before NI 43-101 was implemented, the JORC 
Code was recognized as an “international standard in mineral resource and ore reserve 
reporting.”910 This is notable because NI 43-101 permits a JORC report in certain circumstances, 
instead of a 43-101 technical report.
911
 Taken as a whole then, in comparison to similar 
standards, NI 43-101 can be considered cutting edge by its disclosure of relevant information 
under the auspices of the state’s, in Canada’s case provincial, enforcement authority. With the 
securities disclosure instruments examined above, Canada appears to have a foundation on which 
to put into force a regulatory SR mechanism. 
Similar to NI 43-101, which targets mineral resource disclosure, is NI 51-101, the oil and gas 
equivalent. The provision of NI 51-101 most comparable to the non-financial disclosure of NI 
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<http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/industryguides.pdf> at 34. (Accessed October 30, 2013). This includes Industry 
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909
 Society for Mining, Metallurgy & Exploration, SME/SEC Meeting on Mineral Resources and Reserves Reporting 
Washington, DC (16 December 2011) online: smenet.org 
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December 9, 2013). 
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International Reporting Template, published by CRIRSCO. 
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43-101 is a requirement for geologists and engineers to comply with their professional standards 
and ethics.
912
 Despite requiring these professional standards, NI 51-101 fails to require any form 
of sustainability reporting or other non-financial disclosure.
913
 This “limitation” of NI 51-101, in 
relation to oil and gas SR and its environmental, social, and human rights impacts, is somewhat 
balanced by the OSC Emerging Markets Issuer Review (EMIR) in SN 51-719.
914
  Reinforcing 
the concept of non-financial disclosure in Canada, the EMIR focused on risks and investor 
concerns with the ultimate goal of improving “disclosure and governance practices, due 
diligence requirements, audits and listing processes.”915 The significance of this review is that an 
“emerging market” issuer is defined to include a reporting issuer “whose mind and management 
are largely outside of Canada and whose principal active operations are outside of Canada, in 
regions such as Asia, Africa, South America and Eastern Europe.”916 These regions coincide 
with locations largely occupied by Canadian extractive sector TNCs.
917
 Ultimately, the 
recommendations from the EMIR refused to promote the creation of new policies or rules and 
instead called for the development of greater guidance, best practices, “or enhanced vigilance to 
support compliance,” coinciding with the conclusions of the OSC Review.918 The result of the 
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914
 OSC Staff Notice 51-719 - Emerging Markets Issuer Review, OSC Notice, (March 2012), online: OSC 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_sn_20120320_51-719_emerging-markets.htm> (Accessed August 5, 
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<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/static/_/AnnualReports/2012/year_in_review/emerging_markets.html> (Accessed 
August 5, 2013).  
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and control of the corporation are located”. CCH: International Master Tax Guide, 2009/10, 6th ed, at 369 (Accessed 
August 5, 2013).  
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 TMX, “Global Leader in Mining” (2011) online: TMX <http://www.tmx.com/en/pdf/Mining_Sector_Sheet.pdf> 
(Accessed August 5, 2013). 
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 Ibid. The EMIR reiterated the duty of board and audit committees to have a thorough understanding of the 
business and operating environment of the issuer, a deficiency identified with some EM issuers. In some situations, 
the board was not aware of environmental factors; the review found an unnecessary use of complex corporate 
structures in EMs, which tended to increase the risk profile of an issuer; the facilitation of inappropriate activity, like 
fraud or misappropriation; and questioned the level of transparency. There was also a lack of risk identification and 
understanding found in relation to political factors, such as government instability; property and asset title; the legal 
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legal and cultural factors. Other concerns cited a lack of professional scepticism by auditors when auditing 
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EMIR was the creation of a guide for emerging markets reporting issuers set out in OSC Staff 
Notice 51-720.
919
 Although SN 51-720 outlined extra guidance, such as risks typical in an 
emerging market (legal, regulatory, political and culture), it failed to elaborate on environmental, 
social or human rights issues.
920
 
An additional policy, briefly discussed above, which offers further insights, is NP 51-201.
921
 
This policy instrument adds to the disclosure regulations discussed in NI 51-102 and NI 43-101, 
by providing “guidance on “best disclosure” practices in a difficult area involving competing 
business pressures and legislative requirements”.922 The intent of NP 51-201 is to prevent 
selective disclosure and insider trading and to ensure equal access to information for everyone 
investing in securities.
923
 NP 51-201 is relevant because it provides guidance and standards on 
materiality and best disclosure practices. In particular, section 4.3 of NP 51-201 provides 
examples of potentially material information, ranging from changes in corporate structure, 
capital structure, business and operations, and others issues.
924
 Section 4.4 references non-
financial concerns, such as “External Political, Economic and Social Developments”.925 Under 
section 4.4, if an “external [political, economic, and social] development will have or has had a 
direct effect on the business and affairs of a company that is both material and uncharacteristic of 
the effect generally experienced by other companies engaged in the same business or industry,” 
                                                                                                                                                             
information; unverified/unanalyzed conclusions with no proof; and lack of clarity and transparency displaying 
efforts to understand cultural and business practices. 
919
 OSC Staff Notice - Issuer Guide for Companies Operating in Emerging Markets, OSC Notice 51-720, 
(November 2012), online: OSC <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_sn_20121109_51-720_issuer-
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921
 NP 51-201, supra note 809. 
922
 Ibid.  
923
 Ibid at 1.1. 
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 Ibid at 4.4. 
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then that company is “urged to explain, where practical,” the impact on them.926 The problem 
with this provision is it potentially omits information simply because it is generally applicable to 
the majority of similarly placed companies. For example, government policy affecting most 
companies is not required to be disclosed, and this rationale could be applied to other factors 
such as wide spread environmental, social, and other political issues.
927
 Despite this flaw, NP 51-
201 remains relevant outlining Best Disclosure Practices and guidance that is very much 
applicable to environmental, social and human rights disclosure.
928
 Section 6.2, in particular, 
insists on the creation of a written corporate disclosure policy that is reviewed by the board of 
directors, practical enough to implement, and leads to consistent disclosure.
929
 Section 6.3 
outlines the creation of a committee to oversee and coordinate disclosure, with 6.4 further adding 
that a Board and Audit Committee Review certain disclosure prior to its release to the public.
930
 
Overall, this policy provides a level of guidance and detail not discussed elsewhere, and potential 
of being applied to extractive sector TNC SR disclosure. 
Further reinforcing the idea of SR and engaging in dialogue with stakeholders within the 
Canadian securities disclosure framework is OSC Staff Notice 15-704.  The proposed 
enforcement initiatives in SN 15-704 add support to the growth of disclosure in Canada and the 
notion of SR by revealing self-reporting processes that is certainly applicable to Canadian 
extractive sector TNCs.
931
 This notice looks to resolve enforcement matters quickly and 
effectively through disclosure mechanisms.
932
 It includes a proposal for an explicit No-
Enforcement Action Agreement, whereby a party would make itself no longer subject to OSC 
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932
 SN 15-704, supra note 931.  
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enforcement in exchange for implementing self-reporting on matters that may breach Ontario 
securities laws or “activities that would be considered contrary to the public interest”.933 It 
includes a proposed “New No-Contest Settlement program”, whereby the OSC could make a 
protective order in the absence of a specific admission of a breach of Securities Act violation; a 
clarified process for self-reporting, through a cooperative approach to ensure that all parties are 
informed on how best to self-report and come forward with information; and a proposal for 
enhanced public disclosure of credit granted for cooperation.
934
 Staff Notice 15-704 also 
proposes a whistleblower program for those who provide the OSC with information of 
“misconduct in the marketplace,” a form of information dissemination “to support enforcement 
activity.”935 Although these remedies may arise after the fact, through the inducement of 
corrective behavior SR can help ensure the continuation of corrective actions with subsequent 
disclosure.
 936
 
A. Case Study 1: Copper Mesa in Ecuador 
Copper Mesa, previously known as Ascendant Copper, a junior Canadian copper mining 
company, provides an example of the potential consequences that can arise from the lack of 
disclosure and the corporate failure to provide warning on the condition of growing non-financial 
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risks.
937
 Before operations began in Ecuador, Copper Mesa and its wholly-owned Ecuadorian 
subsidiary, Barbadian, faced heavy opposition to its proposed project.
938
 Copper Mesa claimed 
that “[a]s a public company traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange, [it is] committed to 
upholding the highest standards in the areas of transparency and anti-corruption, promotion of 
local sustainable development, environmental protection, and human rights.”939 On the other 
hand, letters and documents from a local mayor and civil society group Defensa y Conservacion 
Ecologica de Intag (DECOIN) made a strong case for concern and community opposition to the 
proposed project.
940
 Aware of alleged violations and violence, Copper Mesa revealed in its 
prospectus “in detail the history of the conflict between [Copper Mesa] and the local 
community” and “the potential for future violence” and indicated “various allegations of human 
rights abuses and physical threats.”941 After the October 2005 publication of the prospectus by 
Ascendant Copper subsequent continuous disclosure documents failed to further discuss and 
elaborate on the history and tension between the local community and the mining operations.
942
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There was, however, reference to adopted human rights policies as required by Section 5.1(4) of 
the AIF.
943
 The lack of further detailed disclosure is noteworthy because Copper Mesa legally 
owned the mining concession for three years after publishing its prospectus and was so obligated 
to provide relevant disclosure containing environmental, social and human rights disclosure as 
discussed above under NI 51-102.
944
 Arguably, there were a number of non-financial allegations 
that could have been considered material. These allegations touched upon the tension and 
opposition to the mining project and included allegations of conflict, as outlined by the plaintiffs 
in their case against Copper Mesa and the TSX.
945
 Though the tension between anti- and pro-
mining groups ultimately led to a lawsuit, this suit was eventually dismissed.
946
 
According to MiningWatch Canada, the estimated $40 million Copper Mesa raised from selling 
its shares in its public listing was, allegedly, used to create subsidiaries, hire security forces, and 
“business and political consultants” to begin its mining project in Junín.947 Before the decision to 
dismiss the suit against Copper Mesa, its directors, and the TSX was reached, the TSX delisted 
Copper Mesa for failing to meet its “continued listing requirements of TSX”.948 In the end 
investors failed to see any return and lost their investment.
949
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July 2007) online: MiningWatch <http://www.miningwatch.ca/ascendant-ordered-stop-community-relations-junin-
project-loses-major-investor> (Accessed August 15, 2013). Copper Mesa was then delisted from the TSX in Jan 
2010. [Stop Order]. 
943
 The AIFs explicitly made reference to the UN Global Compact and Voluntary Principles on Security and Human 
Rights. 
944
 Stop Order, supra note 942. The MiningWatch argues Copper Mesa owned the concession for more than 3 years. 
945
 Ramirez v Copper Mesa, Statement of Claim, online: RamirezvsCopperMesa 
<http://www.ramirezversuscoppermesa.com/statement-of-claim.pdf> at ¶45, 49, 55, 60, 76. (Accessed Jan12, 2014). 
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 Piedra, supra note 937 at ¶ 71, 92, 98-100. 
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 Carlos Zorilla, “Canada-Ecuador: When Stock Exchanges Fuel Human Rights Violations” Upside Down World 
(24 December 2009) online: MiningWatch <http://www.miningwatch.ca/canada-ecuador-when-stock-exchanges-
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 TMX, News Release, “TSX Delisting Review – Copper Mesa Mining Corporation (CUX)” (19 Jan 2010) online:  
News & Events Exchange Bulletin <http://www.tmx.com/en/news_events/exchange_bulletins/bulletins/1-19-
2010_TSX-ReviewCUX.html> (Accessed August 15, 2013). [TSX Bulletin]; TMX, TSX Company Manual, online: 
tmx <http://tmx.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?rbid=2072&element_id=103&record_id=103> 
(Accessed Aug 5, 2013) at Part IV-Appendix B. These requirements are in addition to the general listing disclosure 
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Copper Mesa also faced further accusations from DECOIN of, allegedly, failing to submit an 
acceptable terms of reference for its Environmental Impact Assessment and to comply with 
Article 88 of Ecuador’s Constitution, which requires community consultation prior to 
undertaking an activity that would potentially impact its natural environment.
950
 This is the type 
of information SR is designed to provide. Similarly, under the reasonable investor test, it is not 
unreasonable to assume some investors would deem non-compliance with local laws, such as 
Article 88, important and material.
951
 MiningWatch has also argued that “[i]n light of official 
recognition of the longstanding problems surrounding [Copper Mesa’s] operations in Ecuador, it 
is clear that due diligence simply is not being exercised by [Canadian] brokers,” by investors in 
Copper Mesa, or by Canadian regulatory authorities.”952 This may be attributed to a combination 
of lack of guidance and enforcement and corporate hesitation to provide complete disclosure. 
This combination allows corporations to operate in an unregulated environment, potentially 
                                                                                                                                                             
requirements; Robert Todd, “Doing it Right” Canadian Lawyer Magazine (June 2010), online: Canadianlawyer 
<http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/942/Doing-it-right.html> (Accessed August 5, 2013). 
949
 TSX Bulletin, supra note 948; Carlos Zorilla, “Copper Mesa Delisted From Toronto Stock Exchange” Decoin 
(23 February, 2010), online: Decoin.org <http://www.decoin.org/2010/02/copper-mesa-delisted-from-the-toronto-
stock-exchange/> (Accessed August 5, 2013). 
950
 Stop Order, supra note 942. MiningWatch Canada and DECOIN argue Copper Mesa failed to follow regulations. 
This began with a failure to comply with previous agreements with the Ecuadorian government by not submitting 
“an acceptable terms of reference for its Environmental Impact Assessment,” or complying with Article 88 of the 
Ecuadorian Constitution. 
951
 SN 51-333, supra note 848 at s 2.1 . Section 2.1 identifies that although materiality determinations may limit 
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to Demand Social and Environmental Accountability, online: Ramirez versus Copper Mesa 
<http://www.ramirezversuscoppermesa.com/summary.html> (Accessed August 5, 2013). [Ramirez]. 
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facts, on the public securities offering; Klippensteins, Ecuadorians Lose Appeal in Lawsuit Against Canadian 
Mining Company and TSX Canadian law continues to fail communities harmed by Canadian mining overseas, (14 
March 2011), online: Ramirez vs. Copper Mesa <http://www.ramirezversuscoppermesa.com/public-announcement-
mar-14-2011.pdf> (Accessed August 5, 2013). 
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leading to consequences for local stakeholders, in environmental and social destruction, and 
investors, with lost investments. 
B. Case Study 2: Goldcorp in Guatemala 
An example of investors seeking information not deemed material by a company is found in the 
activities of Goldcorp Inc. and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Montana Exploradora de Guatemala 
S.A., in Guatemala.
953
 In 2008, persuaded by claims of human rights abuse and violence,
954
 a 
group of shareholders
955
 requested, through a shareholder proposal, that Goldcorp implement an 
independent human rights impact assessment (HRIA) of its Marlin Mine project.
956
 The eventual 
commissioned HRIA found, among other things, the Marlin Mine to be “affecting the full 
spectrum of internationally recognized human rights,” and so recommended all exploration and 
mine expansion to cease until consultation with state-involved and locally affected stakeholders 
took place.
957
 This example demonstrates Goldcorp had not itself chosen to conduct a HRIA and 
release such information, and was only compelled to do so at the insistence of shareholders who 
wanted to be informed of the situation surrounding Goldcorp’s operations at the Marlin Mine. 
                                                 
953
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After the consortium of investors successfully advanced its goals and Goldcorp agreed to 
implement the HRIA, the shareholder proposal was withdrawn.
958
 The withdrawal was preceded 
by a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Goldcorp and the shareholders that 
introduced the proposal.
959
 Although the shareholders that put forward the proposal represented a 
fringe group of Goldcorp investors,
960
 it was within this MOU that Goldcorp agreed to 
implement the HRIA.
961
 Goldcorp had not originally considered the circumstances surrounding 
the Marlin Mine to be material, and therefore, the agreement to undertake the HRIA suggests 
Goldcorp would now deem those issues as relevant, or possibly material, to investors. This is 
supported by the fact the HRIA recommended Goldcorp cease all exploration and mine 
expansion, information likely considered relevant to an investment by investors.
962
 This 
reintroduces the lack of clarity with the concept of materiality. If social and human rights issues 
are deemed material then the concerns highlighted at the Marlin Mine are likely to be disclosed. 
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Mining Sector,  (Toronto: Palgrave, 2011) 201 at 208. The First and Fourth, together with the Second and Third 
Swedish Pension Funds, as of Ethical Fund’s 2010 Annual Report, held 0.11% of the share capital; Ethical Funds, 
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One week after the Goldcorp commissioned independent HRIA was published,
963
 the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights
964
 (IACHR), in an interim-decision,
965
 granted 
precautionary measures on Goldcorp and the Marlin Mine, calling for the government of 
Guatemala to suspend Goldcorp’s mining operations and to address the alleged harms.966 
Although this interim decision was later modified and reversed,
967
 the negative impact of 
Goldcorp’s operations at the Marlin Mine were again highlighted by a Guatemalan Health 
Tribunal.
968
 Organized by non-government organizations and composed of experts and 
academics, the Tribunal’s declaratory verdict found Goldcorp guilty of “seriously damaging the 
health and quality of life,” environment, and the right to self-determination of the affected 
indigenous and campesino communities.
969
 The significance of this tribunal was outlined in its 
objectives, which looked to “engage in a process for greater transparency and accountability of 
Goldcorp’s actions”, highlight community concerns, to provide a stage for consultation, and 
lastly, to promote respect for Indigenous peoples, the environment, health, and human rights in 
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relation to mining practices.
970
 Similar objectives are promoted by SR, which looks to meet the 
growing need for greater information and stakeholder engagement. The IACHR decisions and 
the Goldcorp shareholder proposal also highlight the relevance of SR as a due diligence 
mechanism, to become aware of relevant issues, and reporting process, to inform stakeholders 
that the company knows about relevant issues and the business impacts on these issues. 
Overall, whether or not the lack of disclosure stems from intentional or unintentional corporate 
ignorance, the failure to disclose may lead to relevant environmental, social or human rights 
information that potentially has a significant effect on a corporation or its shareholders simply 
not being reported or addressed. In this case with Goldcorp, the risk associated with the 
investment increased as calls were made for the Marlin Mine to be suspended.
971
 Although 
Goldcorp was not de-listed, the shareholder proposal, the Health Tribunal, the final IACHR 
decision illustrate that greater SR information is sought by a variety of stakeholders, who want to 
be better informed and to understand the issues surrounding mining practices and their 
investment.
972
 
C.   Corporate Governance  
GoldCorp and Copper Mesa reveal that a lack of environmental, social and human rights 
disclosure guidance, ambiguity with the materiality thresholds, coupled with weak compliance 
and enforcement can certainly impact a project. The OSC Review made similar conclusions and 
as a result recommended increasing the level of “transparency for investors and the Canadian 
marketplace regarding the nature and extent of environmental risks and other environmental 
                                                 
970
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971
 Not only do the calls for suspension increase the risk for investors it forgoes the benefits and due diligence 
associated with SR and the potential to minimize non-financial risks to the company and stakeholders; Chris 
Hufstader, Marlin Mine: Violence and Pollution lead to call for Suspension, online: oxfamAmerica 
<http://www.oxfamamerica.org/explore/stories/marlin-mine-violence-and-pollution-lead-to-call-for-suspension/> 
(Accessed March 10, 2014). The calls for suspension came from a variety of sources. Such as the HRIA 
commissioned by Goldcorp, see On Common Ground, supra note 953; calls were also made by locals (by the 
community of Sipakapa); the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights, see IACHR interim-decision, supra 
note 965; and members of the U.S. Congress. 
972
 Dhir BEQ, supra note 955 at 100. 
151 
 
 
matters affecting issuers.”973 This recommendation set in motion the creation of Staff Notice 51-
333 (SN 51-333), which was released in October 2010. SN 51-333 provides environmental 
reporting guidance, clarification that the test for materiality is analyzed objectively, and a non-
exhaustive list of factors to consider in determining materiality. This informs issuers there is no 
bright-line test, and so to consider both quantitative and qualitative factors.
974
 This includes 
considering the context of issues and an assessment of the matter in its “big picture”; considering 
and assessing the probability and impact of trends, demands, commitments, and uncertainties; 
and if unable to determine whether or not an event or issue meets the threshold to “[e]rr on the 
side of materiality – and [to] disclose the information.”975 These factors necessitate an 
adjustment of corporate governance practices.  
Corporate governance is defined to generally mean board governance, and includes guidelines on 
how a company can be directed or controlled.
976
 The rules, processes, and relationships that 
direct and control the actions of the highest level of management and the mechanisms for 
holding issuers, boards of directors, and management accountable form one aspect of corporate 
governance.
977
 Like the guidance from SN 51-333, SR also influences the development of 
corporate governance practices and processes. This involves the process of reporting; rules to 
compel reporting; the due diligence associated with SR; and an emphasis on relationships with 
stakeholders, which looks to influence the corporate decision-makers. The dialogue SR is 
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intended to stimulate can offer insight on relevant issues and become an embedded process 
within the decision-making and overall corporate governance process.
978
 
There is also a “comply or explain” disclosure obligation in Canadian securities regulations.979 
Comply or explain, like SR, has the potential to dictate and influence corporate decision-makers 
and corporate governing processes. Under NI 58-101 - Disclosure of Corporate Governance 
Practices, comply or explain requires TSX-listed corporations to disclose whether or not the 
corporate board of directors has adopted a written code for ethical business conduct, how the 
board monitors compliance, and if they do not monitor compliance, to “explain whether and how 
the board satisfies itself regarding compliance with its code”.980 In comparison, venture issuers 
do not have any similar comply or explain requirements, and instead are only obligated to 
provide a description of “what steps, if any, the board takes to encourage and promote a culture 
of ethical business conduct.”981 This again highlights the different treatment between venture and 
non-venture issuers.
982
 This difference was also evident in NI 51-103 – Ongoing Governance and 
Disclosure Requirements for Venture Issuers, a proposal that looked to tailor and streamline the 
disclosure and governance requirements specifically of venture issuers.
983
 Although NI 51-103 
was not implemented because of the deemed burden it would pose, it was designed to address the 
ongoing governance and disclosure requirements for venture issuers.
984
 The purpose NI 51-103 
intended to serve, and NI 58-101 does serve, is to reveal the process of corporate governance 
decision-making and what guides such governance and decision-making. SR supports corporate 
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governance decision-making by providing feedback to inform such decision-making and at the 
same time also looks to become embedded within the governance process of a company.
985
 
GRI corporate governance disclosure, like Canadian governance disclosure, seeks to influence 
corporate governance processes through the disclosure of “internally developed statements of 
mission or values, codes of conduct, and principles”; the disclosure of how far they are applied 
across the organization and regions; and how well they relate to international standards.
986
  
The GRI does, however, distinguish itself from the Canadian standards. In particular, the GRI 
outlines and emphasizes a dialogue with not just shareholders and employees but stakeholders 
and other external sources.
987
  This includes outlining those stakeholders engaged, the basis for 
their identification, frequency, as well as concerns raised.
988
 Despite this difference between 
Canadian and GRI corporate governance disclosure, it is important to note the OSC Review 
concluded “Canadian corporate governance disclosure requirements are comparable in many 
respects to those in other jurisdictions (Australia, South Africa, and the U.K.)”.989 This parity of 
corporate governance disclosure practices does not, however, prevent the use of the GRI as a 
model for Canada to refer to in the formation of a SR-based regulatory system. 
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4.3 GRI vs. Canadian Securities Regulations 
  A. The GRI and Materiality  
Materiality under the GRI avoids many of the materiality problems cited above under Canadian 
securities law. The GRI definition includes “information [covering] topics and Indicators that 
reflect the organization’s significant economic, environmental, and social impacts or that would 
substantively influence the assessments and decisions of stakeholders.”990 This definition 
explicitly includes a range of information that has the potential to impact different 
stakeholders.
991
 The GRI definition is therefore broader than the market impact and reasonable 
investor tests, and is reinforced with guidance to prevent uncertainty in considering non-financial 
topics. Moreover, GRI materiality reveals specific markers referred to as performance indicators 
(PIs) that elaborate on how to accurately and thoroughly disclose information in the economic, 
environmental and social areas. PIs are further broken down into greater detail through indicator 
protocols (IPs), which provide “definitions, compilation guidance, and other information to assist 
report preparers and to ensure consistency in the interpretation of the” PIs.992 As part of the GRI 
framework, IPs provide guidance on content, quality, and boundaries for SR.
993
 
The GRI recognizes that not all businesses may be capable of implementing or complying with 
its definition of material, and has therefore developed the Report or Explain Campaign Forum.
994
 
Designed with small and medium-sized entities (SMEs) in mind, Report or Explain encourages 
an explanation of why environmental, social, governance (ESG), and human rights issues are not 
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991
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992
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explain/Pages/default.aspx> (Accessed August 5, 2013). See Chapter 1 for a further discussion on the GRI’s Report 
or Explain Campaign Forum. 
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being disclosed in sustainability reports.
995
 This Forum demonstrates the GRI’s flexibility in 
accommodating large, small, or new organizations. In contrast to Canadian securities laws, the 
GRI definition of materiality offers clarity and a comprehensive system of disclosure with 
different available factors and variables to be considered and addressed. This flexibility also 
prevents the “burden” of disclosing on smaller companies but at the same stimulates a dialogue. 
B. GRI Extractive Sector-Specific Guidance  
Another contrast emerges when comparing the level of extractive sector-specific disclosure 
guidance between the GRI and the applicable Canadian securities disclosure requirements under 
the MD&A, the AIF, NI 43-101, and SN 51-333. The GRI has developed many “[t]ailored 
versions of the GRI Guidelines”, for example the Mining and Metals and Oil and Gas Sector 
Supplements.
996
 The Mining and Metal Sector Supplement (MMSS) offers in-depth guidance 
“for measuring and reporting on the economic, environmental, social, and governance 
dimensions of [organizational] activities, products, and services”.997 This is accomplished by 
requiring the disclosure of governance mechanisms designed to manage risks and 
opportunities.
998
 If these mechanisms do not exist, the MMSS indirectly forces their development 
by calling for their disclosure from the highest corporate governance body.
999
 Similar 
sustainability goals are outlined in the OGSS as well.
1000
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23, 2014). 
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The MMSS and OGSS also outline guidance on extractive sector related environmental 
disclosure. This includes disclosure on the impacts of activities on biodiversity and protected 
areas, land identified as requiring protection and management, amount of land owned, “total 
weight of waste by type and disposal method, number and volume of significant spills”, as well 
as strategies for engaging with different stakeholder groups.
1001
 MMSS guidance also helps firms 
recognize important areas of concern and how to implement policies to address those 
concerns.
1002
 GRI environmental disclosure guidance includes a list of PIs that cover a spectrum 
of environmental sustainability factors, such as guidance on materials used, energy consumption, 
water usage, biodiversity, waste and effluents, products and services, compliance, transportation, 
and overall expenditures and investments.
1003
 Each PI includes thirty IPs, which outline and 
discuss how the PIs can be targeted.
1004
 
In contrast to the MMSS and OGSS, SN 51-333, which, as noted above, discusses environmental 
reporting guidance, broadly outlines that the MD&A should look to examine trends and 
uncertainties;
1005
 provide “big picture” disclosure for the long-term in hopes of disclosing 
emerging trends and risks not identifiable in the short-term; disclose the quantification of costs 
and anticipated trends; and, in addition to disclosing the existence of social and environmental 
policies, also disclose the efficiency and success of such policies,
1006
 in particular their impact, 
potential, and effectiveness.
1007
 The SN also outlines the disclosure of issues in relation to 
litigation, physical, regulatory, reputation, and other risks relating to the business model.
1008
 For 
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example, environmental liabilities are discussed and elaborated to include disclosure consisting 
of remediation obligations; civil, administrative, and criminal fines and penalties; personal 
injury; and property damage and economic loss, including damage to natural resources.
1009
 
Finally, SN 51-333 argues for such disclosure to be given the same level of rigor as financial 
disclosure to ensure its reliability.
1010
 
Although SN 51-333 specifically provides practical guidance and direction on environmental 
issues for corporations, there are a couple of limitations evident. The first is that SN 51-333 fails 
to address social and human rights consequences arising from environmental issues, and second, 
it also lacks the in-depth guidance demonstrated by the GRI.
1011
 A similar lack of guidance is 
also characteristic of the extractive sector-specific disclosure obligations in NI 43-101 and NI 
51-101.
1012
 Even collectively, the above instruments fail to establish an equivalent level of 
environmental, social, or human rights guidance for SR or due diligence. This contrast becomes 
evident as the GRI guidelines, as discussed in Chapter 1, include guiding principles on 
materiality, stakeholder inclusiveness, sustainability context, and completeness, along with tests 
to determine what information is to be categorized into the above principles.
1013
 These principles 
outline the necessary Standard Disclosure in their sustainability reports, that is, the most relevant 
and material information to the organization and of interest to most stakeholders.
1014
 This is 
complemented by the GRI and the sector supplements providing guidance on the scope of 
information disclosure as well. Meaning, the GRI and the sector supplements outline guidance 
on a variety of topics, such as impacts on living and non-living natural systems;
1015
 impacts on 
economic IPs;
1016
 and certain sector-specific issues, such as artisanal and small-scale mining 
(ASM), which is a form of subsistence mining for over 100 million people in the developing 
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world;
1017
 resettlement and Indigenous rights, which references the displacement of roughly 
fifteen million people annually who are economically, socially, and culturally integrated with 
their land;
1018
 and community, which the GRI outlines to include local engagement processes, 
land use, land rights, and grievance mechanisms.
1019
 The importance of targeting communities as 
a whole was seen in Guatemala where Goldcorp’s Environmental and Social Impact Assessment 
failed to consider the Sipacapa, a smaller neighboring community directly impacted by a 
Goldcorp’s subsidiary and mining project.1020 Closure planning; 1021 labor;1022 and materials are 
also addressed.
1023
  
Discussed above with NI 43-101, companion policy 43-101 was seen to lack the authority to 
compel greater disclosure of risks and uncertainty associated with production decisions not based 
on feasibility studies.
1024
 Similarly, SN 51-333, as a staff notice, suffers from a similar lack of 
regulatory authority to compel compliance. Even so, SN 51-333 still offers constructive and 
progressive guidance for disclosing environmental topics and issues. Through the reflexive and 
new governance approaches this notice also reasonably offer a level of guidance and awareness 
for a TNC to pay attention to other issues, topics, and trends, as nothing prevents SN 51-333 
from being extrapolated to social and human rights issues and concerns. Such extrapolation is, 
however, unlikely especially without state compulsion.  Therefore, not only does SN 51-333 
outline the extent of environmental disclosure in Canada, which includes a failure to address 
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successive social and human rights issues related to environmental concerns, it also introduces 
the lack of a GRI equivalent social and human rights disclosure guidance policy.
1025
 
The MMSS and OGSS specifically outline direction on Human Rights and Society issues. For 
example, the MMSS outlines different aspects on which disclosure should be made. This 
includes disclosure of “Investment and Procurement Practices; Non-discrimination; Freedom of 
Association and Collective Bargaining; Abolition of Child Labor; Prevention of Forced and 
Compulsory Labor; Complaints and Grievance Practices; Securities Practices; and Indigenous 
Rights.”1026 The most recent version of the GRI Reporting Guidelines adds disclosure of human 
rights assessment of the reporting organization’s supply chain and Human Rights Grievance 
Mechanisms.
1027
 The Societal elements include disclosure on Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining; 
Resettlement; Community; Closure Planning; Grievance Mechanisms and Procedures; 
Emergency Preparedness; Corruption; Public Policy; Anti-Competitive Behaviour; and 
Compliance.
1028
 Supply chain assessment is also included in this aspect.
1029
 
When comparing GRI social and human rights disclosure with Canadian securities laws, another 
disparity arises in the level of detail and scope of guidance. The extent of social and human 
rights guidance and disclosure is limited to NI 51-102, in the AIF, NI 41-101, and potentially NI 
43-101.
1030
 NI 41-101 clearly refers to the disclosure of any implemented human rights 
policies,
1031
 as is the case with the AIF, which also explicitly outlines a requirement to disclose 
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any implemented human rights policies fundamental to the operations of the business.
1032
 Dhir 
makes the argument that the AIF should be read in sync with NI 43-101.
1033
 This is partially due 
to the fact that section 5.4 of the AIF (Form 51-102F2) refers to “Companies with Mineral 
Projects”, which NI 43-101 is primary targeted towards. Through this connection NI 43-101 may 
require the disclosure of any implemented human rights policies. For this reason, it is also 
reasonable to conclude NI 43-101 would similarly include human rights considerations, possibly 
under its “socio-economic” or “political or other relevant factors” topics.1034 Though the level of 
disclosure guidance in Form 43-101F1 is not broken down into further detail, as it is in the GRI, 
Canadian securities disclosure obligations do not prevent companies to determine, or extrapolate, 
on their own the scope of detail, and so the level disclosure. 
The lack of a corresponding instrument or policy specifically designated for social or human 
rights, similar to what SN 51-333 is for environmental reporting guidance, is also noticeably 
absent in Canadian securities disclosure obligations. The AIF does offer some help as it 
generally requires the disclosure of risk factors that relate to the corporation and its business,
1035
 
which includes the disclosure of health and environmental risks and political conditions.
1036
 In 
relation to mining projects, NI 43-101 may also offer some relief since it outlines broad reference 
to legal, political or “other” issues.1037 Despite focusing primarily on mineral reserves and 
resources and lacking an explicit reference to human rights, NI 43-101 is still unique as it offers 
a foundation for SR, and this is because it consistently applies to mineral projects regardless of 
whether an issuer is a public or private issuer listed on the TSX or TSXV. 
The above comparison suggests that the GRI is capable of offering useful and detailed guidance 
on a variety of issues and topics. Even with its voluntary nature, the GRI can provide guidance 
where legislative and regulatory efforts end, offering valuable direction. As mentioned in 
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Chapter 1, the GRI provides a source of information and guidance on issues founded and 
substantiated by stakeholder input. This operates similar to the SR process, and the reason why it 
is used as a standard of comparison. This view coincides with the conclusion from the OSC 
Review, that although no major overhaul of securities disclosure is needed,
1038
 an argument can 
still be made there is a need for greater guidance with regard to ESG disclosure obligations.
1039
 
4.4  Summary Conclusions  
One conclusion identified in this chapter is that the current Canadian securities framework 
permits the consideration of a broad scope of issues without restricting the scope. In practice, 
however, environmental, social, corporate governance, and human rights disclosure under 
Canadian securities laws and regulations suffer from issues of weak enforcement and a lack 
detail and depth of guidance; also failing to provide an equivalent level of guidance as the GRI. 
This reveals Canada lacks a substantive, and authoritative, system of non-financial disclosure for 
Canadian extractive sector TNCs that are subject to the securities laws and regulations.
1040
 At the 
same time, the current securities framework does not prevent the securities disclosure obligations 
from providing a platform on which to develop the SR process.  
There are a number of instruments and efforts in which Canadian securities laws and regulations 
outline environmental, social and human rights disclosure. For instance, the prospectus 
disclosure document offered the disclosure of implemented social or environmental policies 
fundamental to the business as well as due diligence in risk disclosure. The limitation with the 
prospectus document was the complexity of the document and the difficulty for the majority 
stakeholders to comprehensively interpret it. The materiality thresholds, which played the 
important role of determining issues and events to disclose, were also an area of concern, 
particularly because of the uncertainty associated with whether or not environmental, social, and 
human rights issues were to be deemed material. This lack of clarity with the market impact and 
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reasonable investor tests influences the type of disclosure in certain documents, such as the AIF, 
MD&A and MCRs. The AIF and MD&A are documents that broadly outlined environmental, 
social, and human rights topics. The AIF in particular requires the disclosure of environmental 
liabilities for those issuers engaged in mineral projects, which are also repeated in NI 43-101. 
Another instrument which focused on environmental issues was SN 51-333. This notice offered 
clarification on the test for materiality in addition to environmental disclosure and governance 
structures. The “deficit” with SN 51-333 was that it fell short of addressing secondary 
consequences, such as social and human rights concerns. 
Part of the “shortcomings” identified above is also partially explained by the fact that venture 
issuers are not required to provide AIF disclosure. Despite explicitly outlining environmental, 
social, and human rights disclosure requirements, the OSC reasoned that the benefit received 
from AIF disclosure is less than the cost of imposing a disclosure requirement on venture 
issuers.
1041
 This AIF exemption is attributed to the policy rationale of preventing “burdens” to 
the development of venture issuers.
1042
 Another notable exemption is that private issuers are also 
not obligated to comply with the continuous disclosure obligations. Since the majority of 
extractive sector companies are listed on the TSXV, and a majority of the capital raised through 
private placements by issuers listed on the TSXV, a majority of which is by the extractive 
sector,
1043
 this potentially classifies private extractive sector companies on the TSXV as not 
having to provide as much disclosure information as an extractive sector company on the TSX. 
In any case, whether listed on the TSX or TSXV all issuers engaged in mining and oil and gas 
projects are required to provide disclosure as required by NI 43-101 and NI 51-101. Overall, 
with the above exemptions, this suggests TSXV issuers provide less environmental and human 
rights information than TSX reporting issuers, and in general, that both TSX and TSXV entities 
are not given adequate guidance, or compelled, to provide a level of non-financial disclosure 
equivalent to the GRI. 
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The GRI explicitly covers “all main activities in the [extractive] sector” from exploration to 
processing and recycling to the closure and post-closure of projects, providing a detailed 
approach to reporting.
1044
 This guidance includes a variety of topics and depth in guidance, at the 
same time it helps form a standardized system of disclosure as well as consistency that permits 
comparisons, whether through its disclosure framework or its Report or Explain Campaign 
Forum. In contrast, section 21.1(1) of Form 41-101F1, regarding prospectus disclosure, requires 
the disclosure of risk factors relating to the issuer’s business, general risks inherent in the 
business carried on by the issuer, environmental and health risks, economic or political 
conditions, “and any other matter that would be likely to influence an investor’s decision to 
purchase securities of the issuer”1045; Item 20 of Form 43-101F1 requires reporting issuers to 
discuss and disclose “reasonably available information” on environmental studies and “known 
environmental issues that could materially impact the issuer’s ability to extract” resources or 
reserves, and any potential social or community related requirements and plans for the project; 
the MD&A instruction in section 1.4(d) of Form 51-102F1 of NI 51-102 explains that reporting 
issuers should specifically include “any factors that have affected the value of the project(s) such 
as change in commodity prices, land use or political or environmental issues;”1046 CICA MD&A 
guidance requires disclosure to be “transparent and discuss the complete range of possibilities 
and possible outcomes,” both good and bad;1047 section 5.1(4) of the AIF, Form 51-102F2, 
requires the disclosure of “implemented” and “fundamental” policies to a company’s 
operations;
1048
 and section 5.2 of the AIF requires the disclosure of risks related to 
environmental, health, and political conditions along with any other risk likely to have an impact 
on an investor’s decision to purchase the company’s securities.1049 The above guidance and rules 
provide another conclusion, that is, Canadian securities rules and regulations fail to outline 
consistent guidance for disclosure to achieve consistent reporting. In addition, the disclosure 
required from these rules and regulations is not necessarily intended for the purposes of SR. 
Unless explicitly requiring non-financial disclosure for SR, such information may not provide a 
                                                 
1044
 MMSS, supra note 996 at “What is the Mining and Metals Sector Supplement?”. 
1045
 41-101F1, supra note 698 at Item 21: Risk Factors of Form 41-101F1. 
1046
 NI 51-102, supra note 687 at Part 2, section 1.4, instructions (ii).  
1047
 CICA 2009 Report, supra note 753 at 25.  
1048
 NI 51-102, supra note 687 at Form 51-102F2 s 5.1(4). 
1049
 Ibid at Form 51-102F2 s 5.2. 
164 
 
 
clear picture or be easily linked back to greater environmental, social, or human rights risks. 
Therefore, extractive sector TNCs may not disclose information or concerns when it may be 
obvious it should. One thought is to integrate GRI SR guidance into securities disclosure 
obligations. The summary of the disclosure obligations, despite their “limitations” offer a 
potential platform where SR can be implemented, within a state mandated framework with the 
capability to require compliance, stimulate dialogue, and eventually promote corporate self-
reflection. 
The GRI does not, however, represent an easy solution to a complex scenario of implementing 
SR and stakeholder engagement. According to Sarfaty, though the GRI’s indicators “are 
normative tools that embed certain values and shape behavior according to a standard”, they 
have the potential to result in certain costs.
1050
 This risks a “box ticking approach” providing 
superficial, rather than any substantive effects on behavior; a focus on accuracy rather than 
relevance, risking public interests for business interests; and a movement away from “multi-
stakeholder consensus building” towards one focused on companies.1051 Since indicators rely on 
numerical data, stakeholders are potentially left out of the process of standard and indicator 
formation.
1052
 This reliance on numerical data potentially distorts public values into numbers, 
preventing the use of indicators as regulatory tools.
1053
 Another side effect is that those risks that 
are easier to quantify will be measured accurately and feature prominently (for example 
greenhouse gases), whereas other issues, such as human rights and other social impacts are 
“subordinated or even diluted”.1054 Integrated reporting, the concept of merging non-financial 
with financial reporting, arguably, translates “public values into financial terms” and therefore 
into business risks.
1055
 This potentially transforms “value-laden” issues into “financial risks”.1056 
Despite these risks, the GRI still offers to fill a void by outlining guidance on topics lacking 
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direction. Sarfaty warns to not treat GRI indicators “as ends in and of themselves” and instead to 
use GRI indicator guidance as a means to evaluate performance and improve behaviour.
1057
  
Conclusion  
This chapter reveals two overarching conclusions. First, the disclosure trend identified in chapter 
1 is growing in Canada, and second, in comparison to the best practices of the GRI, Canadian 
securities disclosure obligations reveal shortcomings. These shortcomings include 
disproportionate and ambiguous guidance and detail, and fragile enforcement and compliance. 
The consequences of these weaknesses in comparison to the GRI is that they identify Canadian 
securities disclosure can benefit from GRI guidance, and help prevent TNCs from consistently 
being linked with allegations and involvement in environmental, social and human rights 
misconduct. An argument can still be made that the primary components of SR, stakeholder 
participation and dialogue, and state enforcement operating together as required by the reflexive 
law and new governance regulation theories are still developing in Canada. Environmental, 
social, and human rights reporting and transparency is not completely omitted from the Canadian 
securities regulations, and is actually growing. This view is shared by stakeholders in the OSC 
Review who felt that more guidance, reviews and stricter enforcement is needed rather than an 
expansion of existing disclosure requirements; from the development of SN 51-333 and its 
Environmental Reporting Guidance; OSC SN 15-704 and its promotion of greater transparency 
initiatives; and the adoption of the GRI in the mandate of the Extractive Sector CSR Counsellor. 
With regard to stakeholder engagement, the GRI does not, however, outline a process of 
providing stakeholder feedback to TNCs. Nonetheless, the GRI and its stakeholder infused 
knowledge-base have the potential to support Canadian securities non-financial disclosure 
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theory considered to play part of the rule-making role. Lastly, Sarfaty suggests “expanding participation by citizens 
and a broad group of experts”. This last proposal looks to inform, involve and learn from different stakeholders. This 
last solution, like the solutions overall, epitomize the role of SR under the reflexive law and new governance 
theories, which includes informing stakeholders and then seeking feedback on issues that directly impact those 
stakeholders. 
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obligations, and move in the direction of formulating a SR-based regulatory framework. In 
addition to Canada and its CSR Counsellor, the endorsement and adoption of the GRI by other 
states supports the view that the GRI is viewed as a best practice capable of providing 
constructive, regulatory, guidance in the eventual formation of a SR-based regulatory 
framework. 
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Conclusion 
The objective of this research study was to assess Canadian efforts relating to the disclosure of 
environmental, social, and human rights issues and information. This entailed examining the 
Canadian extractive sector operating internationally, and examining Canadian securities 
disclosure obligations with regard to environmental, social and human rights information. The 
study focused on the potential of disclosure as a regulatory tool to increase the level of 
transparency, self-awareness, and accountability of Canadian extractive sector transnational 
corporations (TNCs). This included identifying disclosure and reporting as an international best 
practice; the theoretical underpinnings of disclosure and reporting; the Canadian efforts 
promoting non-financial disclosure with regard to its extractive sector; and the extent to which 
non-financial disclosure is currently required under Canadian securities rules and regulations, 
and comparing these rules and regulations to the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). 
Research Question 1: 
What is sustainability reporting? Specifically, what is environmental, social and human rights 
disclosure, and to what extent is such disclosure promoted through international initiatives as a 
tool for addressing the global governance gap?  
Sustainability Reporting (SR) is the public disclosure of impacts of an organization’s business 
activities on environmental, social, and human rights issues. SR also reveals whether or not 
business activities and impacts can be continued for a period of time and endured in a healthy 
manner for the duration of the project. SR, or environmental, social, and human rights disclosure, 
can consist of disclosure on a number of related issues and is usually limited in scope to the 
operations of the organization. SR is increasingly being promoted in a number of current 
international soft-law initiatives and the extent and depth of such disclosure is growing as well. 
This is reflected in the GRI, the United Nations (U.N.) Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework 
and its Guiding Principles, the U.N. Principles for Responsible Investment, the U.N. Global 
Compact, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, and the International Standards Organization, among others. 
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Research Question 2: 
Why is disclosure promoted as a useful tool? What theories inform the trend in chapter 1? 
Additional related questions are: What role do these theories suggest exist for the state as a 
regulator of corporate conduct? To whom is such disclosure targeted? What are the critiques 
leveled towards disclosure as a regulatory tool? 
Disclosure is a useful tool because corporate transparency compels corporate organizations to 
justify their actions, to educate stakeholders, and to allow stakeholders to hold corporate 
organizations accountable for their actions. The usefulness of disclosure was discussed in 
Chapter 1, and the theories informing the identified international disclosure, reporting and 
transparency trend are legal pluralism, reflexive law, and new governance regulation. New 
governance theory arises from a combination of theories and encompasses the reflexive law 
approach. Reflexive law permits indirect regulation by outlining the organizational principle of 
SR. SR informs stakeholders and allows stakeholders to provide relevant feedback. This 
feedback guides subsequent organizational behavior through self-reflective tendencies of the 
organization. New governance regulation, as a whole, outlines a process-oriented (through SR), 
participatory (through multi-stakeholders), and experimental (self-regulatory and constantly 
evolving) approach to regulation. This includes the state setting boundaries and allowing TNC 
self-regulation to develop and set standards. 
A number of critiques are raised against disclosure as a regulatory tool. This includes the cost 
and complexity associated with implementing SR from the perspective of extractive sector 
TNCs. Another critique outlines the lack of state-mandated SR, its enforcement, and stakeholder 
feedback and input. These are normally explained by the argument that there is a strong 
corporate lobby against any such regulation. In addition, the required literacy to understand 
disclosed information, especially by Indigenous peoples and local communities in developing 
countries who are largely impacted by extractive sector operations is also a cause for concern, as 
is the fear of failing to empower the powerless and reinforcing the powerful, risking the 
furthering of pre-existing inequalities. The latter critique stems from the fact that SR and the 
institutionalization of any stakeholder participation is understandably more easily fulfilled by 
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richer more “developed state and market parties” than lesser developed and smaller companies, 
who will have a harder time satisfying these requirements.
1058
 
As the critiques identify, the role for the state is a necessary component in the creation and 
operation of a reflexive law and new governance SR-based framework. These theories view the 
role of rule making by state governments on par with, and as one source of authority among, 
other private sources of authority. At the same time, this view sees the role of the state, and its 
unique authoritative power, as critically important in compelling and facilitating the enforcement 
of SR and its goals. 
SR targets a broad scope of stakeholders. This is evident from the perspective of new governance 
theory and the evolution of the term stakeholders. “Stakeholder” previously only considered 
shareholders but now includes shareholders together with a wide variety of other actors. The 
consideration of a broad spectrum of groups, individuals, and organizations ensures corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) efforts accurately focus on relevant issues and actors rather than 
being employed to defend corporate activity, such as a means to avoid regulation and the 
creation of private, rather than public, functions and mechanisms. Overall, the process of SR and 
feedback is intended to take advantage of the stakeholder knowledge-base. 
Research Question 3: 
What specific steps has the Canadian federal government taken to implement the disclosure and 
reporting of environmental, social, and human rights impacts of Canadian extractive sector TNCs 
operating abroad? 
Despite many calls for rules, laws and regulations, the most current established Canadian effort 
is the “Building the Canadian Advantage” initiative.1059 The primary disclosure initiative of the 
voluntary Canadian Advantage is included in the Office of the Extractive Sector Corporate 
                                                 
1058
 See section 1.5 in chapter 1. 
1059
 Government of Canada, Building the Canadian Advantage: A Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Strategy 
for the Canadian International Extractive Sector (March 2009), online: Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/other-
autre/csr-strat-rse.aspx> (Accessed August 25, 2013). 
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Social Responsibility (CSR) Counsellor. The CSR Counsellor is relevantly tasked with 
promoting certain performance standards, which includes promoting the GRI and the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) and their respective disclosure initiatives. 
Canada is also in the draft stage of implementing an initiative that looks to improve transparency 
of payments from Canadian extractive sector companies to foreign governments, mirroring 
initiatives implemented in other states.  
Research Question 4:  
What steps have Canadian securities regulators taken to implement the disclosure and reporting 
of non-financial topics, such as environmental, social, and human rights impacts of TNCs 
operating abroad, through Canadian securities regulations? Overall, how do the Canadian efforts 
and initiatives compare with leading International Standards, such as the GRI, and the theories of 
reflexive law and new governance? 
The steps Canada has taken to implement the disclosure of environmental, social, and human 
rights issues is reflected, although to a limited extent, in a number of instruments and efforts in 
Canadian securities laws. The Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) and the Annual 
Information Form (AIF) under the continuous disclosure documents in National Instrument (NI) 
51-102 outline a limited level of environmental, social and human rights disclosure guidance. 
The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants also outlines guidelines in order to clarify the 
level and type of disclosure expected in the MD&A. Other sources of environmental, social, and 
human rights disclosure in Canadian securities laws are outlined, again to a limited extent, in NI 
41-101, which outlines information required in a prospectus; NI 43-101, which outlines 
standards for disclosure for mineral projects; and SN 51-333, which outlines environmental 
reporting guidance. As discussed in chapter 3, this includes the newly proposed initiative to 
provide transparency of payments from the Canadian extractive sector to foreign governments, 
which is envisioned to operate within the securities framework. 
The limitations generally associated with environmental, social, and human rights disclosure 
within Canadian securities regulations includes ambiguous guidance and weak enforcement and 
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compliance. This includes a lack of consistent disclosure, an absence of detailed social and 
human rights disclosure, and a failure to include stakeholder integration and dialogue. Relevant 
exemptions from disclosure obligations are also identified, such as the TSXV issuer exemption 
from AIF disclosure and the “comply or explain” corporate governance practice disclosure 
requirements under NI 58-101. Another important exemption entails a private issuer exemption 
from the prospectus and continuous disclosure obligations. Limited disclosure guidance is also 
seen in the materiality thresholds under the market impact and reasonable investor tests. The lack 
of clarity with materiality makes it difficult for issuers to accurately determine whether or not 
environmental, social and human rights issues or events are to be outlined in disclosure 
documents.  
Despite the claim that Canadian securities disclosure suffers from shortcomings this does not 
mean the current securities disclosure system is inadequate with regard to SR. An argument can 
still be made that SR, stakeholder participation and dialogue, and state enforcement operating 
together as required by the reflexive law and new governance theories are still developing in 
Canada. This is seen from the existence and development of the number of securities 
instruments, such as SN 51-333, the OSC Review, National Policy 51-201, NI 58-101, OSC SN 
15-704, and the adoption of the GRI under the CSR Counsellor’s mandate. For example, whether 
or not an issuer is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) or TSX-Venture Exchange, NI 
43-101 will always require the relevant mining project disclosure. NI 43-101, together with the 
above mentioned instruments, offer a potential platform on which to base the SR requirement. 
Since current securities disclosure obligations often broadly outline concerns, such as social, or 
economic or environmental issues, this allows issuers the option to explore related issues 
touching upon those concerns. In comparison to initiatives from other states, discussed in chapter 
1, Canada is not falling behind in promoting the disclosure of environmental, social, and human 
rights through securities laws. Together with the Canadian efforts examined in chapter 3 and 4 
there is a growing inclination in Canada towards the use of disclosure and transparency in 
standards, rules, and regulations, which generally operates at a pace and on par with other states. 
Though critics argue the state is a necessary component in the successful implementation of a 
new governance SR-based regulatory framework, state-backed securities regulations do not 
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always ensure adequate compliance. The GRI requires similar attention, because GRI guidance 
and indicators face the risk of being reduced to a simple means to an end, or box-ticking 
approach, rather than as a mechanism to evaluate performance and improve behavior. However, 
this behavior changing potential of the GRI can offer the current Canadian securities disclosure 
obligations guidance to develop a SR process, along with business due diligence and stakeholder 
dialogue. Overall, chapter 4 concludes environmental, social, and human rights disclosure in 
Canadian securities regulations is slowly rising, but at the same time suffers from shortcomings, 
particularly in comparison to the best practices of the GRI. The stakeholder infused guidance of 
the GRI can help Canada, and its securities regulations, develop a SR-based framework capable 
of regulating Canadian TNCs operating internationally. 
Areas for Future Research 
The research in this study concludes that despite Canada lacking elements of the reflexive law 
and new governance theories and a level of guidance similar to the GRI, Canada is slowly 
situating itself in a position to use and promote greater disclosure and reporting of 
environmental, social, and human rights information. As a result, Canada has the potential to 
form a SR-based framework, consisting of reflexive and new governance elements, capable of 
regulating Canadian extractive sector TNCs. Although Canada is not a leader in SR, the proposal 
that Canada should refer to the GRI helps solve some of the pitfalls associated with the current 
lack of SR guidance in Canadian provincial securities disclosure obligations. 
What the above research leaves uncertain is the ways in which the SR obligation can actually be 
implemented and used to promote the reflexive and new governance theories. The details of how 
SR is to logistically operate would be valuable in furthering the goal of this research paper. 
Additional topics worthy of further research and discussion touch upon the interpretation of 
information from SR. The complexity of disclosure, the logistics of disseminating information, 
and the standardization of disclosure to ensure even and comparable disclosure also need further 
elaboration and guidance. Since the reflexive and new governance approaches allow a flexible 
free-market approach to address stakeholder concerns, establishing a standardized SR process 
raises the question of how much disclosure from businesses is optimal. For example, this could 
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mean disclosing too much information, whether or not out of fear of not disclosing enough, 
which has the potential of undermining the benefits of disclosure. There is also the potential of 
intentionally omitting disclosure, for example of human rights violating behavior. This as a 
result, prevents optimal disclosure to shareholders, locals, and other stakeholders. This suggests 
another area of future research: the process of determining what level and depth of disclosure is 
adequate to permit the optimal operation of a SR-based new governance system. Other factors of 
SR logistics include the creation of a verification system to ensure the accuracy and truth of 
information; the development of forums or modes of communication for subsequent feedback 
and dialogue from stakeholders in regulatory or non-regulatory situations; and eventually the 
issue of standardized disclosure to ensure SR comparisons. In addition to reporting logistics, the 
issues of cost also suggest an area of future research. This relates to the costs associated with 
reporting for business and the costs of non-disclosure to stakeholders. Ford has argued that 
“[w]hether principles-based systems really do impose greater ex post costs on private actors is an 
empirical unknown.”1060 There will inevitably be arguments for and against the proposition that 
new governance regulatory systems entail greater costs or savings for businesses, but, regardless, 
it identifies a point of further research because if there are greater costs than benefits then the 
chance of implementing a SR-based new governance system will likely meet greater resistance. 
With regard to stakeholders, failing to inform and consider the stakeholder perspective, 
potentially contradicts the reasonable investor test and neglects a valuable and accurate source of 
information. Despite research on the effectiveness of the GRI and securities commission reviews 
of compliance with the disclosure obligations, greater research into the use, value, and potential 
of informing stakeholders may also prove insightful. 
                                                 
1060
 Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, (2005) 103 Mich Law Review 
2073 at 2131–34 cited in Ford, New Governance, supra note 936 at 39. Ford mentions that an accurate measurement 
of greater costs would have to consider the difference between ex ante costs with regard to prescriptive rule-making 
and principles-based regulation. Such an examination would consider the ex ante drafting costs and ex post costs of 
inappropriate, overly broad or narrow application of rules to unanticipated circumstances. Ford argues that it is not 
reasonable to incur ex ante costs of prescriptive rule-making when the regulator is operating under a serious 
information deficit. In comparison, Rubin argues that “open-ended, learning systems are preferred” because in this 
case the regulator “knows the result it is trying to achieve but does not know the means for achieving it”. A regulator 
cannot perfectly achieve corporate compliance, “[i]t is the business of the regulator to try to ensure good compliance 
with law,” with corporations being better situated “to determine appropriate means [to] reach that end.” 
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